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Where the political state has achieved its
full development, man leads a double life,
a heavenly and an earthly life, not only in
thought or consciousness, but in actuality.
In the political community he regards himself
as a communal being, but in civil society he
is active as a private individual, treats
other men as means, reduces himself to a means,
and becomes the plaything of alien powers. The
political state is as spiritual in relation to
civil society as heaven is in relation to earth.
It stands in the same opposition to civil
society, and goes beyond the limitation of the
profane world, that is, by recognising, re¬
establishing, and necessarily allowing itself
to be dominated by it. In his innermost
actuality, in civil society, man is a profane''
being.
KARL MARX, On the Jewish Question
Preface
This study reports an empirical and theoretical
investigation of everyday language. It discusses the
speech of teachers and pupils in a school classroom, from
a 'phenomenological1 point of view.
In recent years, mutually contradictory phenomenolo¬
gical theories of language have been developed, based upon
the works of Schutz and Sartre, whose essentialist readings
of Husserl's explorations in consciousness have been trans¬
lated into theories for the description of everyday speech.
Garfinkel's 'ethnomethodology' follows Schutz in portraying
everyday speakers as sustaining in their talk the appearance
of a shared ' intersubjectivity' or social order, which he
and they presume to be real. On this "optimistic1 view, a
social world shared with others is inescapable. Laing's
'existential psychiatry' follows Sartre in portraying
everyday speakers as sustaining in their talk the appearance
of a unique "subjectivity1 or psychological self, which he
and they presume to be real. On this 'pessimistic' view, a
social world shared with others is unattainable. In con¬
trast, my approach follows Husserl's attempt to suspend
belief in any reality other than that which appears. I
aspire thereby to be 'realistic'.
Til
My approach throws into relief relations between words
which are invisible when attention is focussed on the things
to which words refer. I analyse spoken utterances into
clauses or quasi-clausal units which I call 'pictures1.
Within the speech of a single individual, and more generally,
samenesses and differences can be established between pic¬
tures on the basis of grammatical structure (form), and
vocabulary (content). In the present study, personal pro¬
nouns have been especially important for this purpose. On
this basis 'realms' can be distinguished within everyday
speech 'inhabited' by specific personal pronouns, and
endowed with stable properties, which it is the task of
linguistic phenomenology to investigate.
In these terms I analyse the talk of teachers and the
response of pupils in the classroom setting, using material
gathered during a six month period of participant observa¬
tion. This speech sustains a structure of three realms: a
social order, inhabited by the we, ordered by intelligible,
'rational' rules; a natural order, inhabited by impersonal
figures such as somebody, governed by inexplicit inevitabili¬
ties; and finally a more problematic realm, inhabited by an
I and a you, whose speech to one another entertains alterna-
C-
tive realities in a dialetic. The structure is reminiscent
As.
of the theological realms of 'heaven', 'hell', and 'earth'.
This last realm is for me the reality of ordinary speech, a
reality neglected in previous phenomenologies of language,
which have located reality in the extra-ordinary realms of
social and natural order, 'heaven' and 'hell'.
The same location is made within ordinary speech itself.
A problem crucial to the practice of teaching is the mainte¬
nance of discipline. The skilful teacher solves this
problem by employing extra-ordinary speech to portray a
stable social or natural order, or perhaps a mutually contra¬
dictory combination of the two. In ordinary speech he then
portrays the I and the you present together here and now in
the context of the external social or natural reality. In
IV
theological terms the _! is portrayed as the spokesman on
'earth1 for the 'heavenly' social order, or as the instru¬
ment of the 'hellish' natural order, beyond.
These re-1ms, and the transitions accomplished between
them in language, correspond precisely to the realms and
transitions in consciousness portrayed by Husserl. But
Husserl's investigations are themselves produced in language.
I hypothesise that they may also be found to exist in
Husserl's writing itself. In this case the reference to
'consciousness' is redundant: Husserl's texts can be re¬
read as an exploration in and of language itself, that is,
as exhibiting a linguistic phenomenology.
Analysis shows this to be the case. Husserl's texts
exhibit briefly, the dialectic of ordinary language, from
which the phenomenological reductions make extra-ordinary
departures. His language, like that of the teachers, pur¬
sues the unproblematic certainties of social 'heaven' and
natural 'hell', which once attained can be turned back upon
the problematic 'earth' to order it. From my point of view,
such language falsifies ordinary language, misrepresenting
it to itself: extra-ordinary language covers over the
dialectical flux of ordinary language. Husserl's phenomen¬
ology is uncritical of this extra-ordinary language in
everyday life because it is itself a product of such language.
Linguistic phenomenology must go beyond the limitations of
Husserl's language, in order to be critical of everyday
language itself.
Parts of chapters five and seven are to appear as
"Teachers' Talk and Classroom Discipline" in Explorations
in Classroom Observation, edited by Michael Stubbs and Sara
Delamont, to be published by John Wiley and Sons. A version
of chapter four is to appear, under its present title, in
Life Sentences, edited by Rom Harre, also to be published by
Wiley.
V
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The notion of 'intersubjectivity' was first widely
publicised by Alfred Schutz, though he derived it from the
work of Edmund Husserl. 1Intersubjectivity1 is held to
define the philosophical grounding both for the social
scientist's interpretation of the actions of others and for
his attributed understanding of their interpretations of
one another's actions. The double sense in which the social
scientist employs this notion may be expressed by saying
that for him it has theoreticity.* If he assumes that he
and they assume intersubjectivity as the basis for all
their social interaction, then a we is constituted for him.
In this case, the term defines a closed circle of explana¬
tion: once we are immersed within it, we need never encounter
any reason for emerging. The present text records my attempt
to break out of this circle.
The practical social scientists who work within the
circle of 'intersubjectivity' have been unmoved by recent
2
philosophical criticisms of Schutz's derivation of the term.
Indeed, they have assumed it to be unnecessary to concern
themselves with the philosophical antecedents of the notion.
It is my intention to challenge this assumption, which
amounts to the premise that the philosophical and the
practical are remote from one another. This premise is
one which Schutz has himself investigated. In order to
grasp Schutz's treatment of the problem, I shall consider
the text in which he first systematically developed his
ideas.
In the Phenomenology of the Social World Schutz set
himself the task of providing a rigorous philosophical
underpinning for the methodology of social science.
Believing that thus far Max Weber had made most progress
in this direction, Schutz sought to clarify what Weber
called the 'key concepts of sociology5.
As is well known, Weber begins his series of inter¬
connected definitions with the statement that Sociology is
"a science which attempts the interpretive understanding
of social action, in order thereby to arrive at a causal
3
explanation of its course and effects". Weber thus makes
action, that is behaviour to which the acting individual
"attaches a subjective meaning", the irreducible atomic
unit of sociological enquiry. In particular, he tells us,
the sociologist is concerned with social action, that is
action which "by virtue of the subjective meaning attached
to it by the acting individual (or individuals) ... takes
account of the behavious of others and is thereby oriented
in its course" / This approach exhibits a tendency which
becomes explicit in Talcott Parson's statement that the
"action frame of reference" is analogous to the space/time
frame of reference for physics, in its significance for
sociological explanation.^
Schutz finds this starting-point to be insufficiently
fundamental for his purpose. The concept of 'action', he
says,
- 2 -
by no means defines a primitive ... It is,
on the contrary, a mere labe] for a highly
complex and ramified area that calls for
much further study.^
For Schutz, 'the meaningful act of the individual'
cannot be the basic unit of sociological study, because what
is 'objectively' the 'same' act may have, and generally will
have, different meanings for different individuals and indeed
for the same individual, including the actor himself, on
different occasions. It therefore becomes necessary to
investigate a phenomenon more fundamental than 'action',
namely mean!ng.
At this point, Schutz introduces a distinction unremarked
by Weber, between commonsense and scientific methods of
interpreting the actions of others. He states:
It must be stressed that careful description of
the processes which enable one man to understand
another's thoughts and actions is a prerequisite
for the methodology of the empirical social
sciences. The question how a scientific inter¬
pretation of human action is possible can only
be resolved if an adequate answer is first given
to the question of how man, in the natural
attitude of daily life and common-sense, can
understand another's action at all.'7
Since Weber never made this distinction, his account of
the interpretation of the actions of others has ambigous
status. It is at once a hypothesis as to how action is
actually interpreted, in everyday life, and a methodological
recommendation as to the interpretive procedures to be used
by the social scientist.
For Schutz, the question then becomes: what method can
be used to describe how one man interprets another in the
natural attitude of daily life and common-sense? Schutz
says that the procedure used can be "neither the method of
- 3 -
the empirical social sciences nor the method of common-
g
sense" . He finds the source of such a method, in the
'phenomenology' of Edmund Husserl.
- 4 -
Chapter One
HUSSERL'S TWO PHENOMENOLOGIES OF EVERYDAYNESS
The Idea of Phenomenology
The Idea of Phenomenology} a collection of lectures,
originally delivered by Husserl in 1907, provides a simple
introduction to his phenomenology. In this work, Husserl
polemically identifies the whole of philosophy and science
as previously practised, together with commonsense, as the
'natural attitude' in contrast to which he will define his
own new science of philosophy. He states:
In the natural mode of reflection, we are turned
to the objects as they are given to us each time
. . . even though they are given in different ways,
and in different modes of being ... In perception,
for instance, a thing stands before our eyes as a
matter of course. It is there, among other things,
living or lifeless, animate or inanimate. It is,
in short, within a world of which part is perceived,
... and of which part is contextually supplied by
[our] memory,from whence xt spreads out into the
indeterminate and the unknown ... Our judgements
relate to this world .. We make judgements about
things, their relations, their changes, about the
- 5 -
conditions which functionally determine their
changes, and about the laws of their variations
... We generalise, and then apply again general
knowledge to particular cases, or deduce analy¬
tically new generalisations from general know¬
ledge. Isolated cognitions do not simply follow
each other in the manner of mere succession. They
enter logical relations with each other, they
follow from one another, they support one another,
thereby strengthening their logical power.
Thus far, it would seem, the 'natural attitude' consists of
an elaborate self-fulfilling prophecy. But,
On the other hand, they also clash and contra¬
dict one another. They do not agree with one
another ... and their claim to be cognitions
is discredited ...2
What action do we now take? Do these contradictions
cause us to question the 'natural' attitude?
Where do we look for help? We now weigh the
reasons for different possible ways of deciding
or providing an explanation. The weaker must
give way to the stronger, and the stronger, in
its turn, are of value [only] as long as they
will stand up ... 3
Paradoxically, then, an apparent weakness becomes a
source of strength:
Thus, natural knowledge makes strides ... the
various sciences of.the natural sort come into
being and flourish.
The point which Husserl is making is that under the
'natural' attitude, in science or in commonsense, no distinc¬
tion is acknowledged between the 'different ways' in which
objects are given to us, and their correspondingly different
modes of being. Such a distinction is to be made for example
within what, in the 'natural' attitude we regard as'percep¬
tion', between that part which is 'perceived', and the part
which is 'contextually supplied'. The relation between these
parts is somewhat problematic: yet we never address it. We
- 6 -
confound the two levels together, never seeing any
difficulty in their relationship.
What change in attitude precisely, does Husserl want
to effect? He says,
Let us contrast the natural mode of reflection
with the philosophical. With the awakening of
reflection about the relation of cognition to
its object, abysmal difficulties arise. Cogni¬
tion, the thing most taken for granted in
natural thinking, suddenly emerges as a mystery.
But I must be more exact. What is taken for
granted in natural thinking is the possibility
of cognition. Constantly busy producing results,
advancing from discovery to discovery in newer
and newer branches of science, natural thinking
finds no occasion to raise the question of the
possibility of cognition as such ...
Now. what exactly is this 'question*? Husserl says,
the correlation between cognition as a mental
process, its referent and what objectively is,
. . . is the source of the deepest and most
difficult problems. Collectively, the problem
of cognition.^
So, for Husserl the 'natural1 attitude assumes that
'cognitions' can correspond with what objectively is in the
real world to which those cognitions refer. This is not to
assume that there always is such correspondence: Husserl
has acknowledged that within this attitude the distinction
between true and false cognitions is made. By contrast,
Husserl poses the 'philosophical1 attitude, which makes no
such presumption. Following Husserl, then, I propose to
designate as the problem of philosophy the relation between
the two 'modes of being', which for him is neglected by the
'natural attitude' of commonsense.
- 7 -
In his later writings, Husserl came to elaborate two
distinct ways in which these modes could be investigated.
These were the two famous 1phenomenological reductions',
whereby the world was 'reduced' to the viewpoint of one mode
of being or the other. For an overview of the broader con¬
text of the development of his writings, I can do no better
than to quote Paul Ricoeur's statement:
After the Logical Investigations, Husserl's works
follow two paths. On the one hand, descriptive
themes never cease to be enriched and to overflow
the initial logical framework; on the other hand,
Husserl continues to refine the philosophy of his
method, and thus to mix a phenomenological philo¬
sophy with a phenomenology actually practised ...
The fact is, that the idealist interpretation of
the method does not necessarily coincide with its
actual practise, as many of his disciples have
pointed out.
I propose to focus attention on two texts, respectively
representative of the 'descriptive' and the 'philosophical'
tendencies within Husserl's work, namely the Ideas, published
in 1913? and the Cartesian Meditations, published in 1929-
Apart from the fact that they are the best-known writings
g
of Husserl's middle period, each of these presents a
'phenomenology of the social world'.
Immanentism
The Ideas in fact begins with an account of the social
world, prior to the definition of the phenomenological
reduction itself. In section 27, entitled "The World of the
Natural Standpoint: I and my World about Me", Husserl states:
Our first outlook upon life is that of natural
human beings, imagining, judging, feeling,
willing, 'from the natural standpoint'. Let
us make clear to ourselves what this means in
the form of simple meditations which we can
best carry on in the first person.
- 8 -
I am aware of a world, spread out in space end¬
lessly, and in time becoming and become, without
end. I am aware of it, that mea-s first of all,
I discover it immediately, intuitively, I exper¬
ience it. Through sight, touch, hearing, etc.,
in the different ways of sensory perception,
corporeal things somehow spatially distributed
are for me simply there, in verbal or figurative
sense "present" whether or not I pay them special
attention by busying myself with them, consider¬
ing, thinking, feeling, willing. ... [l]t is not
necessary that they and other objects likewise
should be present precisely in my field of
perception. For me real objects are there,
definite, more or less familiar, agreeing with
what is actually perceived without being them¬
selves perceived or even intuitively present ...
I find myself at all times, and without my ever
being able to change this, set in relation to a
world which, through constant changes, remains
one and ever the same ... It is then to this
world ... that the complex forms of my ... con¬
sciousness stand related ... Related to it like¬
wise are the diverse acts and states of sentiment
and disapproval, joy and sorrow ... decision and
action. All these, together with the sheer acts
of the Ego, in which I become acquainted with the
world as immediately given to me, ... are included
under the one Cartesian expression: Cogito.9
Thus I live in the Cogito, according to Husserl in this
descriptive analysis. Should I step back and reflect upon
'my' experiences, then an Ego arises as an object for the
Cogito: but that Cogito itself is not reflected upon, not
an object for thought. I can by reflection, step aside
from the natural attitude, into one of many other realms of
thought, e.g. that of arithmetic:
The arithmetic world is there for me only when
and so long as I occupy the arithmetic stand¬
point, But the natural world ... is constantly
there for me, so long as I live naturally, and
look in its direction.*0
"The two worlds are present together, but disconnected", says
Husserl.
Now it is within the 'natural1 world, that I
- 9 -
comprehend other people. Within the 'natural attitude'
" whatever holds good for me personally". Husserl states,
"also holds good, as I know, for all other men whom I find
present in my world-about-me".^ Under this attitude, the
world that is simply there for me is the same world that is
simply there for all other men; and in this case a we arises.
we come to understandings with our neighbours,
and set up in common an objective spatio-temporal
fact-world as the world about us that is there
for us all, and to which we ourselves nonetheless
1 ?
belong.
The presumption of a world simply there, one and the
same world for us all, Husserl now characterises as "the
general thesis of the natural standpoint". This thesis is
not a proposition, a judgement, or an assertion. Rather, it
is prior to and assumed tacitly within every proposition,
judgement, assertion, theory, formulated within the 'natural'
attitude of commonsense.
Wishing to distance himself from the 'natural' stand¬
point which he has delineated, Husserl now defines his own
standpoint with reference to the 'general thesis'. Such a
new standpoint is only possible because he has expressed
explicitly what could never be expressed within the natural
attitude itself.
The new attitude may be anticipated in the light of
Husserl's earlier argument. Under the 'natural' attitude,
cognitions were judged to be 'true' or 'false', judgements
which, in either case, took for granted the possibility of
cognition. By contrast, in the 'philosophical' attitude,
Husserl told us, no such correspondence could be presumed
possible.Similarly in his new formulation of the matter in
Ideas, Husserl wants to abstain from all judgements as to the
truth or falsity of the 'general thesis of the natural stand¬
point' . He engages in an epoche, an 'abstinence' from or
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'bracketing' of this attitude, which he calls the
phenomenological epoche, and so reaches a new stance.
The new stance involves, so Husserl claims, a radical
scepticism towards the claims made by the 'natural1 sciences,
a category which would of course include all non-phenomeno-
logical 'social' or 'human' sciences. He declares that
all sciences which relate to the natural world,
though they stand never so firm to me, though
they fill me with wondering admiration, though
I am far from any thought of objecting to them
in the least degree, 1^ make no use of their
standards.^ 3
Why is this? Consider one such standard. 'Natural'
sciences of all kinds have often laid claim to the title of
'positivism': the claim to rest their arguments on a firm
'position'. ^ But Husserl says,
If, by 'positivism' we are to mean the absolutely
unbiassed grounding of all science on what is
'positive', i.e. on what can be primordially
apprehended, then it is we who are the true
positivists.1^
The core reason for this is, that the so-called positivists
of the 'natural' sciences do not set out to explicate the
constitutive assumptions of their own way of seeing the world:
they are therefore far from being unbiassed and presupposition-
less, as they claim to be.
On what basis does Husserl's claim to a firm 'position'
rest, at this stage? He defines the philosophical status of
this position in section 46 of the book, entitled "Indubita-
bility of Immanent, Dubitability of Transcendent Perception",
where he states
The thesis of my pure Ego and its personal life,
which is 'necessary' and plainly indubitable,
thus stands opposed to the thesis of the world,
which is 'contingent'.
- 11 -
The Ego here referred to is defined as "the stream of
experience of the one who is thinking". It is ever-present.
Therefore, echoing Descartes1 expression, Husserl says, "I
say forthwith and because I must, I. am, this life is, I live,
17
cogito".
In the analysis of Ideas, then, the focus of Husserl's
attention has become 'the stream of experience of the one who
is thinking: this is immanent, and so indubitable. By
contrast, what has been bracketed away, the transcendent and
so dubitable, is the world common to all, presumed under the
thesis of the 'natural8 standpoint. All intersubjective,
transcendental knowledge, therefore is to be bracketed, and
the phenomenologist is to address his attention to what is
unique and personal in his own subjective life.
Transcendentalism
Consider now, by contrast, the account of the social
world given by Husserl in his theoretical phenomenological
study, the Cartesian Meditations. For in section 8, Husserl
tells us that the ego cogito , if Descartes' method is
followed correctly, is not the immanent ego, the concrete
person who 'has' my experiences, but is the transcendental
ego, the 'apodictic1 being which is 'antecedent to the
being of the world'. How is this being revealed, discovered,
from within my experience? By now carrying out another,
second reduction, over and above the phenomenological
reduction of Ideas, a transcendental reduction. In the
first reduction, I abstained from judging whether I posited
a world 'out there' corresponding to my experiences. I was
left, then, merely contemplating my consciousness per se.
Now I further abstain from judging whether I posit an _E
'out there', the possessor of experiences which I regard as
'mine'.
It is necessary to guard against a possible misinter-
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pretation of this procedure. The first epoche did not
involve any disbelief in the external world, nor any
forgetting of my experiences about that world. It rather
involved taking up a new attitude which treated 'my
experiences' as the object of enquiry in its own right.
Similarly, the second epoche involves no disbelief in my
experiences, nor any forgetting of the content of those
experiences. It too involves a new attitude, which treats
'experience' as the object of enquiry in its own right.
Husserl explains:
the philosophically reflective ego's abstention
from position-takings, his depriving them of
acceptance, does not signify their disappearance
from his field of experience. The concrete sub¬
jective experiences, let us repeat, are indeed
the things to which his attentive regard is
directed, but the ... philosophising Ego prac¬
tises abstention with regard to what he intuits
... [Ejverything meant in such accepting or
positing ... is still retained completely, but
... [as] 'mere phenomenon1.^
The key to understanding this unfamiliar recommendation, lies
I believe in Husserl's choice of the word 'reflective'.
Within the transcendental attitude, the philosophical attitude,
I examine my'subjective' experiences, certainly (what else can
I ever do?) but not with a view to finding out about the
uniqueness of my subjective consciousness as was my concern
in the immanent attitudes, but rather with a view to finding
out about consciousness per se, that is, about necessary
features of all possible subjective experience.
It may therefore be misleading of Husserl to employ the
term 'transcendental ego', as if this were a subject. For it
is not an empirically existing subject in the sense that the
cogito of Ideas was an empirically existing subject. The
notion of a unique 'transcendental ego' is a contradiction,
as if my transcendental ego were different to yours. For, if
- 13 -
this knowledge is knowledge held by any possible subjecti¬
vity , then plainly it is held by all -objectivities. It is
this argument which Husserl undertakes in the most famous
passage from his Cartesian Meditations, the concluding
"Fifth Meditation".*''
First,then, consider the argument with which Husserl
opens this meditation. It is a defence against the charge,
that transcendental phenomenology is in fact transcendental
solipsism. Husserl sets out to answer this charge, by
providing a transcendental phenomenological account of how
it is possible to apprehend other people in the social
world. He observes that, in the multiplicity of ways in
which I apprehend others, two stand out. On the one
hand, I experience them as objects 'in' the world. On the
other hand, I experience them as subjects 'for' the world,
as experiencing the same world that I experience, and in so
doing experiencing me too, even as I experience the world
and others in it. Now, he asks, how is it that the latter
way of apprehending the other, as subjectivity, arises?
In a circuitous answer to this question, Husserl first
re-considers how it is possible for me to apprehend what is
my own. Within the transcendental sphere that is, wherein
I am already considering features of any possible subjecti¬
vity, I am now to enquire, how can my subjectivity be
apprehended? In other words, I am investigating features
of any possible my-ness. I can conceive of this my-ness,
he argues, by carrying out a third reduction. In effect,
it is a repeat of the first, phenomenological reduction,
observed from within the reflective standpoint attained by
the second.
This third epoche is a bracketing-off of all that is
alien to my I alone, i.e. all references to 'others', such
as cultural objects, everything belonging to the surrounding
world being capable of belonging to everyone, not simply to
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1^. This leaves behind, so Husserl argues, a 'unitary,
founding stratum', a 'monad', comprising 'my1 nature,
animate organism, sensations, functioning organs, psychic
life. This monad he calls the human ego. But this ego is
not the entirety of the transcendental sphere. What is the
other-ness which was, temporarily, bracketed off? How do I
apprehend this sphere? Husserl now suggests, that I constitute
a human ego not as I myself but as mirrored in my own human Ego,
an 'alter ego' : a mirroring of my own self, an analogue, a
pairing.
By means of this procedure, Husserl now argues that the
problem of 'solipsism1 has been overcome: the charge was
unwarranted: transcendental phenomenology can account for our
understanding of other people.
The 'pairing', 'mirror-image' notion explicates precisely
the logical argument each of us must pursue to engage in
social interaction with other people at all. In simple terms
the procedure amounts to the assumption that others are 'like'
ourselves. But, Husserl's two analyses permit greater
precision than this. For a genuinely transcendental inter-
subjectivity, the 'likeness' that is involved is not some
sort of vague resemblance between two empirically different
psychological individuals. Such a claimed resemblance would
in fact be false: for according to the presumptions of the
immanent phenomenology which investigates these empirical
psychologies, each may be unique. Rather, this 'likeness1 is
an exact identity, as between the necessary (and necessarily
shared) features of any possible subjectivity. Such a claimed
resemblance is true and indeed is for Husserl the only truth
worthy of the name in its full sense. It follows, then, that
insofar as transcendental phenomenology has not yet become
part of the everyday consciousness of all society's members,
then we live in a less than fully 'true' society: a society
which remains false, fulfilling less than its true potential,
to the extent that its members believe and daily act on the
belief in their dealings with one another, that their
- 15 -
actuality corresponds with their potentiality.
Husserl explores the logic of this argument through
his "Fifth Meditation", designating as "'higher order
intersubjectivities1 those in which men become progressively
more aware of one another's mutual orientedness. The beginn¬
ing of this progression, which Husserl designates as the
"First Objectivity" is simply the 'natural' world as it was
described in Ideas, under the assumption of the 'general
thesis of the natural standpoint'. It is characterised by
the assumption, on each person's part, that the same nature,
the same world, exists for all others as exists for me,
with the allowance that for you it appears "as if I were
20
standing over there". This nature, this world, is
constituted by each as 'the same' for all: "an identical
21
intentional object of separate conscious processes".
Progression to higher order intersubjectivities is
possible, however insofar as the transcendental possibilities
become immanent. That is, insofar as each monad becomes
aware of others as aware of himself, as aware of possible
as well as actual others, themselves aware of possible and
actual others and so on. It might seem that the ramifying
complexities could continue indefinitely, but for Husserl
this is not the case. There is, rather, a Utopian single
community of monads, characterised by a specially developed
form of reciprocated sociality, which marks the end-point,
the telos of this process, conceived historically. Husserl
describes it in this way:
Actually, therefore, there can exist only a single
community of monads, the community of all co¬
existing monads. Hence, there can exist only one
Objective world, only one Objective time, only one
Objective space, only one Objective Nature.^2
The pursuit of this one world is furthered by transcendental
phenomenology which is nothing else than "an all-embracing
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self-investigation"
In other words: the path leading to a knowledge
absolutely grounded in the highest sense, or
(this being the same thing) a philosophical
knowledge, is necessarily the path of universal
self-knowledge - first of all monadic, and then
intermonadic. We can also say that a radical
and universal continuation of Cartesian medita¬
tions, or (equivalently) a universal self-
cognition, is philosophy itself and encompasses
all self-accountable science. The Delphic motto
"Know thyself" has gained a new signification
. ^
Transcendental phenomenology can clarify the nature of
this goal, and the steps which must be taken towards its
attainment. The goal and the steps involve the deepening
self-knowledge of man, a knowledge which takes a pre-assigned
form, and so is amenable to a scientific analysis. Thus the
conclusion of the Cartesian Meditations opens up a vista
running from the immanentism of Ideas to the transcendental¬
ism of his later position - a journey which it is man's
historical destiny to complete.
Realism
Perhaps Husserl's utopia is too clinical for comfort.
But if one is sceptical as to the culmination of his
historical process, then the "Fifth Meditation" becomes
suggestive as an exploration of modes of sociality in society
2 5
short of the telos. A range of such modes can be conceived
in a world in which each member is engaged in ascribing a
'sameness', a 'pairing' to the others which differs from the
ones others are ascribing to him. Three are explicitly
explored by Husserl. First the mundane, or 'natural' attitude
is subjected to critique in both of his studies, but is
recognisably the same phenomenon in each. Secondly, the
immanentist attitude is explored in some detail in Ideas, as
an alternative to the 'natural' view. Thirdly the trans¬
cendentalist attitude, in its fully developed form, is
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presented in the Meditations where it stands in contrast
to both of its predecessors.
Husserl, of course, has devoted most attention to
exploring the two extremes. In comparison he has neglected
to articulate the standpoint of the mundane world itself.
But his investigations throw light on this problem. Consider
the standpoint of the mundane individual. Such an individual
believes in the objectivity of the external world, and believes
that consciousnesses can correspond to it, though not necessar¬
ily that they actually do. Thus he recognises that empirically
a gap may exist, either between consciousness and reality, or
between consciousness and consciousness, but he believes that
this need not be the case. He thus postulates as his utopia
a state of affairs in which full correspondence between
consciousnesses and world exists. If this is his 'heaven',
then his 'hell' is by contrast a world in which correspondence
exists neither between consciousness and consciousness nor
between consciousness and world.
But it is the immanentist consciousness which gives rise
to the mundane vision of hell, with the necessary additional
feature, to preserve it as hell, that its occupants know that
they are there. More precisely, its members are sceptical as
to the possibility of correspondence either between conscious¬
ness and consciousness or between world and consciousness, and
therefore the remedies open to the mundane consciousness are
denied them.
Likewise, it is the transcendentalist consciousness which
gives rise to the mundane heaven, again with the necessary
additional feature, to preserve it as heaven, that its
occupants know that they are there. More precisely, they are
certain of the correspondence between consciousness and
consciousness, and so any possible consciousness, and so, the
world.
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From the mundane viewpoint, the nmmanentist vision
is pessimistic, and the transcendentalist vision is
optimistic. Neither could Lc the basis for a realistic
investigation of everyday life. Each is an escape from the
historical pursuit of rationality, the first by a denial of
the possibility of such rationality, the second by a
complacent assertion that it has been attained. Rather
than escaping problematic everyday life for one or other of
these unproblematic visions, the problem is to extricate
consciousness from these visions and bring it back down to
earth. It is with this aim in mind that I propose to
pursue the investigations of the phenomenologists.
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Chapter Two
THE OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM OF SCHUTZ AND SARTRE
Life versus thought in Schutz
Schutz's use of the method of phenomenology to advance
upon Weber's account of action centres on a single distinc¬
tion. "Weber", states Schutz, "makes no distinction between
the action, considered as something in progress, and the
completed act".* Schutz distinguishes these two as 'life'
and 'thought1, in the following terms:
Thought is focussed on the objects of the spatio-
temporal world; life pertains to duration. The
tension between the two is of the essence of the
smeaningfulness1 of experience. It is misleading
to say that experiences have meaning ... Rather,
those experiences are meaningful which are grasped
reflectively. The meaning is the way in which Ego
regards its experience. The meaning lies in the
attitude of the Ego towards that part of its
stream of consciousness which has already flowed
by. 2
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This distinction seems familiar. For Schutz as for
Husserl, the ongoing immersion in life of the immanent,
'psychological ego' is contrasted with the reflective, time¬
less detachment of the 'transcendental ego'. But, Husserl
himself was not consistent as to his own location within
this distinction: in one work he takes up, methodologically,
an immanentist position: in the other, he takes up metho¬
dologically a transcendentalist position. I have proposed,
in opposition to each of these, a realist position.
It is of some importance to establish what position
Schutz himself adopts. 'Lived experience', for Schutz, is
rich and complex, but it can never apprehend itself. All
apprehension of it takes place at the level of reflected
thought. This applies to the man-in-the-street thinking
about his experiences as much as it does to the phenomeno-
logist theorising about experience in general. 'Thought'
takes place at the level of reflection. Experience,
regrettable though it may be, cannot be grasped and is
always elusive: this is its very nature. But if these two
are to be distinguished as transcendent reality versus
immanent appearance, which is which? Here is a surprising
reversal of the analysis of Husserl: it is experience which
is real, whereas thought presents only the appearance of
this reality. By contrast, in the developed viewpoint of
Husserl's Meditations, experience grasped the mere immanent
appearance of a reality knowable only in thought.
Intersub.j ectivity
In the light of this distinction, consider now Schutz's
treatment of the problem of understanding other people. He
distinguishes two cases. On the one hand, there is the case
where I read about or hear about the actions of another
person, without being there myself. In this case, obviously
I have to deal in judgements about the other: my knowledge
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is and remains a knowledge of types. But there is another
case, namely that of face-to-face interaction, where I
directly observe the ongoing actions of the other as they
occur. Here, says Schutz, we meet in lived experience. A
special and precise form of knowledge of the other person
is here possible. Schutz portrays the situation in this way:
Since he is confronting me in person, the range of
symptoms by which I apprehend his consciousness
includes much more than what he is communicating
to me purposefully. I observe his movements,
gestures, and facial expressions. I hear the
intonation and the rhythm of his utterances. Each
phase of my consciousness is co-ordinated with a
phase of my partner's. Since I perceive the con¬
tinuous manifestations of my partner's conscious
life, I am continuously attuned to it. One highly
important consequence of this state of affairs is
that my partner is given to me more vividly and in
a sense more 'directly' than I apprehend myself.
Since I'know' my past, I 'know' myself in infinitely
greater detail than anyone else. Yet this is know¬
ledge in retrospect, in reflection: it is not direct
and vivid experience. Hence, while I am straight¬
forwardly engaged in the business of life, my own
self is not present to me in an equally wide range
of symptoms as is a fellow-man whom I confront in
the Here and Now of a concrete We-relation.3
In this We-relation, Schutz states that a sharing of lived-
experience occurs, that we 'grow older together'. This
relationship then has a special importance, neglected by
all those social theorists who conceive of social relation¬
ships purely on the reflective level, in terms of types.
For Schutz, this apprehension of the other is not the outcome
of reflection or judgment. It is 'pre-predicative', to use
Husserl's term. In direct experience, I apprehend what the
other says and does as he does so. I experience this ongoing
action as 'his' stream of consciousness, his lived experience.
I live through my own stream of experience but I do not
experience it as 'mine', though I could do so by disengaging
from the shared lived experience and engaging in a private
reflection. In everyday experience we believe that we know
when the other's attention wanders in this way. But when
attention is reciprocated, we experience an interweaving of
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subjectivities in a single stream: not rrr^ intersubjectivity,
nor yours, but ours: this is intersub jectivity.
Plainly, this state of affairs can be located within
the range of alternative visions of the social world por¬
trayed by Husserl. It is the world in which men are "certain
of the correspondence between consciousness and consciousness,
and so any possible consciousness, and so, the world"It
is, then, the world which Husserl portrayed in his Cartesian
Meditations as the utopian telos of history, the end-of-the
world vision, of a society in which all men are transcendental
phenomenologists, and apprehend one another as such. But now,
what status does Schutz ascribe to this world? Is it, perhaps,
an ideal vision of an interpersonal relationship which we
occasionally glimpse, perhaps in a fleetingly intimate sharing
of understanding with another person whom we know deeply, even
love? Or is it, less optimistically, a vision of a relation¬
ship unattainable in the fallen state of our present society,
a picture of social life in a yet-to-be-attained utopia, or
with God in the Kingdom of Heaven? Not so, for Schutz. For
Schutz, this we-relationship is not hard to attain. It is
indeed impossible to avoid, insofar as we engage in any
social encounter, however brief, with another person. The
we-relationship, according to Schutz, characterises our
everyday dealings with all other members of our society.
For Schutz, it is the 'natural' attitude of everyday life.
In Schutz, Husserl's transcendentalist vision has been
made immanent."* One implication of this is particularly
crucial for my argument. For Husserl the utopia was to be
attained, historically, through the discipline of thought.
For Schutz by contrast, this utopia is already available
in the indiscipline of experience. Whereas Husserl's
rationalist vision implies the necessity of changing society,
Schutz's irrationalist vision implies the impossibility of
doing so. For Schutz, we already live in the best of all




Intersubjectivity is not the only reality which Schutz
explores. Inspired by the a^«_ount of 'multiple realities'
given by William James,^ Schutz suggests that
there are several, probably an infinite number of
various orders of realities, each with its own
special and separate style of esistence[:] the
world of sense of physical things, the world of
science, ... the worlds of sheer madness and
vagary. The popular mind conceives of all these
... more or less disconnectedly, and when dealing
with one of them forgets for the time being its
relations to the rest. But every object we think
of is ... referred to one of these subworldsJ
Schutz refers to these 'orders of realities' as finite
provinces of meaning. Examples he suggests would be 'wide-
awakeness', 'dreams', 'film', the world of a 'novel', the
worlds of 'science', and so on. Each one of us encounters
very many different provinces of meaning during the course of
a day, and the shift from one to another is experienced, in
Kierkegaard's term, as an existential 'shock', or 'leap'.
(I am writing at my typewriter, for instance, absorbed in my
work, when there is a knock on the door). These provinces
may be distinguished by means of several parameters of which
two are pre-eminent for the purposes of the present argument.
These are 'accent of reality', and 'mode of sociality'.
The notion of a specific 'accent of reality' is one which
James himself put forward, and it has an intuitive significance
in for example the comparison between 'joking' and 'serious'
talk. But Schutz is able to give it a more precise sense. He
proposes adapting Husserl's methodological notion, that we may
regard each accent of reality as sustained by a specific
epoche of its own. This idea is highly suggestive because it
promises to enable Husserl's immanent and transcendent realms,
to be located in relation to everyday experience. What then
of the reality which Husserl considered to be the core of
everyday experience itself, the 'natural' attitude? Schutz
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suggests that this attitude should be considered a finite
province of meaning, one of special importance. He
discusses its epoche as follows:
Phenomenology has taught us the concept of the
phenomenological epoche, the suspension of our
belief in the world as a device to overcome the
natural attitude by radicalising the Cartesian
method of philosophical doubt. The suggestion
may be ventured that man within the natural
attitude also uses a specific epoche, of course
quite another one than the phenomenologist. He
does not suspend belief in the outer world and
its objects, but on the contrary, he suspends
doubt in its existence. What he puts in brackets
is the doubt that the world and its objects might
be otherwise than it appears to him. We propose
to call this epoche, the epoche of the natural
attitude. °
Schutz, then defines the epoche of the natural attitude as
the diametric opposite of the phenomenological epoche. But
which phenomenological epoche is this? It is, of course,
none other than the immanentist reduction of Husserl's
Ideas, the suspension of the 'general thesis of the natural
standpoint'. What, then, is the epoche of the natural
attitude? Man within the 'natural attitude' for Schutz,
suspends doubt that the world might be otherwise than it
appears: not only to him as one individual, but to any
individual, since this 'natural' attitude is intersubjective.
But this does not refer to the mundane world as I have
q
defined it - within that world, issues of 'truth' and
'falsity' are burning topics of conversation. It is,rather,
the epoche of the transcendentalist stance, wherein corres¬
pondence between consciousness and consciousness, any
consciousness, and so with world, is presumed. Thus it is
confirmed that in Schutz's vision the 'natural' attitude
is what is for Husserl the attitude of transcendentalism.
But now a broader conclusion follows. For, having
defined his two polar opposite provinces of meaning, with
reference to their accents bf reality, Schutz now proceeds
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to make this opposition the principle of organisation
of all provinces of meaning: an organisation which I
prefer to call a structure.^ ^ He states that the specific
epoche governing each and every other province of meaning
can be considered as a further epoche applied to that of
the natural attitude,
which suspend belief in more and more layers of
the reality of daily life, putting them in
brackets.
Clearly this process cannot continue indefinitely, but will
terminate when the existence of the external world itself
is put in brackets, namely, when it reaches the immanentist
reduction explored by Ilusserl in Ideas. Thus, implicit
within Schutz's analysis, is a theory as to the constitution
of reality within the world of daily life, a theory which
complements and extends Husserl's account to a greater extent
than Schutz himself appeared to realise. It is that
Husserl's 'immanentist' and 'transcendentalist' spheres
define the extreme possibilities of a continuum of provinces
of meaning ranging from the philosophical to the practical,
all of which are available to the adventurous consciousness.
Consider now Schutz's notion of 'mode of sociality'.
For Schutz, as has been shown, the 'natural' attitude, which
in this respect corresponds to Husserl's transcendentalist
vision, is characterised by intersubjectivity, the fullest
form of communication possible with others. The opposite
pole of the continuum, which in this respect corresponds to
Husserl's immanentist reduced realm, is characterised by the
least degree of communication possible with others. But to
give a clear characterisation of this'least degree of
communication' presents difficulties. For if in the
immanentist realm I experience only my unique subjectivity,
then I can presumably communicate nothing of it to you: if
I claim to do so, do I not thereby deny its claimed unique¬
ness? Is it in fact possible to communicate clearly the
details of any 'province of meaning' one of whose character-
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istics is that, within it, less than completely clear
communication is possible? Schutz himself shows ambiguity
over this issue. His tendency is, in fact, to argue that
communication is only possible at all within the inter-
subjective 'natural1 attitude, but then to retreat from
this position with somewhat ambiguous qualifications.
Consider three of these arguments.
First, Schutz asserts repeatedly - it is perhaps his
most famous slogan - that the world is 'from the outset' an
intersubjective world. We are - all of us - born into the
world of the 'natural' attitude, and that is where we remain,
in all our interpersonal dealings, throughout our lives,
unless we take specific steps to the contrary. The everyday
intersubjecfcive world is portrayed as a trouble-free zone:
it is hard to understand why anyone would want to leave it.
The practical man, getting on with the business of living
would have no reason to do so. Only people engaging in
psychological and philosophical speculations - people
enquiring, perhaps into the 'phenomenology of the social
world', or into other esoteric problems - would wish to do
so. "The natural attitude", Schutz tells us,
does not know these problems. To it, the world
is from the outset not the private world of the
single individual, but an intersubjective world,
common to all of us, in which we have not a ^
theoretical, but an eminently practical interest.
This is perhaps the weakest of the statements of the problem
which is found in Schutz, in this sense: it does not rule out
communication in other realms, but portrays such communication
as a disturbance to the smooth-running world of everyday life.
Schutz's second formulation hinges on the question of
language. He argues, that language per se pertains to the
intersubjective world of the 'natural' attitude, and as such
"obstinately resists serving as a vehicle for meanings which
1
transcend its own presuppositions". This implies that
thought is for Schutz something quite other than language.
The former is private, the latter public.
This distinction will plainly pose problems for the prac¬
tise of any proposed social science, or social philosophy,
for it denies the possibility of any specialist language
able to sustain a 'province of meaning1 other than that of
everyday life. This denial implies that for Schutz the
status of his own writing, like that of any other writing,
is that of the 'natural attitude1 as he defines it. in
the term I earlier employed, this attitude has theoreti-
city for him.^' I propose, by contrast, that from the
mundane standpoint as I have defined it, Schutz articulates
the view as seen from the unrealistic vision of heaven. As
against this utopianism, it is already possible to venture
an alternative suggestion. If as I have suggested, the
everyday world should be correctly located at neither
immanentist nor transcendentalist extreme, but at a point
from which both can be entertained, then perhaps language
should be acknowledged to belong in itself to neither
extreme, but to be capable of conjuring up either possibil¬
ity. Schutz*s language would then stand as an example of
language conjuring up one of these, namely, the utopia of
transcendentalism.
Schutz's third formulation is his strongest. In the
posthumously published writing entitled, The Problem of
Relevance, he asserts, that "the level of reality consti¬
tuted by our working acts gearing into the outer world",
that is, the 'natural1 attitude,
is the paramount reality because only within it
are sociality and intrahuman communication at
all possible.^ 5
It is interesting that, in an editorial note at this point,
R.M. Zaner states, "This sentence was marked for deletion".
Schutz, it seems, was unhappy with this statement which seems
to impose an implausible straitjacket on the possibilities of
the social world. But, I propose, within the terms of the
position which he had set out to explore, he had no
alternative but to make it.
The Solitary Scientist
Schutz's importance is as a philosopher of social
science. Where, then, is the social scientist located
1 Q
within his scheme? This location ha^ recently been sub-
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jected to critique by Barry Hindess, who is incensed by
Schutz's argument that the social scientist is engaged in
no more than the construction of yet another province of
meaning, given Schutz's account of the relations between
such provinces. This is, that
Consistency and compatibility of experience ...
merely within the borders of the particular
province of meaning to which those experinnces
belong. By no means will that which is compa¬
tible within the province of meaning P be also
compatible within the province of meaning Q.
On the contrary, seen from P, supposed to be
real, Q and all the experiences belonging to it
would appear as merely fictitious, inconsistent
and incompatible, and vice versa.
Hindess is disturbed by the implications of a position which,
he says, portrays "a world in which there can be no science
1 9of history and no rational politics". Hindess diagnoses
Schutz's failing as 'psychologism'. To make his interpret¬
ation, he takes note of this remark by Schutz:
The finite provinces of meaning are not separated
states of the mental life in the sense that pass¬
ing from one to another would require a transmi¬
gration of the soul and a complete extinction of
memory and consciousness by death ... They are
merely names for different tensions of one and
the same consciousness ... experiences in various
provinces can be remembered and reproduced. And
that is why they can be communicated in ordinary
language.
Hindess concludes, "Thus relationships between the provinces
of history and of social science [or, social science and
everyday life, B.T.] exist only in the consciousness of the
knowing subject - or in books or papers that he may have
2 1
written". But relationships in consciousness, and in
books, and papers, for that matter, are precisely the topic
of Schutz's, and of any phenomenological, enquiry. To dismiss
the search for such relationships as 'psychologism* per se
- 29 -
is to portray a world in which there can be no science of
consciousness, and no rational books or papers. I propose
rather to pursue such a science, and such a rationality by
criticising the account of these relationships which Schutz
has produced.
What, then, is Schutz's account of the relationship
between the 'natural' attitude of everyday life on the one
hand, and the attitude of 'social science' on the other?
Schutz discusses this problem at numerous points throughout
his work. In the Phenomenology of the Social World, he put
it this way:
All scientific knowledge of the social world is
indirect: it is knowledge of the world of con¬
temporaries and the world of predecessors, never
of the world of immediate social reality. Accord¬
ingly, the social sciences can understand man in
his everyday social life not as a living individual
person with a unique consciousness but only as a
personal ideal type without duration [of lived
experience, B.T. ] or spontaneity. They can under¬
stand him only as existing within an impersonal
and anonymous objective time which no one ever has,
or ever can, experience. ... Since the social
sciences ... never actually encounter real people
but deal only in personal ideal types, it is not
the social scientist's function to understand the
subjective meaning of another's action.^"
It is often assumed that as a 'phenomenological social
philosopher', Schutz advocated a 'phenomenological social
science'. Nothing could be further from the truth. In his
view, expressed in this early work and unchanged throughout
his life, the social scientist's task was the specification
of the 'objective meaning contexts of subjective meaning
contexts', and of all the social sciences economics most
perfectly exemplified this ideal:
In our view, pure economics is a perfect example
of an objective-meaning complex about subjective
meaning-complexes, in other words, of an objective
meaning-configuration stipulating the typical and
invariant subjective experiences of anyone who
acts within an economic framework.^3
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Such a social science plainly aspires to transcendentalism
- an account of the necessary conditions of any possible
experience in the given social situation - but then it is
only describing a state which everyday life has already
achieved. Whereas Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is
out in front, criticising the 'natural' attitude for its lack
of self-knowledge, Schutz's social science is one step behind.
Its task is to celebrate the self-knowledge exhibited by
everyday life, exemplified by the predictability of subjective
experience within the present economic order. Even this task
it can only perform imperfectly.^^
There seems little doubt, then, as to the location of
social science within the range of provinces of meaning as
Schutz defines it: the solitary scientist has retreated from
the transcendent reality of life to the immanent appearance
of thought. This conclusion is reiterated in Schutz's later
discussions of this problem. He develops one further
implication which is crucial for the present argument. This
arises from a consideration of the social scientist's account
of human beings in the social world. Schutz tells us that
the theoretical thinker while remaining in the
theoretical attitude cannot experience origin-
arily and grasp in immediacy the world of every¬
day life within which I and you, Peter and Paul,
anyone and everyone have confused and ineffable
perceptions, act, work, plan, worry, hope, are
born, grow up, and will die, in a word live their
life ... in their full humanity. This world
eludes the immediate grasp of the theoretical
social scientist. ^
2 6He "has to build up an artificial device", the method of
the social sciences, which substitutes for the intersubjective
life-world a model of this world:
This model, however, is not peopled with human
beings in their full humanity, but with puppets,
with types: they are constructed as though they
could perform working actions and reactions . . .
Of course, these working actions and reactions
are merely fictitious: ... they are only assigned
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to these puppets by the grace of the scientist
I shall propose that this conception has a wider importance
than it is granted by Schutz. For if it is the case, as I
shall argue, that the range of provinces of meaning which
Schutz has defined is, in fact, available to all of us
within everyday language itself, then it may be suggested
that the theoretical construction of models, peopled with
puppets, is not the exclusive achievement of the solitary
social scientist, but is rather practised by us all, insofar
as within our speech we refer to other persons, or even to
ourselves.
In this case, Schutz's account of the relations between
provinces of meaning can indeed be criticised as 'psychologis-
tic1, but in a way which offers in its place a constructive
alternative. Such an alternative would be an account of
these relations as 'linguistic'. It would understand these
relations not as a property of the mind of the individual
thinker, but as the outcome of the social practise of
speakers, an understanding which would indeed promise to be
rational, and perhaps even scientific.
Life versus thought in Sartre
I now want to consider the social philosophy of Jean-
Paul Sartre, which is widely regarded as radically incompat-
o O
ible with that of Schutz, not least by Schutz himself.
But I shall argue that it presents an account of the same
structure of provinces of meaning, viewed from the opposite
standpoint. The possibility of Sartre's standpoint is
contained within that of Schutz, and vice-versa. This arises
from the fact that both stem from a common origin, namely
Husserl.
Despite the differences, a striking similarity appears
in the discussions of consciousness by Schutz and by Sartre.
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A passage from Sartre's early work, The Transcendence of
the Ego states
[Tjranscendental consciousness is an impersonal
spontaneity. It determines our existence at
each instant, without our being able to conceive
anything before it. Thus each instant of our
conscious life reveals to us a creation ex. nihilo.
Not a new arrangement, but a new existence. There
is something distressing for each of us, to catch
in the act this tireless creation of existence of
which w£ are not the creators. At this level, man
has the impression of ceaselessly escaping from
himself, of overflowing himself, of being surprised
by riches which are always unexpected.-9
Sartre explicitly identifies conscious experience as
transcendental, an identification which had to be extracted
from Schutz despite himself. Sartre vividly suggests the
richness of this ongoing flow of time. However, this
consciousness is never, in his view, empty. "Consciousness
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is always consciousness of something". An example of such
consciousness of a thing is Sartre's presentation, in his
early novel Nausea, of his hero Roquentin's encounter with
an object on the sea-shore:
Knotty, inert, nameless, it fascinated me, filled
my eyes, brought me back unceasingly to its own
existence ... I saw clearly that you could not
pass from its function as a root, as a sujiction
pump, to that, to that hard and thick skin of a
sea-lion, to this oily, callous, stubborn look.
The function explained nothing. The root with
its colour, shape, its congealed movement, was
beneath all explanation. Each of its qualities
escaped it a little, flowed out of it, half
solidified, almost became a thing: each one was
superflous in the root.^
It seems, then, that there is a parallel, for Sartre between
the way in which man overflows himself, and the way in which
things overflow our conceptions of them. In the latter case,
the properties which we ascribe in our descriptions of a thing
are what the thing 'overflows', transcends. These properties
are what we ascribe in reflective thought. But Roquentin is
able to experience much more than this. Thus for Sartre as
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for Schutz, ongoing lived experience is transcendent-
Life is transcendent, by contrast with thought which presents
merely the immanent appeara^^e of that life. And lived
experience holds out the promise of apprehending the very
transcendence of 'things'.
By the same logic, Sartre argues that man's life trans¬
cends man's thought about man. Sartre argues that 'things',
with their names, their reliable properties, their clear
outlines, come into being as a result of our reflections on
our experiences. In exactly the same way, he argues that the
'ego' comes into being only in reflection: in lived experience
it does not exist. The 'ego' is man viewed as a 'thing'.
Sartre states,
The ego never appears, in fact, except when one
is not looking at it. ... Then, ... at the horizon,
the ego appears. It is therefore never seen
except 'out of the corner of my eye'.33
The identification which is commonly made then, between the 'I'
and consciousness - an identification enshrined philosophically
in Descartes' remark, "I think, therefore I am" - is therefore,
for Sartre, false. The 'I' is the immanent appearance in
thought of the transcendent living reality, consciousness,
for which it is an object. Sartre argues
Instead of expressing itself in effect as 'I
alone exist as absolute', it must assert that
'absolute consciousness alone exists as
absolute', which is obviously a truism. My
T in effect is no more certain for conscious¬
ness than the I of other men. It is only more
intimate.34
The 'me', Sartre states, is
an existent, strictly contemporaneous with the
world whose existence has the same essential
characteristics as the world.35
But this point of view is already familiar. It is indeed
precisely the argument Husserl employs in his Ideas, with
- 34 -
the merely terminological substitution by Sartre of the
word 'consciousness' for Husserl's 'cogito'. In that work
Husserl portrays 'the world as immediately given me',
'together with the sheer acts of the Ego'. Should I wish
to stand back and engage in an act of reflection, I may do
so: in this case, the Ego arises as an object for the
cogito, but that cogito itself is not reflected upon, not
an object for thought.
But, in his Cartesian Meditations, Husserl was engaged
precisely in an enquiry into the conditions of any possible
cogito (consciousness), by way of an exploration of
Descartes' starting-point, the 'I think'. This enterprise
reverses the assumptions of his early approach. Inspired
as he is by that early approach, Sartre finds Husserl's
transcendentalism a betrayal of all that, for him,
phenomenology stood for. In his repudiation of this work
of the later Husserl Sartre tells us:
[A]ll the accomplishments of phenomenology are in
danger of crumbling if the I is not, in the same ,
manner as the world, an object for consciousness.
Thus far the explanatory framework offered by Schutz and
Sartre appears identical. The difference between them is
merely one of mood. It is in the elaborating of his theory
of social relations that Sartre marks an analytical break
from Schutz.
Solitude Disturbed
It must be said at once that Sartre's presentation of
his theory, in Being and Nothingness, is somewhat enigmatic.
The crucial arguments are presented by way of examples which
are intended more to remind the reader of experiences he or
she has had, than to present analytical descriptions of
unfamiliar situations. The character of this language is
clearly a central question for the present argument.
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Consider, then, two scenarios in which Sartre exhibits
his account of understanding other people. In the first, the
individual concerned is portrayed as alone in a public park,
when he gradually becomes aware of the presence of another
person:
I am in a public park. Not far away there is a
lawn, and along the edge of that lawn there are
benches. A man passes by those benches. I see
this man: I apprehend him as an object and at
the same time as a man. What does this mean?
What do I imply when I assert that this object
is a man? 3 8
Sartre argues that if I saw him as a mere puppet, I should
group him among other spatio-temporal 'things': 'beside'
the benches, two yards and twenty inches from the lawn, and
so on .
His relation with other objects would be of the
purely additive type. ... In short, no new
relations would appear through him between those
things in my universe.3^
But this is not the case. To perceive him as a man is to
perceive the things: in the park as standing in a relation
to him. This relation is not to be apprehended merely by my
distances. "For instead of a grouping toward me of the
objects, there is now an orientation which flees from me"
Sartre develops this theme:
The distance which unfolds between the lawn and
the man ... is a negation of the distance which
I establish ... between these two objects. The
distance appears as a pure disintegration of the
relations which I apprehend between the objects
of my universe. ... Thus, the appearance among
the objects of my universe of an element of dis¬
integration of that universe is what I mean by
the appearance of a man in my universe. ... The
appearance of the Other in the world corresponds
therefore to a congealed sliding of the whole
universe, to a decentralisation of the world -which
undermines the centralisation which I am simul¬
taneously effecting.41
In this first scenario, then, Sartre's theme is the
individual in relation to physical things, and the way in
which that relation is changed, challenged, by the presence
of another man.
For Sartre the individual alone with objects can
experience directly their transcendental reality. Insofar
as the 'transcendent' is the 'real', then communion with
this 'real' is always to be regarded as good, as authentic.
But now the 'other' appears on the scene. With the appear¬
ance of the other, the correspondence between consciousness
and world, and between consciousness and consciousness has
been broken, not just possibly, but absolutely. I have been
precipitated into what, from the mundane point of view as I
earlier defined it, is the vision of 'hell'.^~ This state
arises in Sartre out of the denial of any possible corres¬
pondence between subjectivity and subjectivity, and there¬
fore the attribution of absolute Other-ness to the empirically
other person. It involves, in other words, an absolute denial
of intersubjectivity. What is the source of such a denial? It
is, I suggest, a familiar possibility: the one explored by
the immanentist Husserl in Ideas: the definitive feature of
that perspective was its suspension of belief in the 'general
thesis of the natural standpoint', namely of one common
external world. For Husserl this perspective was a methodo¬
logical device: Sartre however has granted to this perspective
ontological status.^
Other-ness
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre discusses previous
treatments of the problem of the "existence of others"
He declares that his earlier critique of Husserl in the
Transcendence of the Ego, was not adequate as a treatment of
the problem.
[A]lthough I am still persuaded that the hypo¬
thesis of a transcendental subject is useless
and disastrous, abandoning it does not help one
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bit to solve the question of the existence
of Others. Even if outside the empirical Ego
there is nothing other than the consciousness
of that Ego - that is a transcendental field
without a subject - the fact remains that my
affirmation of the Other demands and requires
the existence beyond the world of a similar
transcendental field.3
Recall that Sartre has explicitly stated, that consciousness
is 'transcendental1 and in particular his idea that
experience 'overflows' our thoughts about that experience,
an idea which, I argued, he shares with Schutz.^ But now
he diverges from Schutz. According to Sartre, 'beyond' one
'transcendental field', which despite his failure to do so,
I can hardly fail to identify as 'mine', I 'demand and
require the existence' of another 'similar transcendental
field'.
How is it possible to conceive of more than one 'trans¬
cendent reality'? For the later Husserl, certainly such a
conception would be self-contradictory. But Sartre has
rejected the arguments of the later Husserl: his source
is the Husserl of Ideas. In that work, Husserl's own
attitude towards the 'transcendent' was somewhat paradoxical:
he 'bracketed' it, and so was able to pronounce the
'Indubitability of Immanent, Dubitability of Transcendent
Perception'As the expression of a methodological device,
such reasoning may be acceptable. But if it is put forward
as anything more, then the wording is rather strange. If
the 'immanent'/'transcendent' distinction is another name
for the 'appearance'/'reality' dichotomy, then it becomes
awkward to refer to 'reality' as doubtful, whilst 'appear¬
ance' as opposed to reality is certain. A more logical
terminology would rather adopt the reverse wording. This
would refer to what had previously been taken as certain,
the 'transcendent', but which from the new stance was doubt¬
ful, as the 'immanent', and would refer to what had previously
been taken as doubtful, the 'mere' appearance, the 'immanent',
which from our new stance is certain, as the 'transcendent'.
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I propose that this is precisely what Sartre has done.
He has taken as real, as !ontologi^al", what for Husserl
is purely a 'methodological' position. In so doing, he
has reversed Husserl's terminology and is in Husserl's
terms taking up an immanentist position, which quite
correctly from his viewpoint, he speaks of as transcendentalist.
It is from this position, I propose, that he is able to
pose his problem in the terms he does. He continues again,
Consequently the only way to escape solipsism
would be here again to prove that my transcendental
consciousness is in its very being, affected by the
extra-mundane existences of other consciousnesses
of the same type.48
Having first performed a radical detachment of consciousness
from the social world within which al] our dealings with
other people are ordinarily performed, Sartre now demands
that the social nature of the resulting privatised sphere
be proven to him:
In a word, the sole point of departure is the
interiority of the cogito. We must understand
by this that each one must be able by starting
out from his own inferiority, to rediscover the
Other's being as a transcendence which conditions
the very being of that interiority.^9
And again, suggestively, "we must ask absolute immanence to
throw us into absolute transcendence"
How is this to be done? As previously, Sartre presents
a scenario:
Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curious-
ity, or vice, I have just glued my ear to the
door and looked through a keyhole ... [Tjhere is
no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing
therefore to which I can refer my acts in order
to qualify them. They are in no way known; I am
my acts and hence they carry in themselves their
whole justification. I am a pure consciousness o_f
things, and things, caught up in the circuit of my
selfness, offer to me their potentialities.51
- 39 -
The setting is familiar. The individual is absorbed in a
world of things, a pure 'immanentism1 in Husserlian terms:
for Sartre, consciousness simply being its own transcendence,
lived experience not reflective thought.
But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hal^
Someone is looking at me! What does this mean?
What it means, Sartre names as 'shame1. He says,
I now exist as myself for my unreflective
consciousness. 5T
But previously for Sartre, my self could
object for consciousness when that was a
ness. This remains true:
Only the reflective consciousness has the self
directly for an object. The unreflective
consciousness does not apprehend the person
directly or as its object; the person is
presented to consciousness in so far as the
person is an object for the Other. 54
What is the difference? The difference is, that, not having
access to the other's subjectivity, I do not know the object
I am for the other.
[A]ll of a sudden, I am conscious of myself
as escaping myself ... in that I have a
foundation outside myself.55
Not 'knowing' (thought, reflective), but 'living' (experience,
unreflective):
shame or pride makes me live, not know the
situation of being looked at. . . . [S Jhame,
is shame of self, it is the recognition of
the fact that I arn indeed that object which
the Other is looking at and judging ... Beyond
any knowledge that I can have, I am this self
which another knows. And this self which ] am
- this I am in a world which the Other has made
alien to me, for the Other's look embraces my
being, and correlatively the walls, the door,
the keyhole. All these instrument-things in
the midst of which I am, now turn toward the,-/




The other, as a 'transcendent1 consciousness, escapes my
consciousness, and my 'transcendent1 consciousness escapes
his. But 'I1, as an object do not escape his consciousness,
and neither does 'he5 as an object escape mine. Rather,
what 1 I1 am as an object for his consciousness escapes my
consciousness, and what 'he1 is as an object for my conscious¬
ness escapes his consciousness. Each one of us alienates the
other, of necessity: the very condition of the transcendence
of the other consciousness over anything that it or I can
portray it as being is that I cannot know that other. There¬
fore I cannot know what I am for that other, and therefore
that unknown 'what' alienates 'me1, the unknown object that
I am for the other, from my own transcendence, and vice-
57
versa. Each is "transcendence-transcended".
Optimism and Pessimism
1
Sartres theory is a radical denial of the possibility of
a real intersubjectivity. This being so, the theorist to whose
views Sartre's can be most directly opposed is Alfred Schutz.
It is fortunate, therefore, that Schutz has taken the
5 8trouble to set out precisely his view of Sartre's arguments.
One may anticipate at once the conclusion of Schutz's state¬
ment. He tells us:
His attempt to overcome epistemological solipsism
leads to an unrealistic construction which involves,
so to speak, a practical solipsism. Either the
Other looks at me, and alienates my liberty, or I,-
assimilate and seize within Sartre's philosophy.
But this is only an assertion of Schutz's differences of
opinion with Sartre. What arguments does Schutz offer?
Schutz states:
Sartre has correctly critised Hegel for not
having taken one particular concrete conscious¬
ness as the starting point and system of refer¬
ence. But Sartre himself becomes the victim of
such 'optimism1. As a starting point of his
analysis, he takes it tacitly for granted that
my experiencing the Other's experiencing me are
simply interchangeable.60
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Schutz's viewpoint is that
the demonstration of such an interchangeability
might be the outcome of any analysis of inter-
subjective relation. it cannot be taken for
granted as its 1 starting point1 without, committing
a petitio principii.b1
But Schutz's own approach is not without its petitio prin¬
cipii . In the Phenomenology of the Social World he disclaims
the rigour of Husserl's approach in these words:
The difficult question of the transcendental
constitution of this [we] experience, and of
the experience of the alter ego cannot be
pursued here. By assuming the mundane exis¬
tence of other Selves, we may turn to the
description of the origin of experiences of
fellow-men in the we-relation.^2
I have already shown that the assumption of the mundane
existence of other Selves in the form in which Schutz makes
it, amounts precisely to the assumption' that transcendental
intersubjectivity is already achieved, that is, to 'optimism'
in my terms. I have proposed, that in a state of society
short of the telos, such an assumption is false. For in such
a society, the interchangeability of standpoints is invalid
insofar as rational thought has not yet established the
necessary conditions of any possible subjectivity. To that
extent, my consciousness remains inexplicably different from
yours. But this is precisely the point Sartre makes. However
Sartre assumes that this uniqueness can never be overcome, that
the transcendence of your consciousness over mine is absolute.
In my terms, this amounts to 'pessimism'.
'Optimism' and 'pessimism' arise in Schutz and Sartre,
insofar as, in both writers, experience is posed as the
transcendent reality s?u_i generis of which thought is the mere
immanent appearance. On this view, 'thought' has no ability
to criticise or to transform 'experience': rather, 'experience'
defines the context within which 'thought' occurs, essentially.
The difference between the two writers is, that in one respect
they credit 'experience', with opposite properties. For
Schutz, this transcendent reality is 'from the outset'
intersubjective, 'subjective' experience being a derivative
phenomenon, whereas for Sartre this transcendent reality is,
and always remains, subjective: it is 'intersubjective'
phenomena which take or. secondary status. 'Mutual inter¬
action in freedom,' Schutz tells us, 'has no place within
Sartre's philosophy'. This is true, but it may be replied
that mutual interaction in unfreedom lias no place within
Schutz's.
The source of these two opposed 'ontological' positions
can be found in Husserl's two opposed methodological
investigations. But in order to defend his positions, each
of the ontologists sets up his 'transcendent' realm as having
a certain definitive property. It could never apprehend
itself: it could be apprehended only in a derivative realm.
For both Schutz and Sartre, Husserl's concluding watchword,
'know thyself', is a contradiction in terms: more precisely,
it is ungramrriatica 1. For 'knowing' pertains to one sphere
of meaning, the sphere of 'reflective thought' which captures
no more than the immanent appearance of things, whereas
'thyself, the reality of who, ontologically, I am pertains
to a separate sphere of meaning, the sphere of transcendent
'lived experience'. These two are forever alienated from
one another, as 'thought' and 'life'.
As opposed to this essential alienation posed in the
phenorr.enologies of Schutz, and of Sartre, Husserl holds out
the prospect of a historical transformation of life into
thought, immanent into transcendent, of which the motive
force would be the thought of phenomenology itself.
Accordingly, it is in his terms that I now propose a
'phenomenological' investigation of the constitution of
social 'reality' within a particular social setting. But
first, it is necessary to devote some consideration to
existing approaches competing for the claim to be 'phenomeno¬
logical sociologies', in order to understand the relation¬




THE ESSENTIALISMS OF ETHNOMETHODOLOGY AND
EXISTENTIALISM
Bthnomethodological Sociology
Any attempt to develop a phenomenological sociology
must acknowledge the contribution made by Harold Garfinkel's
*ethnomethodology1. A clear statement of his programme is
to be found in the "Preface" to his book, Studies in
Ethnomethodology. There he announces,
In doing sociology, lay and professional, every
reference to the 'real world', even where the
reference is to physical or biological events, is
a reference to the organised activities of every¬
day life. Thereby, in contrast to certain
versions of Durkheim that teach that the objective
reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental
principle, the lesson is taken instead, and used
as a study policy, that the objective reality of
social facts as an ongoing accomplishment of the
concerted activities of daily life, with the
ordinary artful ways of that accomplishment being
by members known, used, and taken for granted, is,
for members doing sociology, a fundamental pheno¬
menon. Because, and in the ways it is practical
sociology's fundamental phenomenon, it is the pre¬
vailing topic for ethnomethodological study.*
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Garfinkel calls attention to the concern for Reality5 held
not simply by 'professional' philosophers or other theorists,
but also by 'lay' 'members' 'accomplishing' such reality in
everyday life. To this extent, his concern and mine are
identical. But Garfinkel puts a particular interpretation
on this concern. For him, the 'members' and the 'professionals'
are doing 'sociology'. What does this imply? Garfinkel states,
referring to the 'fundamental phenomenon' earlier identified,
Ethnomethodological studies analyse everyday
activities as members' methods for making
those same activities visibly-rational-and-
reportable-for-all-practical-purposes, i.e.
'accountable', as organisations of common¬
place everyday activities. The reflexivity
of that phenomenon is a singular feature of
practical actions, of practical circumstances,
of commonsense knowledge of social structures,
and of practical sociological reasoning. By
permitting us to locate and examine their
occurrence, the reflexivity of that phenomenon
establishes their study.2
Members' methods, then, make their activities accountable
1for-all-practical-purposes'. Why 'practical'? Why not
'poetic', 'artistic', 'theological', 'scientific', or an
indefinite number of other kinds of purposes? One suspects
that Garfinkel is proposing in his 'ethnomethodology' to
exhibit his vision of 'practical' man, which is only one of
indefinitely many alternative visions which might be
exhibited.
In Schutz's view, the main alternative to the 'practical',
'everyday' attitude was the 'theoretical' viewpoint of the
philosopher or social scientist. What has Garfinkel to say
about this distinction? The study of everyday activities,
he states,
is directed to the tasks of learning how members'
actual, ordinary, activities consist of methods
to make practical actions, practical circumstances,
commonsense knowledge of social structures, and
practical sociological reasoning analysable; and
of discovering the formal properties of common¬
place, practical commonsense actions 'from within'
actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of
those settings. The; formal properties obtain
their guarantees from no other source, and in no
other wav. Because this is so, our study tasks
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cannot be accomplished by free invention,
constructive analytic theorising, mock-ups,
or book reviews, and so no special interest
is paid to them aside from an interest in
their varieties as organisationally situated
methods of practical reasoning. Similarly,
there can be nothing to quarrel with or to
correct about practical sociological reason¬
ing, and so, because professional sociological
enquiries are practical through and through,
except that quarrels between those doing prof¬
essional enquiries and ethnomethodology may be
of interest as phenomena for ethnomethodological
studies, these quarrels need not be taken
seriously.3
Garfinkel himself, then, inhabits the same world which we
all inhabit: a practical world through and through. There
is 'no other source' than this practicality for the very
standards of reasoned analysis by which everyday activities
can be approached. Those who set themselves up as superior
to those everyday standards are brought down to size abruptly:
'no special interest is paid to them' except as themselves
examples of practicality. The ethnomethodologist's own work
is nothing more nor less than practical reasoning ruminating
on itself. The only problem seems to be, how it is that
some of these 'practical' reasoners, the self-styled
'professional' ones could have got it into their heads to
conceive of themselves as anything other than merely
'practical' men: how, that is, 'practicality' could have
itself, somehow, given rise to something other than
'practicality'. But this problem does not present itself
to the ethnomethodologist. For his analysis of everyday
activities ' a_s members' methods for making those same
activities visibly-rational-and-reportable-for-all-practical
-purposes' involves precisely that these activities be seen
in this way, and only in this way.
So, Garfinkel's vision is of a sociology which is
thoroughly part of the society which it investigates, which
is itself immersed in the standards of that society, whose
task is to 'learn how' that society works, but never to
criticise it, because it has no external standard by which
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such criticism could be undertaken.
They [e thnomethodological studies] do not
formulate a remedy for practical actions,
as if it was being four'"' out about practical
actions that they were better or worse than
they are usually cracked up to be.4
Its attitude to criticisms which it may encounter, e.g.
criticisms of itself from 'professional' sociologists, is
merely to learn from this criticism how criticism is done.
In this vision, we already live in the best of all possible
worlds: all we can do is to celebrate that fact. Previous
sociology has failed to do so. Previous sociology has set
itself up on a pedestal above society, and from those heights
has reflected upon it. But the laugh is on that sociology.
For, from those supposed 'heights' only an impoverished
vision is available of the society below, and in fact the
view obtained by those sociologists even of their own
activity is an un-self-aware one. They have only apprehended
an appearance of a reality which transcends their formulation
of it.
Transcendentalism
But is this not a very familiar viewpoint? The vision
of a society whose rich complexity transcends any possible
formulation of it in reflective thought, a society which is
beyond the scope of criticism, whose goodness we can only
celebrate, is precisely Husserl's transcendentalist vision
of 'heaven' as made immanent by Alfred Schutz. The picture
of the impoverished work of conventional sociology is also
Schutz's. But not having to be one himself, Schutz was
quite reconciled to the idea of social scientists continuing
their inadequate work indefinitely. The tone of Garfinkel's
programme is rather different. Rather than staying up above
with the social scientists, Garfinkel prefers to descend to
immerse himself within the ongoing experience of life in the
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'natural1 attitude, there to carry out the Schutzian
celebration of that attitude to greater effect. Thus,
Garfinkel can be located precisely on the map which Schutz
provided.
I propose that Garfinkel accepts the Schutzian vision
of the world. Its main features are the transcendence of
the 'natural' attitude of intersubjectivity, as compared
with the mere immanence of any formulations of that attitude
in thought. But he locates himself in a different position
to that which Schutz recommends for the social scientist,
namely within the 'natural8 attitude itself. Once settled
therein, he is able to castigate those social scientists
who remain, as Schutz recommended they should, outside
peering in. He is also able, believing himself in the best
of all possible worlds, to refuse to conceive of the
possibility of any alternative world, even in thought.
In short, Garfinkel's analysis, which explicates
everyday language 'from within' does so precisely in the
context of Schutz's statement that 'language - any language
- pertains ... to the intersubjective world of working, and
therefore obstinately resists serving as a vehicle for
meanings which transcend its own presuppositions'. Ethno-
methodology confines itself to elucidating those presupposi¬
tions, making no attempt to transcend them.
What has Garfinkel to say concerning the relation between
his work and that of Schutz? A key paper, entitled "Studies
of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities", exhibits this
relation. Garfinkel tells us,
In everyday discipline, humanistic or scientific,
the familiar commonsense world of everyday life is
a matter of abiding interest. In the social
sciences, and in sociology particularly, it is a
matter of essential preoccupation. It makes up
sociology's problematic subject matter, enters
the very constitution of the sociological attitude,
and exercises an odd and obstinate sovereignty _
over sociologists' claims to adequate explanation.
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But, he continues,
Although sociologists take socially structured
scenes of everyday life as a point of departure,
they rarely see, as a task of sociological in¬
quiry in its own right, the general question of
how any such comnionsense world is possible.
Instead, the possibility of the everyday world
is either settled by theoretical representation
or merely assumed. As a topic and methodological
ground for sociological enquiries, the definition
of the commonsense world of everyday life, though
is is appropriately a project of sociological
inquiry, has been neglected.6
7Garfinkel now cites one "magnificent exception" to his
pessimistic statement, namely Alfred Schutz. He tells us,
Almost alone among sociological theorists, the
late Alfred Schutz, in a series of classi^ studies
of the constitutive phenomenology of the world of
everyday life, described many of these seen but
unnoticed background expectancies. He called
them the 'attitude of daily life'. He referred
to their scenic attributions as the 'world known
in common and taken for granted'. Schutz's
fundamental work makes it possible to pursue
further the tasks of clarifying their nature and
operations, of relating them to the processes of
concerted actions, and assigning theingtheir place
in an empirically imaginable society.
In what way, then, does Garfinkel propose to 'further pursue'
these tasks? For Garfinkel does not continue the method of
individual philosophising of Schutz, Sartre, or Husserl. He
conducts empirical investigations.
The Epoche of the 'Natural' Attitude
"Procedurally", Garfinkel states, "it is my preference
to start with familiar scenes, and ask what can be done to
make trouble".^ But, he says,
Despite their procedural emphasis, my studies are
not, properly speaking, experimental. They are
demonstrations, designed, in Herbert Spiegelberg's
phrase, as 'aids to a sluggish imagination'. I
have found that they produce reflections through
which the strangeness of an obstinately familiar
world can be detected.10
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Is there a chink in Garfinkel5s armour here? He refers in
the earlier quotation above to 'assigning the background
expectancies of daily life their places in an empirically
imaginable society1. Now he refers to 'aids to a sluggish
imagination'. He also refers to the 'special motive' needed
to become estranged from everyday life, in order for these
background expectancies to come into view. This 'special
motive', he tells us,
consists in the programmatic task of treating
a societal member's practical circumstances ...
as matters of theoret.ic interest. 1 '
But if the ethnomethodologist's work is a matter of
'imagination' and 'theorising' as opposed to 'practicality',
then two awkward questions emerge, namely first, how is the
ethnomethodologist1s stance different from that of other
social scientists, in their departure from everyday life,
and second, if these other than practical attitudes are
possible for ethnomethodologists or other social scientists,
then are they not also possible for members within everyday
life?
While bearing these philosophical anxieties in mind,
I propose they should not forestall a practical considera¬
tion of what Garfinkel is proposing. Consider one particular
'background expectancy' described by Schutz, and the bearing
of Garfinkel's empirical investigations upon it. Garfinkel
states:
One of the background expectancies Schutz des¬
cribed concerns the sanctioned use of doubt as a
constituent feature of a world that is being
understood in common. Schutz proposed, that
for the conduct of his everyday affairs the person
assumes, assumes the other person assumes as well,
and assumes that as he assumes it of the other
person, the other person assumes it of him, that a
relation of undoubted correspondence is the sanc¬
tioned relationship between the actual appearances
of an object and the intended object that appears
in a particular way. For the person conducting his
everyday affairs, objects, for him as he expects
for others, are as they appear to be.l2
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This proposal of Schutz's is perfectly familiar. It is
what he called the 'epoche of the natural attitude1, which
he described wherein man "puts in brackets the doubt that
the world and its objects might be otherwise than it appears
1 ?
to him". An earlier source of this notion is Husserl's
statement in the Idea of Phenomenology that "[w]hat is
taken for granted in natural thinking is the possibility of
cognition". ^ Garfinkel gives his own name to this
r
assumption: he calls it 'trust'. He now advocates an
experimental procedure, whereby the experimenter will
exhibit distrust in the experimental social setting:
The term 'trust' is used ... to refer to a
person's compliance with the expectancies of
the attitude of daily life as a morality.
Acting in accordance with a rule of doubt
directed to the correspondence between
appearances and the objects that appearances
are appearances of is only one way of
specifying 'distrust'. Modifications of
each of the other expectancies that make
up the attitude of daily life, as well as
their various sub-sets, furnish variations
on the central theme of treating a world
that one is required to know in common and^
take for granted as a problematic matter.
Thus the analytically identical notion is proposed, as a
constitutive feature of the 'natural attitude' of daily life,
by Garfinkel, Schutz, and Husserl. But in Garfinkel it takes
on a subtly new significance.
The 'epoche of the natural attitude', Garfinkel says,
is a moral rule. It is a 'sanctioned' property of common
discourse. Referring to such rules, he states:
They furnish a background of seen but unnoticed
features of common discourse whereby actual
utterances are recognised as events of common,
reasonable, understandable, plain talk. Persons
require these properties of discourse as
conditions under which they are themselves
entitled and entitle others to claim that they
know what they are talking about, and that what
they are saying is understandable and ought to
be understood. In short, their seen but un¬
noticed presence is used to entitle persons to
conduct their common conversational affairs
without interference. Departures from such
usages call forth immediate attempts to
restore a right state uf affairs.T7
In essence, Garfinkel has transformed what was in Husserl
and in Schutz a 'philosophical' rule into a 'sociological'
one. But is this transformation unambiguously a gain?
Husserl was clear that the assumption of the possibility of
cognition was a barrier to the philosophical issues which
he sought to pursue. It became the butt for his scornful
criticism. Schutz was more ambiguous: very ready to
tolerate the 'practical' justifications for the 'epoche of
the natural attitude', he nonetheless and somewhat inex¬
plicably found time to pursue philosophy, and granted that
others might do the same. With Garfinkel, a new clarity
is reached. From the commonsense standpoint within which
he situates himself, philosophical questioning is inconceivable:
departures from this epoche which alone would make philo¬
sophical discourse possible 'call forth immediate attempts
to restore a right state of affairs'. The implications of
this standpoint can be explored by examining one of
Garfinkel's experiments.
Consider then an example of an experiment which was
intended precisely to investigate 'trust' as 'a background
feature of common discourse'. He reports the following:
Students were instructed to engage an acquaintance
or a friend in ordinary conversation, and, without
indicating that what the experimenter was asking
was in any way unusual, to insist that the person
clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks.1 8
Plainly, this is one way of breaking the rule of 'trust'. To
ask someone to clarify the sense of remarks which would
'normally' be taken not to need such clarification is to
call into question the 'correspondence between consciousness
and consciousness' and so between consciousness and world
which is definitive of the transcendentalist 'heaven' which
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both Garfinkel and Schutz take to be the 'natural1
attitude. It is to question whether appearances corres¬
pond with the object that appearances are appearances of,
i.e. reality. There are, I propose, two ways in which such
a question may be taken. GarfinkelJs sociological way takes
the question as departing from orderly conversation into
disorder, or anomie, that is from meaningfulness to meaning-
lessness. By contrast, Husserl's philosophical way takes
the question as departing from the practical attitude into
a philosophically questioning attitude, i.e. as posing the
problem of cognition, by shifting from transcendentalism
into immanentism.
Consider, then the following conversation which
Garfinkel reports:
Subject: Hi, Ray. How is your girl friend feeling? (l)
Experimenter: What do you mean, 'How is she feeling? Do
you mean physical or mental? (2)
S_: I mean how is she feeling? What's the
matter with you? (He looked peeved) (3)
Ej Nothing. Just explain a little clearer
what you mean. (4)
S_: Skip it. How are your Med School
applications coming? (5)
_E: What do you mean, 'How are they?1 (6)
S_: You know what I mean. (7)
E: I really don't. (8)
Sj What's the matter with you? Are you
sicl<?19 (9)
According to Garfinkel, this conversation and others demon¬
strates the sanctioned character of the epoche of the natural
attitude, i.e. trust. How can this sociological conclusion
be displayed? I propose the following interpretation. The
dialogue reveals two conversations. Within each conversation
a 'social order' was briefly built up, but regrettably, in
each case it broke down again into anomie. On this reading,
the first of these conversations is 'about' Ray's girl
friend, and l^sts from utterance (l) to utterance (4), while
the second is 'about' Ray's Med School applications, and
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lasts from utterance (5) to utterance (9)- On this
interpretation of the conversation, tonical coherence
consists in sustained reference to the same object, of
which the conversation presents only the appearance, and
that coherence is therefore by definition broken when the
correspondence between the appearance (the conversation
itself) and the reality (the object) is broken.
Anomie
Such a reading of the conversation depends upon the
claim that at two points in the conversation, an anomic
breakdown occurred, preciptated deliberately by the very non-
'natural1 act of the sociological Experimenter, which con¬
sisted in !insisting that someone clarify the sense of his
commonplace remarks1. This is an intriguing suggestion.
It implies that it should now be possible to examine the
conversation closely to see where this 'breaking-down'
occurred, and to learn about a matter crucial to sociologi¬
cal theory: how to 'break-down1 social order. However, on
closer examination of the conversation, the matter appears
less clear. Firstly, the point at which the Experimenter's
deliberate act occurs is not the same as the point at which
the breakdown occurs. In the conversation about the girl
friend, the Experimenter's non-natural remark is utterance
(2), "What do you mean, 'How is she feeling?' Do you mean
physical or mental?". How does the Subject respond to
this utterance? Not in a way which is obviously anomic. He
meets the Experimenter's question with a question of his
own, thereby continuing the conversation. In the conversation
about the Med School applications, the Experimenter's non-
natural remark is utterance (6), "What do you mean, 'How are
They?'". Again the Subject's response continues the conversa¬
tion: 'anomie' makes no appearance. Where, then, does it
appear? Here is a paradox. Whereas it was easy to identify
the Experimenter's remark which 'insisted that the Subject
clarify the sense of his commonplace remarks', it is extremely
difficult to pinpoint where it is that the 'anomie1 appears.
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Nonetheless, an attempt can be made. It would seem
that the breakdown of the first conversation occurs at or
around the end of utterance (4) and the beginning of
utterance (5): "Just explain a little clearer what you mean",
"Skip it". And it would seem, that the breakdown of the
second conversation occurs at or around the end of utterance
(9): "Are you sick?". It is hard not to be vague about
exactly where, in either case. What is the reason for this
vagueness? I suggest, it is because in themselves, utter¬
ances (4)5 (5), and (9) are not anomic at all. They are,
rather, perfectly well-formed utterances occurring
intelligibly within a conversation. Where, then, is the
'anomie' if not in the conversation at one or more of these
points? The answer seems to be, that it must be posed as
standing outside the conversation. We might say, that it
is located 'between' utterances (4) and (5), and 'after'
utterance (9)* In this case, these utterances themselves
do not exhibit anomie. They exhibit order.
But,if anomie is to be attributed to the situation at
all, then it must presumably be viewed as standing in some
relation to the conversation. These utterances, or some
of them, must then be viewed as orienting to the anomie,
perhaps, as coping with it. On this reading, such remarks
as "What's the matter with you?", "Skip it", and "Are you
sick?" are to be regarded as ways of coping with anomie,
despite the fact that they make no mention of it. But
then we are departing from the 'natural' attitude assump¬
tion that appearances correspond to reality, in order to
make this attribution. As sociologists, then, we are saying
that the problem we regard as 'anomie' is treated by every¬
day conversationalists in a very different way, i.e. that
what we treat theoretically as 'anomie', everyday conversa¬
tionalists treat practically in other terms. This point
can be made more generally.
. If ordered social life .is viewed as a conversation,
then analytically anomie can never appear in the
conversation itself: because any
conversation is by that very token
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ordered, not anomic. Therefore, to attribute anomie to a
situation, is to attribute a phenomenon which it is
impossible for the speakers in the conversation to address,
in their speech. The attribution of anomie can only be an
external judgement, made in external terms. Thus Garfinkel's
sociological ethnomethodology is unable to live up to its
aspirations. It is able to depict everyday life as wholly
practical only by itself taking up a theoretical stance
external to that of everyday life.
Conversational Analysis
Ethnomethodology has developed beyond Garfinkel's
early experimental technique. In view of this I propose
to reconsider his conversation in the light of the approach
to everyday speech developed by Harvey Sacks and Emmanuel
Schegloff under the title of 'conversational analysis'.
This analysis will not simply replicate the conclusion just
reached, but express it in a more precise form which points
to a way of overcoming the limitations of the ethnomethodol¬
ogy itself.
One rule of 'orderly' conversation states, according to
Sacks, that questions must be answered. He expresses the
rule in this way:
If one party asks a question, when the question is
complete, the other party properly speaks, and
properly offers an answer to the question, and
says no rr.ore than that.^^
It is important not to deprecate Sacks instantly for the
simplicity of his rule, or that fact that as he says, "you
2 1
know the rules anyway". The parsimony of the statement
is a virtue, and it is not intended to be complete, but as
2 2he says "will need considerable explication". One
particularly important 'explication' of this rule is its
extension by the notion of 'insertion sequences', a topic
researched by Emmanuel Schegloff. Schegloff states his
rule, thus:
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The kind of occurrences we are concerned with here
may be called 'insertion sequences' or 'inserted
sequences' because between an initial question and
its answer there is inserted another question-
answer sequence. ... If we represent question and
answer pairs with the form QA, then we can represent
such pairs with an inserted sequence as QQAA or
where the subscript lb! stands for 'base' and the
subscript 'i' stands for 'first insertion'. A
general formulation of this format might be as
follows: a QA sequence can take a QA inserted
sequence. If we take this general formulation
without qualification, then we may note that Q^A^
above, being a QA pair, can take an inserted
sequence Q..A.., ... and Q..A.. can take an
11 11 11 11
inserted sequence Q. . . A • • • , and so forth2ii iii
indefinitely. It is possible to invent a
conversational fragment with many insertion
sequences; for example one with three sequences ...
However, such multiple insertions are rarely found
in naturally occurring conversations. In many
cases a Q.. or second insertion sequence will be
a meta- question, requesting repetition of
the Q^ (e.g. 'Huh?', or 'what?').^3
With these two rules, it is possible to analyse the
conversation. But first a general comment will help clarify
the argument. Sacks is concerned with features of 'proper'
conversation. His 'question/answer' (QA for short) rule is
put forward as such a feature. This means that if the rule
is obeyed, then the conversation exhibits order, whereas if
it is disobeyed, then the conversation exhibits anomie.
The conversation can be readily analysed along Sacks/




















(b) How is your girl f-ri. .id feeling?
What do you mean, 'How is she
feeling? ' Do you mean physical
or mental?
(a) I mean how is she feeling.
(b) What's the matter with you?
(a) Nothing.
(b) Just explain a little clearer,
what you mean.
(a) Skip it.
(b) How are your Med School applications
coming?
What do you mean, 'How are they?'
You know what I mean.
I really don't.
What's the matter with you? Are you
sick?
A number of comments need to be made about this analysis:
(i) The analysis itself, i.e. the categorisation devices
provided by Sacks and Schegloff, divide up the 'utter¬
ances', so that these are no longer the atomic units.
(ii) "Hi, Ray" is a greeting which I have omitted from
analysis.
(iii) In identifying insertion sequences, I have followed
Schegloff in designating the first insertion 'i'.
However, the second insertion is not inserted within
insertion 'i', for insertion 'i' is terminated before
this second insertion begins. Accordingly, I have
designated it 'i1', the next one 'i>>t, and so on.
(Should there be, in a hypothetical case, insertions
within such second insertions, these would have to
be designated 'i'i', 'i'ii', and so on).
This implies that the number of the subscript (i, ii,
etc. as opposed to its discriminant1,'' ,etc. ) deter¬
mines what may be called the 'level' of the insertion.
I take it that it is the number of these 'levels' to
which Schegloff is referring when he says 'multiple
insertions are rarely found in naturally occurring
conversations', as intuitively there seems nothing
unusual about the higher number of discriminants
(five) found in the present case. In this case, the
present conversation, which only reaches the level
of one insertion, is not unusual by Schgloff's standard,
! 1
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(iv) In utterance (2) there might appear to be two
questions: I have only identified one. I
propose that the second reformulates the first,
so as to specify it. This could perhaps be
regarded as a kind of mini-insertion sequence
of its own within Q., but I prefer to regard
the whole as a single question. The same
situation arises in utterance (9)-
(v) Utterance (4) section (b) is not a question.
It does however demand a response. There seems
no difficulty in assimilating it to the cate¬
gory of what Schegloff, following Sacks, calls
'summonses', which show a similar kind of
organisation which can be called 'summons-
answer sequences'.^4 Accordingly, this section
is designated by S, instead of Q.
Utterance (8) presents a slightly different case.
Utterance (7) is not a 'question'. Utterance (7)
rather questions the need for the question: none¬
theless, from the point of view of its sequential
structure in the conversation, it appears to ful¬
fil the role of an 'answer1, i.e. in the absence
of any following challenge to it (such as occurr¬
ed in this case), the 'question1 would be deemed
'answered'. (in everyday language, the express¬
ion 'answered back' fits this case happily).
Accordingly, it is so treated here. But utter¬
ance (8) does then challenge its validity, so in
the absence of any following challenge to it
(such a challenge does not appear here), the
original question is now once again deemed not
answered. This somewhat complex case can be
covered by designating utterance (8) as a 'summons'
(vi) In Scbegloff's diagram, the lines stemming from
'base' questions (Q^ and ) are not drawn,
neither are 'question' and 'answer' lines
joined in the case of insertion sequences.
However, it plainly aids the present presentation
to do so.
On the diagram which results from this analysis, the 'anom.ie'
can be plainly seen. It consists precisely in the 'loose'
ends: questions which have not been answered.
The value of such an analysis should not be lightly
dismissed. Rather, I want to draw attention to a product of
this analysis unremarked by ethnomethodology. In my inter¬
pretation, the Sacks/Schegloff mode of 'conversational
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analysis' reveals two levels of meaning within the
conversation. It is easy to identify »d~iat these levels
are. The 'base' level is, of ccurse, the transcendent
intersubjectivity of the natural attitude itself, that
realm whose participants 'are certain of the correspondence
between consciousness and consciousness, and so any possible
consciousness, and so, the world', the unproblematic 'heaven'.
Level 'i' on the other hand is the realm to which the dis¬
course shifts when there is trouble abroad. This is the
immanentist subjectivity, a world of uncertain theorising
and fantasy, that realm whose participants 'are sceptical
as to the possibility of correspondence either between
consciousness and consciousness or between world and
consciousness', the vision of 'hell'.
This analysis in terms of form finds confirmation in
terms of the content of the remarks. Q^, refers to 'your
Med School applications', a taken-for-granted feature of
the external world. £L however takes as its topic not a
feature of the external world but part of the conversation
itself. The relation between this appearance and a pre¬
supposed underlying reality is called into question hy the
reference to 'what you mean'. This question is only
intelligible when a real meaning is posited as separate
to the appearance which exhibits its meaningfulness. Like¬
wise Q , S^j,, s , j and i j » 2 i an<^ the answers to them
variously question and posit realities other than those
which appear, and attempt to discuss them in a tone of
uncertainty. In short, these remarks exhibit members
speaking philosophically, whereas and , exhibit
members speaking practically.
I want to propose, that reading Sacks and Schegloff's
analysis in this way raises more problems than their
analysis can solve. Specifically, I shall argue, that their
analysis solves neither their problem nor mine. Their problem,
which I take to be the same as Garfinkel's, is how is the
anoinie produced? My problem is, how is the shift from
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transcendent to immanent levels of meaning produced?
Consider each of these in turn.
1Anomie'
According to Garfinkel, it was the Experimenter who
produced the anomie, by his question (2). But according to
my Sacks/Schegloff analysis, the conversation was well
ordered at every stage up to utterance (5). Although there
were insertion sequences, these were never in excess of the
permitted one level of insertions. According to the Sacks/
Schegloff rules, the Experimenter was not limited in the
number of sequential insertions he was permitted, and at
any point he could have produced an utterance which cculd
have read as A^, an answer to , "How is your girl friend
feeling?". Therefore to speak in exact terms, it was
nothing that he did which produced the anomie. It was
rather, retrospectively, the Subject who produced the
anomie, by his remark (5) (a), "Skip it", followed by his
question (5) (b), "How are your Med School applications
coming?" But this was the remark which, previously, was
judged to be a 'way of coping with anomie', if the notion
was to he; employed at all .
The same observation can be repeated in the case of the
second occurrence of 'anomie'. Following the Subject's
question t, the Experimenter is quite 'entitled', in
terms of the Sacks/Schgloff rules, to begin the insertion
sequence ' i"" , and when that is complet ed, the sequence
'i""i. Retrospectively, it is the Subject who by his
question Q.„„,, constitutes not one but two instances of
Sacks rule having been broken.
The intriguing conclusion, emerges then, that, so long
as the notion of anoir.ie is to be upheld at all, then it is
the remark which 'ccpes' with it which itself 'produces' it.
This conclusion is an illustration of Howard Becker's
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famous slogan, that "deviance is behaviour successfully so
2 5
labelled". Insofar as 'deviance' is a version of the
idea of 'anomie', then this is not a new, but a very old,
observation.
It is now possible to expand on the earlier finding,
namely that anomie can never appear in the conversation
itself. Rather, from within a state of order, anomie can
be posed as having occurred, or as being about to occur.
This is the case in the present instances. That is to say,
utterances (5) and (9)5 spoken by the Subject, are them¬
selves perfectly orderly, and promise to usher in a brave
new era of ordered conversation, leaving the past behind.
Anomie is a feature of accounts of reality, not of reality
itself. That is, it may figure in the speech of members
of society, or of sociologists. But it does not figure in
society itself. For this reason, it should always be
placed in quotation marks, thus: 'anomie'. It follows
that all talk of 'producing' anomie should be treated in
the same way. Similarly, all talk of 'deviance', or
'producing deviance' should be similarly treated. But
'deviance' and 'anomie' are simply 'rule-breaking'. It
follows, that 'rules' and 'rule-breaking' should be treated
in the same way. All of these are matters of accounts of
reality, not of reality itself.
Now it is possible to see why Sacks and Schegloff's
approach cannot solve the problem, how is anomie produced?
For, if anomie is a feature of accounts of reality, then
to ask, "How is anomie produced?" is itself to give an
account of anomie, that is, to produce anomie. A question
which does not involve this vicious circularity is, "How
is 'anomie' produced?" But this is a question which acknow¬
ledges the separation between the levels of accounts
(practise), and the 'reality' portrayed in those accounts
(theory) which the ethnomethodologists, with their commit¬
ment to a practical vision of man, cannot acknowledge. The
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separation, however, is made visible by ethnomethodology1s
ow; analysis. It is clear that within language this
duality corresponds precisely to the dichotomy within
consciousness between 'lived experience' and 'reflective
thought'. This is suggestive. The phenomenological
philosophers, Husserl, Schutz, and Sartre assume that as a
feature of consciousness this distinction is an aspect of a
reality external to accounts of that reality. Now however
the reverse possibility comes into view: that this distinc¬
tion is itself a feature of language, and as such of accounts
of reality, rather than having a prior real existence.
Existential Psychology
By immersing himself within one of the two positions
explored by phenomenological philosophers, namely Schutz's
vision of the transcendent reality as 'intersubjectivity',
Garfinkel has produced a 'phenomenological sociology' which
views everyday speakers as everyday sociologists. This
interpretation suggests an equal and opposite hypothetical
possibility. By immersing oneself within the other position
explored in phenomenological philosophy, namely Sartre's
vision of the transcendent reality as 'subjectivity', it
should be possible to produce a 'phenomenological psychology',
which viev/s everyday speakers as everyday psychologists.
Indeed, Sartre anticipated this possibility himself in
Being and Nothingness. He called it, 'existential psycho¬
analysis' . This 'psychoanalysis', for Sartre, was to begin
with
the principie ... that man is a totality and not
a collection. Consequently, he expresses himself
as a whole in even hj s most insignificant and liis
most superficial behaviour'. In other words, there
is not a taste, a mannerism, or an human act which
is not revealing.26
Such a. psychoanalysis could no doubt be inspired by Sartre's
earlier remark, in the Transcendence of the Ego, that 'my I,
in effect, is no more certain for consciousness than the I
of other men. It is only more intimate.' As he observed in
that work, the theory that the I is a public object for
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consciousness implies that it is available for investiga¬
tion by other consciousnesses, and this can be the basis
for a psychology:
I cannot conceive Peter's consciousness without
making an object of it (since I do not conceive
it as being my_ consciousness) . I cannot conceive
it because I would have to think of it as pure
inter! ority and as transcendence a_t the same time,
which is impossible. A consciousness cannot
conceive of a consciousness other than itself.
Thus we can distinguish, thanks to our conception
of the me_, a sphere accessible to psychology, in
which the method of external observation and the
introspective method have the same rights, and
can mutually assist each other, and a pure trans¬
cendental sphere [in Husserl's terms a 'pure
immanent sphere', B.T.| accessible to phenomeno¬
logy alone.^ 7
I propose a linguistic interpretation of this suggestion.
The 'psychology' which Sartre puts forward, v/ould be one
whose concern would be for the language of the subject,
investigating the 1 and the me spoken of by subject con¬
ceived as 'objects' for his'consciousness'.
Such a psychology would never be able to gain access
to that 'consciousness' which would be available only to a
phenomenological investigation carried out by the subject
upon himself. Thus, the 'psychological' approach would
always be an incomplete investigation, an outsider's view:
'really to know oneself' is inevitably to take
toward oneself the point of view of others,
that is to say, a point of view which is
necessarily false.
Precisely the same limitation is found to be in force, in
Sartre's Being and Nothingness formulation of a programme
for psychology:
[P]rojects revealed, by existential psychoanaly¬
sis will be apprehended from the point of view
of the Other.2 9
Sartre, then, is quite explicit that there can be no trans¬
gressing the privileged appreciation which one consciousness
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has of itself: all 'psychological' interpretation, is
necessarily of the secondary kind, 'from the point of
view of the Other'.
Thus, Sartre's psychologist has no privileged position
as against the man-in-the-street: neither has he any dis¬
advantage. By contrast, Schutz's sociologist is at a
disadvantage compared to the man-in-the-street in that he
can never make use cf the direct experience of the other
in the pure We-relationship. Sartre's psychologist sets up
no puppets. Rather, he views everyday speakers themselves
as setting up puppets, and it is these puppets which his
psychology sets out to investigate. First and foremost
among the puppets which any speaker sets up is, of course,
his Ego. This suggests precisely the relationship between
the methodologies], statements of Schutz and of Sartre. In
Sartre's vision, every man is a 'scientist' of the kind
portrayed by Schutz. Each of these sciences is imperfect:
an attempt by reflective thought to grasp lived experience,
which is doomed to failure. For Schutz, 'the working
actions and reactions [of puppets] are merely fictitious'.
For Sartre, 'to take, the point of view of others is
necessarily false'. Nonetheless each is convinced as to
the truth of its vision. For Schutz, the object of this
science is transcendental intersubjectivity, shared by all.
For Sartre, the object of this science is transcendental
subjectivity, to which the individual alone has access.
Now, what situation arises if rival believers come face-
to-face?
Ontological Insecurity
R.D. Laing has proposed, that these visions are
alternative possibilities within everyday life. In his
Divided Self, he vividly portrays the two possible states
of mind, which he designates as 'ontological security' and
'ontological insecurity, respectively. He states:
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A man may have a sense of his presence in the
world as a real, active, alive whole, and in a
temporal sense continuous person. As such, he
can live out into the world and meet others: a
world and others experienced as equally real,
alive, whole, and continuous. Such a basically
ontologically secure person will encounter all
the hazards of life, social, ethical, spiritual,
biological, from a centrally firm sense of his
own and other people's reality and identity. It
is often difficult for a; person with such a
sense of integral selfhood and personal identity,
of the permanency of things, of the reliability
of natural processes, ... of the substantiality
of others, to transpose himself into the world
of an Individual whose experiences may be utterly
lacking in any unquestionable self-validating
certainties.3U
On the other hand,
The individual in the ordinary circumstances of
living may feel more unreal than real; in a
lateral sense, more dead than alive; precariously
differentiated from the world so that his identity
and autonomy are always in question. He may not
possess an over-riding sense of personal consis¬
tency or cohesiveness. He may feel more insubstan¬
tial than substantial, and unable to assume that
the stuff he is made of is genuine, good, valuable.
And he may feel that his self is partially
divorced from his body.31
Laing illustrates what -this 'ontological insecurity' means
by quoting from an argument between two patients in an
analytic group. One suddenly breaks off the argument to
say, " I can't go on. You are arguing in order to have the
pleasure of triumph over me. At best you win an argument.
At worst you lose an argument. I am arguing in order to
. . „ 32 """
preserve my existence."
These two states of mind are quite familiar. The first
is the outlook which is Schutz's concern and defines his
own location: the complacency of consciousness in the
'natural' attitude, certain of the correspondence between
consciousness and consciousness, and so any possible con-
sciousr.es, and so world. The second is the outlook which
defiles Sartre's viewpoint: that of the restless conscious¬
ness, ceaselessLy transcending itself, sceptical as to the
possibility of correspondence between consciousness and
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consciousness, or consciousness and world. Each thus
conceives itself to inhabit a world populated by others
like itself. That is, each assumes its own assumptions
to have 1theoreticityJ.
s impossible to apprehend
it is seen that for him the
is quite correct in his un-
ng's viewpoint the corres-
s and consciousness, conscious-
c. The assumption that it is
This false assumption finds
icular situation: the psychiatric
anings to the 'subjective* state
Laing is well aware that this
lay* and 'professional*
main characteristic of this
, is that the account of his
by the *sick* person is denied
cts, who attribute to him
than the ones which he ascribes.
if we agree that you do not experience my experience,
we agree that we rely on our communication to give us
our clues as to how or what we are thinking, feeling,
imagining, dreaming, and so forth. Things are going
to be difficult if you tell me that I am experiencing
something which I am not experiencing.33
Yet such attribution does occur as a feature of everyday life,
at least in the present state of our society. One kind of
culprit - for Laing, such attribution is a crime, a consti¬
tuent feature of the process of 'driving the: other crazy* -
can be the parent or other authority figure in relation to a
subservient person. Laing gives a fictitious example:
A little boy runs out of school to meet his mother.
... [H]is mother opens her arms to hug him and he
stands a little way off. She says, 'Don't you love
your mummy?1 He says, 'No*. She says, 'But mummy
knows you do, darling,* and gives him a big hug.
Laing comments,
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Now, I propose that it i
Laing's point of view unless
'ontologically insecure' man
'natural' attitude. From Lai
pondence between consciousnes
ness and world, is problemati
not so is a false assumption,
potent expression in one part
attribution of 'objective' me
of mind of the 'sick' person,
is identically a feature of '
psychiatric attribution. The
situation, wherever it occurs
subjective experiences given
by others with whom he intera
subjective experiences other
In Laing's words,
mother is impervious to what he says and feels,
and counters by attributing feelings that over¬
rule his own testimony. This form of attribution
makes unreal feelings the 1 victim1 experiences as
real. In this way, real disjunction is abolished
and a false conjunction created.
Examples of attribution of this order are:
'You are just saying that. I know you don't mean it'.





for Laing, men really 'feel® and ®experience®, 'think,
imagine, dream®, and these conscious experiences are
leged.
This argument is only intelligible from an immanentist
position, in Husserl's terns:, within which I suspend judge¬
ment on the truth of any reality 'outside® my own conscious¬
ness. From a transcendentalist viewpoint, his argument
is unintelligible. For, from the transcendentalist view¬
point, through reflecting on my thoughts, feelings, imaginings,
dreams, etc., I can seek to investigate the characteristics
of any possible thoughts, feelings, imaginings, dreams, etc.,
and in this sense I can know characteristies of the thoughts,
feelings, imaginings, and dreams of ethers. Such knowledge
is, of course, the aspiration of scientific psychology, and
it is such psychology which Laing finds to be the other kind
of culprit par excellence. He asserts:
The psychiatrist may base his diagnosis of
schizophrenia as much on what he considers the
patient's relation to his actions to be, as on
the actions themselves, viewed as 'behaviour®
pure and simple. If the psychiatrist, or'
psychopathologist, under the illusion that he
sees the other person in a purely 'objective®
way, fails to subject his diagnosis by 'signs®
and 'symptoms' to a critical examination, he
is condemned by these 'clinical® categories to
an impoverished and twisted view of the other.
Such 'clinical® categories as schizoid, autistic,
'impoverished® affect, 'withdrawal®, all pre¬
suppose that there are reliable, valid impersonal
criteria for making attributions about the other
person's relation to his actions., There are no
such reliable or valid criteria.5°
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The belief of those *ontologically secure' persons under¬
standing the world in terms of the transcendental]st
'natural* attitude, places 1ontologically insecure*
inmanentist persons in a false position. They find them¬
selves ir. a divided world, split between their own 'inner*
thoughts, feelings, imaginings, dreainings, etc. on the one
hand, and the 'outer* accounts of those thoughts, feelings,
imaginings, dreamings, accepted as true by others. This
situation is vividly portrayed by laing, as the title
indicates, in his study The Divided Sel f . It is important
to see that this 'divided self* arises as an analytic
possibility as an emergent phenomenon: it is neither the
experience of the immanentist nor the transcendentalist on
his own, or immersed in a society consisting wholly of
ethers of his kind, but is rather the experience of the
immanertist in a world of transcendentalists. Now since
Laing is at ore with Garfinkel and Schutz in his assumption
that the everyday social world is such a world of trans¬
cendentalists, his analysis is wholly compatible with
theirs: if anyone were foolish enough to take up the
immanentist stance, Garfinkel and the othnomethodolcgists
would be forced to agree, then his experiences would indeed
be: as Laing portrays them.
Immanentism
Laing claims, that his perspective enables him to
speak for, and enables us to understand, those whom in the
'natural* attitude we have failed to comprehend, those whom
we have placed in the position of a 'divided self*. He
makes the following general statement as to his interp>retive
procedures, and what distinguished his interpretive proced¬
ures from those of the fscientific* psychologists to whom,
he is so epposed.
One basic function of genuinely analytical or
existential therapy is the provision of a
setting in [ sic] which as little as possible
impedes each person's capacity to discover
his own self.37
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I propose the following interpretation of what this means.
The 'divided self' arises, as an emergent phenomenon in
the situation wherein an immanentist finds himself in a
society of transcendentalists. Plainly, then, if the
analyst takes up a transcendentalist position, if that is,
he approaches the 'patient* with his own theory as to the
conditions of all possible subjective states of mind, then
within the encounter between patient and psychoanalyst,
the divided self phenomenon will once again emerge. I-
have already considered Laing's account of how this is
the case, in the encounter between the patient and the
'scientific' psychologist. But what perspective couldthe
therapist take up which would differ from this? From
Laing's point of view, the therapist must take up an
immanentist position himself, in order not to 'impede' the
immanentism of the patient. This is indeed the position
which Laing himself takes up. Laing states,
our view of the other depends on our willingness
to enlist all the powers of every aspect of our¬
selves in the act of comprehension. It seems
also that we require to orient ourselves to the
person in such a way as to leave open the
possibility of understanding him. The art of
understanding those aspects of an individual's
being which we can observe as expressive of his
mode of being-in-the-world, requires us to relate
his actions to his way of experiencing the
situation he is in with us. Similarly, it is in
terms of his present that we have to understand
his past, and not exclusively the other way round.
This again is true even in the negative instances
when it may be apparent through his behaviour that
he is denying the existence of any situation he
may be in with us, for instance when we feel our¬
selves treated as though we did not exist, or as
existing only in terms of the patient's own wishes
or anxieties. It is not a question here of affix¬
ing predetermined meanings to this behaviour in a
rigid way. If we look at his actions as 'signs*
of a 'disease1, we are already imposing our cate¬
gories of thought on to the patient. In a manner
analogous to the way we may regard him as treating
us; and we shall be doing the same if we imagine
that we can 'explain* his present as a mechanical
resultant of an immutable 'past*.3°
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Laing portrays the gulf between 'his way of experiencing
the situation', 'his mode of being-in-the-world', 'his
present® and 'his past®, and 'ours* as absolute. To con¬
ceive of such a gulf is, as Laing just as much as Schutz,
and Garfinkel, is aware, is quite contrary to the 'natural®
attitude of commonsense.
What is required of us? Understand him? The
kernel of the schizophrenic's experience of
himself must remain incomprehensible to us.
As long as we are sane and he is insane, it
will remain so. But comprehension as an effort
to reach and grasp him, while remaining within
our own world and judging him by our own cate¬
gories by which he inevitably falls short, is
not what the schizophrenic either wants or
requires. We have to recognise all the time
his distinctiveness and differentness, his
separateness and loneliness and despair.39
How can the therapist, Laing, grant the patient such
'recognition®, this curious sympathy which takes the form
of entering, with the patient, into a world in which all
sympathy is eliminated, in which we are all alone, together?
By taking up the very un-'natural® stance of *immanentism®,
in early Husserlian terms, or 'existentialism®, as Sartre
40
puts it. But the danger inherent in this position is
clear. If Laing himself adopts an immanentist position in
order to appreciate the immanentists done down by our trans-
cendentalist society, then he runs the risk of being done
down himself in the same manner. And who better to do him
down than the spokesmen for transcendentalism, the ethno-
methodologists? This is precisely what one ethnomethodolo-
gist, Jeff Coulter, has recently set out to do.
In his chapter entitled, " Phenomenological Conceptions
of Schizophrenia", Coulter discusses Laing's work. Pie sets
tPie scene by way of a discussion of Husserl's point of view:
In seelcing to 'return® to the date of experience
(Erlebnisse), phenomenologists seem to assume a
disjunction between all events and our experience
of them, as if there is always an intrinsic
difference between my description of a thing or
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event, and my description of my conscious
experience of a thing or event. They do
great service when they remind us that
scientific knowledge (like all shared know¬
ledge) has an intersub.jective character ...
but they confuse us when they appear to
assert that there is a 'phenomenal world' ...
somehow superimposed, or co-current with, the
external world.41
The ethnomethodologist approves of the transcendental!st
side of Husserl's work, but disapproves the immanentist
side. More precisely, he situates hhimself within that
'heaven' in which correspondence between consciousness
and consciousness, and so with the world, is assured, and
from this position disbelieves in the 'hell' in which such
correspondences cannot be assumed.
From Coulter's point of view the 'immanentist' vision
of Sartre and of Laing, is simply wrong - unintelligible,
even mad. It is instructive to consider one analysis by
Laing, and Coulter's response to it, in crder to see what
this means. Consider then the following: Coulter's commen¬
tary on a case presented by Laing in The Politics of
.. . 42
Experience:
Laing presents a transcription, with accompany¬
ing interpretive commentary, of a subject's
recollections of a psychotic 'episode' (a voyage
'into inner space and time') recorded twenty-
five years afterwards. A feature of this voyag¬
ing is 'ego-loss', wherein a danger is that 'One's
own ego-less mind may be confused with one's ego.'
A profusion of similarly metaphoric and apocalyptic
imagery follows: the narrative is suffused with
poetry and rhetoric.43
The core of Coulter's complaint is that:
Laing treats his subjects' utterances both as
resources for the explication of theoretical
notions ('ontological insecurity' and 'self body
split'), some of which he borrows from Sartre,
some from Heidegger, and also as sketcly accounts
in need of repair from time to time. We switch
from a specialised sublanguage, probably quite
foreign to the interlocutor, to paraphrasing and
fillers-in with terms that do not significantly
depart from the overall manner in which the
subject is himself speaking. When Laing engages
in the use of his sublanguage, we are supposed
to see in that an attempt at illumination or
clarification; but it is here where we cannot
be sure who is the better authority - analyst
or analysand. Since his subject is cited as
speaking coherent, albeit poetic, English
sentences, it seems a little odd to see Laing
as decoding them in a manner analogous to the
translation of an alien tongue.44
What seems, perhaps, odder is the implied claim Coulter is
making for his own approach to the speech of 'schizophrenics1
and other everyday members of society: is this to involve no
'specialised sublanguage1, no 'decoding5 of 'coherent English
sentences 5 ?
But first consider what for Coulter is a very different
matter, but which one suspects is the same matter exactly,
in another guise, namely Coulter's approach to the speech of
his professional colleague. For I suggest that Laing's
writing too involves 5 coherent English sentences': but
Coulter's 'decoding' of this writing is designed precisely
to translate these into an alien tongue. Coulter finds
Laing's statement 'One's own ego-less mind may be confused
with one's ego' to be an example of 'metaphoric and apo¬
calyptic imagery'. I propose, ironically, that Coulter's
words are eminently self-certifying: his expression is
itself 'metaphoric and apocalyptic'. More seriously, I
propose that his statement confirms exactly my earlier
analysis of the character of 'sociological' ethnomethodology.
For here Coulter attributes anomie to Laing's speech,
precisely as Garfinkel did to the speech of the Experimenter,
and generally, as transcendentalism must do to
immanentism.
I propose an alternative interpretation of Laing's
remark. Consider the context in which it appears. The
statement made by the inner voyager, Jesse Watkins, describes
an experience he had, as follows:
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'I was put in a bed and -- um well, I remember
that night it was an apalling sort of experience
because I had the - feeling that - um - that I
was then - that I had died. And I felt that
other people were in beds around me, and I thought
they were all other people that had died - and
they were there - just waiting to pass on to the
next department J^5
Laing comments,
He had not died physically, but his 1 ego1 had
died. Along with this ego-loss, this death,
came feelings of the enhanced significance and
relevance of everything. Loss of ego may be
confused with one's death. ... One's own ego¬
less mind may be confused with one's ego.4"
It is certainly clear that Laing's comment is a translation,
just as Coulter says it is. Laing renders Jesse's account
in his own terms, terms which presumably are unavailable to
Jesse. What terms are these? One can be perfectly explicit
about this. Far from being 'metaphoric' or 'apocalyptic',
they are precise analytical terms: the terms of immanentist
Husserlian phenomenology, as adopted by Sartre in his
Transcendence of the Ego. In these terms, the 'ego' that
has 'died' is the 'I' of the patient, an 'object' or
'puppet' portrayed in the speech of Jesse. The 'I* that
'had the feeling* is not the same 'I'. It is Jesse's
'consciousness* or 'cogito', which is Laing's 'he' that had
not died physically. Thus, the 'I* of reflected thought,
the social * I*, had gone: all that was left was the
immanent cogito.
Subj ectivism
Laing's account is a theoretical account. The voice
which he speaks, and its 'relation' to the voices about
which he speaks, is open to investigation by investigating
that theory, as indeed I am presently doing. There can be no
grounds for criticism of him for this, per se. Rather, if
one is interested in attributing praise or blame, then a
necessary pre-requisite is that one should first locate
the theory, with which he speaks. Having so located his
theory, I do indeed now criticise the 'relation* which that
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voice claims to the voices about which it speaks.
Laing understands an interpretation such as the one I
have here considered in terms of his statement that ![t]he
art of understanding those aspects of an individual's being
which we can observe ... requires us to relate his actions
to his way of experiencing the situation he is in with us.'
But, in his view, such interpretation can only ever be
incomplete; '[t]he kernel of the schizophrenic's experience
of himself must remain incomprehensible to us'. In short,
he understands his interpretation as a formulation of a
phenomenon, 'consciousness', 'cogito', 'subjectivity8, which
transcends formulation. Thus Laing himself exhibits a
'divided self'. On the one hand, an interpretation such as
that of Jesse Watkins' dream poses itself as absolute, that
is, as Coulter points out, as a translation from a less
articulate voice (Jesse's) to a more articulate voice
(Laing's interpretation). But on the other hand, in his
'meta-statements' about interpretation he claims that any
such interpretation must be dependent. What really seems
to be involved in Laing's scheme is this: Jesse's 'subject¬
ivity', transcends any formulation of it, including Jesse's
own and Laing's. Laing's formulation of it, however, is a
better one than Jesse's. Thus we have the spectacle of a
competition between two speakers, Jesse and Laing, to best
articulate an inarticulable transcendent, which goes by the
name of 'Jesse'.
Do I, then, share Coulter's criticisms of Laing? I
share them, and I claim, employ them more consistently than
Coulter does. For me, these objections are just as force¬
fully employed against Coulter himself. In order to see this,
consider now the other section of his essay which is of
importance to us, namely Coulter's investigation into
conversations with persons labelled 'schizophrenic'.
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Intersubj ecti vlsm
Before discussing CouHer's own research, I should
perhaps anticipate what one might expect an 'ethnomethodo-
logical1 approach to find worthy of investigation in the
field of 'insanity1 given that the 'consciousness' of the
'insane' person is not a worthy topic of such an enquiry.
By contrast to Laing and Sartre's focus upon 'subjectivity'
as the transcendent reality, Garfinkel and Schutz focus
upon 'intersubjectivity'. It may be anticipated, then,
that an 'ethnomethodological' approach to this topic would
concern itself with everyday ways of dealing with 'insanity'.
But more can be said than this. As 'sociologists', the
'ethnomethodologists' work within the perspective of the
problem of sociology, conceiving of everyday speakers as
'solving' the problem of 'order' versus 'disorder', 'anomie'.
So it may be anticipated that the problem of 'dealing with
'insanity' will be conceived as the problem of 'dealing
with disorder 1. And one further prediction can be made.
Following Schutz, the ethnomethodologists conceive of the
everyday world of the 'natural' attitude as the 'best of all
possible worlds', indeed, qua transcendent, as the only
possible world. It can be anticipated then further that
the 'everyday' procedures of dealing with insanity as dis¬
order will be upheld as the best of all possible ways, indeed
as beyond criticism, in striking contrast to Laing1s indict¬
ment of these procedures.
Each of these characteristics is indeed to be found,
in Coulter's presentation. He tells us,
We must, I believe, redefine the sociologist's
legitimate interest in the phenomena of mental
disorder, and provide a re formulation of his
research task. Such a task ... should not be
the provision of either mechanistic or conven¬
tional reason-adducing accounts aimed at
covering the whole field of mental disorders or
any specific class or sample of the same. The
sociologist must turn away from 'explanation'
of the whys of insanity and toward a description
of the hows of insanity ascription. 47
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Consider one such analysis offered by Coulter, to see
what it involves. One constituent feature of some insanity
ascriptions, which Coulter discusses,is that of hallucina¬
tion. He offers us the following record of an interview
between a 'Mental Welfare Officer' and an interviewee, as
an illustration of the way in which 'the hows of insanity
ascription1 may be investigated. The man being interviewed,
Coulter states, was living in a flat, and was reported to
the Mental Health Department by his flatmate "because of
his moodiness, irritability, and refusal to get out of bed
day after day - a condition which arose shortly after the
man's brother's death".^
Mental Welfare Officer: How long is't since yer brother
died, Frank?
Frank: About a year. (Pause)
MWO: D'ya . . . think . . . about 1im much?
Fd Yeah. (Pause) Quite a bit.
MWO: Errm ... d'ya ever hear him? In
yer thoughts I mean. D'ya ever
hear Iris voice?
F: No. (Pause) No, I think about Vim.
MWO: Are they yer own thoughts or yer
brother's, Frank? (Pause)
Fd Me own thoughts.
MWO: Does yer brother ... er ... yer
brother ever speak t'ya from beyond?
(Pause)
Fd They're me own thoughts.
Coulter is concerned with the speech of the Mental Welfare
Officer, not that of Frank. He argues,
Given limited time and resources, mental health
personnel must do an ad hoc operation of probing
where they think necessary in order to obtain
grounds for inference [as] to psychological
status; it is not always possible to allow mun¬
dane conversation to develop in the hope that it
might generate such grounds by itself, and
officers frequently force the issue in an attempt
to detect any undisplayed mental problems.50
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Thus, in terms of the conversation, Coulter points out
that the MWO1s line of questioning "is not deterred by
preliminary negative responses, which might, after all,
be further evidence of the covertness of the 'real, under¬
lying' trouble!'"'*
Here Coulter is involved, just as was Laing, in 'trans¬
lating' what are 'coherent English sentences' into his own
terms. Once again, there can be no grounds for criticism
of him for this, per se. Rather, if one is interested in
attributing praise or blame, then a necessary pre-requisite
is that one should first locate the theory with which he
speaks. Having so located his theory, I do indeed now
criticise the 'relation' which that voice claims to the
voices about which it speaks. Coulter understands an
interpretation such as the one he is here dealing with in
terms of his statement that "my discussion of insanity
ascription [begins] to focus upon the conventional
procedures and presuppositions involved in any set of
52
recorded instances of talk about psychological status".
But in his view such interpretation can only ever be in¬
complete: "We seek out and state the logically unavoidable
procedures and presuppositions which members can make,
irrespective of guessing any situated reading a member does
make. Our interest lies not in definitive warrants for
interpretations, but in specifying available interpretive
51
procedures". In short, he understands his interpretation
as a formulation of a phenomenon, 'intersubjectivity', which
transcends formulation. Thus Coulter himself speaks 'meta¬
phorically and apocalyptically'. On the one hand, an
interpretation such as that of the Mental Welfare Officer's
questioning poses itself as absolute. That is, the MWO is
posed as having no alternative but to speak in the way he
does: 'given limited time and resources, mental health
personnel must do an ad hoc operation of probing'. It is
not always possible to allow mundane conversation to develop.
But on the other hand, in his 'meta-statements' about inter¬
pretation, which I have just considered, he denies there
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can be any such 'definitive warrants'. What really seems
to be involved in Coulter's scheme is th is: 'intersubject-
ivity', the definitive range of 'available interpretive
procedures', transcends any formulation of them, including
the MWO 's own, and Coulter's. Coulter's formulation of
them, however, is a better one than the MWO's. Thus we
have the spectacle of a competition between two speakers,
the MWO and Coulter, to best articulate an inarticulable
transcendent, which goes by the name of 'intersubjectivity'.
Thus, Coulter's criticisms of Laing are turned back
upon himself.
Linguistic Phenomenology
Both Laing and his 'existential psychiatrist' colleagues
on the one hand, and Garfinkel, Coulter, and their 'ethno-
methodological' colleagues on the other, sustain, following
respectively Sartre and Schutz, a vision of their own speech
as well as that of everyday speakers as dedicated to the
task of glorifying a transcendent reality itself posed as
outside speech. The opposition between these two visions
is, I propose, not accidental but is itself an expression
of the structure of meaningfulness which the phenomenologists
have explored and within which their writing is itself
located. It is only by coming to terms with this structure
that a realistic phenomenology can be produced.
But what prospect is there of overcoming this dualism?
I propose to explore a third possibility by refusing to lay
claim to any transcendent reality, whether 'subjectivity'
or 'intersubjectivity', standing outside speech. Such an
approach will reverse the assumption of the essentialists,
whether subjectivist or intersubjectivist, that speech is a
false expression of the truth of these realities. It will
rather propose that these 'realities' are the figments of
accounts of reality in speech, whereas it is the speech
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"that is real. It will focus a.tt°nti on speech itself,
placing in brackets any reality to which speech is
supposed to correspond. In this sense it will be neither
a socio-logy nor a psycho-logy, but a linguistic pheno¬
menology in the strict sense of the term.
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Chapter Four
SOME WAYS OF NOT LISTENING TO WHAT PEOPLE SAY
A Pure Speaking
The aim of my investigation is to produce a linguistic
phenomenology. I have investigated the existing claimants
to this title stemming from Husserl via Schutz on the one
hand and Sartre on the other and found them in each case to
suffer from the fact that they pose transcendent realities
standing outside the language which they investigate, and
are thereby not genuinely phenomenological in Husserl's
sense of the term. Otherwise stated, they are respectively
'sociological5 or psychological' rather than 'philosophical'.
That is to say, they respectively posit a 'society' (inter-
subjectivity) or a 'psyche' (subjectivity) as the reality to
which the appearance of speech corresponds, rather than
acknowledging that within speech itself the distinction
between appearance and reality is already made, and that the
relation between these two is a problem for speakers, and
not simply for the sociologists or psychologists who speak
about their speech. In contrast to these two reductionist
approaches which stem respectively from Husserl's 'immanentist'
and 'transcendentalist5 investigations taken in isolation, I
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have upheld the possibility of a 'realistic' phenomenology,
which attempts to draw upon Husserl's two enquiries as a
unity.
It is now time to pursue that possibility further. A
first statement of the modus operandi of such a phenomeno¬
logy may be derived from a statement made by Husserl in
his early Idea of Phenomenology. There he proposes:
Every intellectual process, and indeed every
mental process whatever, while being enacted,
can be made the object of a pure 'seeing' and
understanding, and is something absolutely
given in this 'seeing'.^
How can Husserl's proposal be put into effect as a method
of investigating language? In the phenomenological stance which
he here recommends, Husserl advocates a suspension of any
belief in an external reality to which 'intellectual
processes' correspond, and instead a focus on those 'pro¬
cesses' as a reality sui generis. I propose a borrowing of
his idea : this would involve suspending any belief in an
external reality to which 'linguistic1 processes correspond,
and instead a focus on those 'processes' as a reality sui
generis.
Though Husserl's formulation is itself expressed in
language, it proposes both an object of enquiry, namely
'intellectual processes', and a mode of enquiry, namely
'seeing' which are posed as realities external to language.
If both are translated into linguistic terms, then the mode
presumably becomes one of 'pure speaking'. The aspiration
to a 'pure speaking' seems fraught with difficulties however,
not the least of which is that such speech would somehow have
to give a perfect account of its own character as speech.
However the aspiration to such a speech undoubtedly acts as
a polemic force against those 'impure' forms of speech which
are demonstrably not presuppositionless in the way that, qua
phenomenological speech, they claim to be. Thrust on by the
logic of the argument itself, I propose to pursue this aim,
of a 'pure speaking' though anticipating this aim to be
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impossible of attainment,in order to discover what is
achieved when that aim is pursued.
So, in aiming at the ideal which Husserl has provoked
in me, namely that of 'pure speech' , I adopt an attitude
somewhat different to that of, inter alia, the positivist
2
methodologists who currently hold sway in social science.
I expect that the ideal itself may be unattainable, and
that, this being so, my way of living up to this ideal
will be revealing of myself, as well as of the ideal. By
contrast, the positivist believes that he attains the
ideal, and as such that neither 'he' nor the ideal are
revealed by his doing so. I can permit myself, then, a
certain playfulness in my approach to this ideal, not with
a view to being anarchic but with a view to revealing as¬
pects of the ideal and of myself which might otherwise have
remained hidden. I adopt, in short, an ironic attitude
towards Husserl's methodological recommendation.^ With
this aspiration in mind, then, I turn to the empirical
content of enquiry, namely the 'everyday' speech of teachers
and pupils in a school classroom.
Reporting Speech
The conversation materials which I am about to report
were collected from a class of forty-one boys, and their
teachers, in a large urban comprehensive school in a
Scottish city. I shall call it Port Ness school. The
class was a lower-middle stream boys class in the second
year: I shall call it class D2. The boys were mainly
fourteen years of age, and of skilled manual working-class
family backgrounds. I engaged in participant observation
with this class over a period of six months from January
1970. Unless I had a special reason for absence, I attended
all of their lessons during this period, and usually spent
breaks and lunch times in the company of the boys. I also
visited all their homes once or twice during the period,
and some of the youth clubs and other organisations which
they frequented out of school. I maintained cordial but
not familiar relations with the teaching staff, and inter¬
viewed each teacher towards the end of my stay. However,
all of the conversations reported in this study were
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collected in the classroom itself. I simply recorded
conversations which interested me in longhand in a note¬
book. This admittedly rough and ready procedure offered
one outstanding advantage over tape-recording, the more
usual procedure today. This was, its flexibility. In
the setting of the school classroom, in which most people
were sitting at desks writing in books for most of the
time, my own activity, namely sitting at a desk writing in
a book, was inconspicuous. In the playground, I was often
able to retire from a conversation to jot down an exchange
which I had observed, without drawing attention to myself.
In general, any remark which I overheard on any occasion
could be recorded.
Nonetheless, it will be retorted, the method did con¬
stitute an intervention in the setting: my presence, my
conversation with those already present, and my activity
of writing all constituted a disturbance. Events took
place which would not have taken place had I been absent,
and events which would, or could, have taken place did not,
or could not, because I was present. These points must be
addressed. As to the first, the most clear-cut category
of 'events which would not have taken place had I been
absent1 is those events specifically oriented toward me.
Such events occurred, and insofar as they were linguistic
were reportable by me. Indeed several such incidents
provided intriguing samples of conversation for my analysis.
There is no reason why they should be excluded. Insofar as
events oriented to me were linguistic events, they were of
as much interest for my enquiry as were linguistic events
oriented to others. As to the second point, its importance
must be considered in the specific context of the present
enquiry. My concern is with the range of linguistic events,
a range defined by my own categories. In terms of those
categories, such a range was indeed found within the
materials which I collected. Although this range may be
narrower than it could otherwise have been, it is nonethe¬
less a range upon which my analysis can set to work.
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In order to introduce that analysis consider now the
approach which I made to one teac^er^ in the very first
7
lesson which I observed during my stay at Port Ness.
The lesson was English, taught by a teacher I shall call
Mr. Cramond. His classroom was open, and the boys entered
before he arrived. When he appeared, I noted,
At first, almost complete silence. As lesson
goes on, some talking, some gazing around, some
whispering and hand tapping, coughing."
The lesson dealt with etymology, e.g. 'tele-vision' means
'vision at a distance'. The teacher generally talked, then
recapitulated, asking questions whose answers were the
facts he had just given. I noted that there was "lively
competition to answer" and a "good deal of shouting out",
and that the knows a lot of boys' Christian
names" . ' Toward the end of the lesson he gave them
"'seven minutes to talk quietly' "^, and came to talk to me.
He told me that "this class very good - f>ji never needed to
reprimand anyone".^ I noted,
Mr. Cramond has v^// relaxed air, though kind
of ... firmness in face jLfi taut, and ^
voice hard, commands all the time.
He told me that he made a point of learning boys' Christian
names because the use of surnames "'sets a barrier between
you and them - I had that all through my school, surnames
1 5
only'". Also, he told me, he always gave the boys five
minutes to talk at the end of lessons.
On my first encounter with Mr. Cramond, then, I made
various observations which help to convey the atmosphere
of his lesson. But they did so only by formulating the
situation in my words. To describe Mr. Cramond as 'relaxed',
'firm of face', with a 'hard, commanding voice' conjures
up a picture of a teacher - but he is then no more than a
puppet in my portrayal of the world. This approach denies
access to his own ability to conjure up such visions. This




In my second lesson with Mr.Cramond, I began to make
observations of a different kind. This was the second period
of a Monday afternoon, which as I later discovered Mr. Cramond
regularly set aside for compositions. On this occasion, which
was the first composition lesson after the Christmas-New Year
holidays,^he began by naming two alternative composition
titles, 'Hogmanay','^ or 'The Best Day of the Holidays'. He
discussed some points of writing style, e.g. that paragraph
beginnings should be indented but that otherwise lines should
start close to the margin. Then he announced,
'When we do compositions, we don't have any
talking at all. I hope that is clear'.^
This utterance repays a little attention. For it gives
access to the vision of the world conjured up by the
speech of a person within the situation. What can be made
of it?
I have elsewhere explored some of the less fruitful
1 7
ways in which this utterance may be approached. Now, I
approach it with a clearer mind. This linguistic process,
while being enacted is to be made the object of a 'pure
speaking'. I have found the following train of thought to
be suggestive, in encouraging a new way of looking at a
remark such as this one, a way which promises to exemplify
the ideal proposed by Husserl. It is inspired by my own
research experience, namely that of coming from a training
as a social anthropologist in ways of approach] rig the
strangest and most distant cultures from our own, to a
situation at once familiar and close at hand, namely a
school classroom. Was it not possible to recognise the
strangeness that can be seen in the familiar and the close
l 8
at hand? This is after all only the reverse of the
practise of the social anthropologist, which is to recognise
the familiarity of the strange and distant.
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A direct way of making this transformation presents
itself from this line of thought. Consider the we and the
1 in Mr. Cramond's remark. These are words which are so
familiar to us that we scarcely count them as words. We
think of them simply as pointers, equivalent perhaps to a
brief gesture with the forefinger, pointing to persons
really present, ' "' with us. Perhaps in a 'Schutzian1 frame
of mind we experience the vivid presence of these persons
face-to-face with us as infinitely richer than these mere
words. Or, perhaps in a more Sartrian mood, I conceive the
mystery of the other's difference from myself to be such
that mere words can never bridge the gap between us. We
conceive of the we and the X as indications of a reality
external to language, not as entities worthy of considera¬
tion in their own right. Certainly, we neither expect nor
want to learn about the we_ and the I from words such as
these. But suppose the utterance was
When Baba Yaga stamps three times, she turns
twice the size. The frog promised this event
would soon be seen.
Faced with this passage, we experience what Schutz calls an
existential 'shock'. Our attitude changes dramatically, our
feeling of familiarity changes to one of strangeness and un¬
certainty. We know a little about Baba Yaga - she figures
in many Russian folk tales, and so do frogs that talk. But
because we know that these characters figure nowhere but in
tales, we pay those tales special attention. They are the
only way in which we can learn about Baba Yaga and such
frogs. What is more, faced with a magical tale of this kind,
we are less certain of our usually taken-for-granted pre¬
sumptions about any character, any person, at all. Rather
than jumping to conclusions, we wait attentively for each
new fact about these characters. And we tentatively put
together their properties and try to make sense of them.
Finally, uncertain about these characters, we are also
uncertain about the milieu in which they live, and in
particular its relation to the one which we believe our¬
selves to inhabit. We are attentive too, therefore, for
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any signs of familiarity within the strange tale, which
can help us to locate it in relation oo ourselves.
Now, I propose to return to Mr. Cramond's utterance,
and treat it with the attention which we would have been
prepared to give to the folk tale.
Consider what is in the present case. Take the we
and I. referred to in the utterance. Obviously, it might
be said, we know what these refer to: the boys and the
teacher together, and the teacher alone, respectively.
But, under my new attitude of mind, I propose to refrain
from any such 'obvious1 judgements, which begin and end
with the assumption that there is nothing more to be said,
that we already know what is obvious for Mr. Cramond. I
prefer to assume that his remarks are his way of saying
what is obvious for him.
In what relationship then are these two 'persons'
posed as standing, first to one another, second to the
impersonal features of Mr. Cramond's picture? Seemingly,
the we is posed as subject to a rule, of the form 'if A
then B', (in this case, when one does compositions |] then]
one does not have any talking at all). The I then appears
as standing back from the we, reflecting on its position:
'_I hope that |~ the position of the we] is clear'. It seems
that here the 1 is posed as the interpreter of the rule.
The we itself apparently has no room for manoeuvre within
the rule. But doubt is possible in the province of the I,
namely over the interpretation of the rule: the term 'hope'
seems to express something less than certainty: it seems
the I_ is available to the unspecified others present to
make the interpretation clear if they wish.
The utterance, then, seems to convey the following
definition of the situation:
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1. There are rules governing our position here,
rules which can be explicitly stated.
2. The rules affect all of us (the we) without
distinction.
3- My special position (the I.) is not that I
stand above the rules, but that I can inter¬
pret the rules to you if you are in doubt
about them.
Already then it has been possible to provide a description
of the reality which Mr. " Cramond - sustains in his speech.
This description has been produced in a manner analogous to
the descriptive phenomenology elaborated in Husserl's Ideas,
which takes as its object what is unique and personal in
subjective life. By contrast I have taken as my object
what is unique and personal in the speech of an individual.
But on its own mere description pertains to the immanentism
which has been explored in Sartre and in Laing: the vision
of unique individual subjectivities, here translated into a
portrayal of unique private languages. If my language des¬
cribing the teacher's language is simply yet another unique
private language, then it is no more 'pure' than any other.
If my language claims more than this, it must make a claim
to theorise, and so speak of language in general. It is to
such theorising that I now turn.
Theorising
If my describing was inspired by Husserl's Ideas, my
theorising is inspired by his Cartesian Meditations. It
asks, what does Mr. Cramond's qaeech reveal as to the
necessary conditions of any possible speech? Generalising
from my analysis of this utterance, it would appear that
every speaker can conjure up in his speech what might be
called a 'world'. This world can be described as comprising
a series of different realms, each with its specific
properties, and each inhabited by specific persons. In
confirmation of the idea which inspired this vision, note
that such a 'world' is in principle very like the 'cosmology'
conjured up in the folk tales of traditional society or
the myths of a primitive tribe.
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But, more significantly for the present argument,
such a world of multiple realms appears to be the exact
equivalent, in linguistic terms, of the 'multiple realities'
described by Schutz as properties of conscious experience.
Within such a world, then, the different characters, IE, we,
and others, are puppets conjured up by the speaker. The
time in which they live, whether past, present, or future,
is created for them by their speaker. The space which they
inhabit, whether it has differentiated areas of great
complexity, or an absence of such differentiation, is
space granted to them by their speaker. And such conscious¬
ness as they may have, whether it be a brute mechanism of
primitive urges, or a sophisticated appreciation of other
persons, will be solely a consciousness attributed to them
2 0
and sustained by that speaker.
But does this convergence with Schutz's ideas then
involve a capitulation to his version of 'phenomenology'
as against that of Sartre or others? Not at all. Intri-
guingly, this conception harmonises perfectly well with
Sartre's account of conscious experience. The cornerstone
of his first work, the Transcendence of the Ego, was the
contention that 'the I is, in the same manner as the world,
an object for consciousness'. It follows, of course, that
so are the we, you, they, etc. In my terms, then, each of
these entities is 'an object for language'. This is no
trivial point. On the contrary, this 'translation'
expresses the intelligibility of Sartre's insight more
clearly than he does himself. Thus, a core implication of
his theory is that 'my I in effect is no more certain for
consciousness than the I of other men. It is only more
intimate'. So long as this thesis is expressed in terms
of consciousness, it seems to be at best an analogy: the
'I' per se is not visible: it could only be inferred by a
complex and problematic interpretation. But in my terms,
the thesis is exact. My X, as a feature of my speech, is
directly visible to other men. The promise of my method,
then, is that it produces a syncretism of the two divergent
phenomenologies of Schutz and Sartre.
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But the very divergence of these approaches poses
a further problem. Since Schutz and Sartre each advocate,
prima facie, very different notions of 'reality1, what is
the notion of 'reality' implicit in this 'syncretism'? I
have once again found the anthropological analogy suggestive
in answering this question. The identification of the world
of multiple realms conjured up by the individual speaker
within an everyday setting with the world conjured up in
fairy tales, or in myths, immediately invites the criticism
which Hindess directed against Schutz's 'multiple realities'
conception. As noted earlier, Hindess is particularly
aggrieved by the implication of Schutz's position that
science itself, and indeed all sense of 'reality' is no
more than a "fairy tale'. As has been seen, he expresses
this criticism by referring to Schutz's position as
"psychologism', insofar as 'relationships between provinces
of meaning exist only in the consciousness of the knowing
subject'. In translation, Hindess' criticism of my present
position can be expressed by the charge of 'linguisticism',
the claim that 'relationships between realms exist only in
the language of the speaker',- Indeed, Hindess includes
within his description of 'psychologism' the view that
these relationships exist 'in books or papers that the
subject may have written'.
Hindess' charge stands so long as the object of
linguistic phenomenological investigation is taken to be
concretely the speech of the individual speaker, or the
2 1
text of the individual writer. The speech in which I
described the speech of Mr. Cramond was a concrete speech
in this sense. My speaking posed his utterance as a self-
sufficient e_x niliilo creation. As such my speaking was
'impure' in speaking of a reality external to itself. A
pure speaking would acknowledge its sameness with the
speech of which it speaks. How can this be done?
Analysing
The object of linguistic phenomenology is not the
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concrete speech of a single speaker nor the books and
papers of a single writer. It is rather the language
2 2
which makes possible both speech and writing." This
language cannot be apprehended by treating either speech
or writing at face value. Such a treatment trades on all
manner of presuppositions which remain unexplicated, covered
over by the belief in the mysterious uniqueness of the
2 2
utterance or text." The ideal of presuppositionlessness
remains suggestive. I propose to treat as problematic the
unity of the utterance, and to re-examine the utterance as
Husserl puts it 'while being enacted'i.e. sequentially
Aspiring to bring with me no presuppositions, I shall seek
th explicate, step-by-step, the way in which the utterance
itself puts forward suppositions and connects them together.
Consider then the utterance, word by word. The first
word encountered, following this procedure, is 'when'.
"When This word does not 'make sense' on its own. But
it points forward to other words which will com¬
plete its sense. Encountering this word, one
knows in some detail what to expect. 'When' refers
to a time. There are two aspects to such a time,
first 'when' it is, and secondly what will happen
'at' that time. If the present utterance is
coherent, one may expect that each of these
aspects will be specified. One may also antici¬
pate the grammatical form in which they will be
specified. The normal form is 'when A then B',
where A specifies the time, and B specifies what
will happen 'at' that time.
we This word does not complete the sense begun by
the first word, 'when'. It therefore itself
points forward to other words, as yet unspecified,
which will complete that sense if the utterance is
well formed.
do This word contributes to the sense begun by the
previous word 'we'. As it does not complete this
sense, it points forward to other words which will
complete it.
composi¬
tions This word completes the sense begun by the previous
two words, 'we' and 'do'. These three words
together form a self-contained unit of sense,
namely 'we do compositions', which points neither
forward nor backward: it requires no other words
to complete it. This unit is therefore an example
of an atomic unit of sensibility within the
utterance.
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I propose to call such a unit a picture.
The sense of the picture has been completed but within
the utterance a loose end remains to be completed. The word
'when1, I previously noted, required the specification of two
further aspects to complete its sense. It is now possible
to see that the picture 'we do compositions' expressed the
first of these aspects. It may be anticipated that another
picture will complete the second. However, no such picture
has yet presented itself, that is, the sense of the utterance
still points forward.
we This word points forward to complete its sense,
and still the when points forward to complete
its own sense.
don't This word contributes to the sense begun by the
previous word 'we'. As it does not complete
this sense, it points forward to other words
which will complete it.
have This word contributes to the sense begun by the
previous words 'we don't'. As it does not complete
this sense, it points forward to other words which
will complete it.
any This word contributes to the sense begun by the
previous words 'we don''t have'. As it does not
complete this sense, it points forward to other
words which will complete it.
talking This word completes the sense begun by the previous
words, ''we don't have any'. These five words
together form a self-contained unit of sense,
namely 'we don't have any talking' which points
neither forward nor backward: it requires no other
words to complete it. This unit, then, is a second
instance of the atomic unit of sense which I have
called a picture.
Not only the sense of the second picture has now been
completed. The loose end remaining from the uncompleted
sense of the 'when' has now been closed. There is now no
outstanding sense awaiting completion. The whole string of
words, 'when we do compositions we don't have any talking'
thus comprises a self-contained unit of sense. But this is
not an atomic unit. Rather, since it contains within itself
as constituent parts two atomic units together with an
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additional word, it is a molecular unit,
call such a molecular unit, a stanza.
I propose to
at It is not clear that this word refers to any word
previously spoken, but it is clear that it points
forward to other words which will complete its sense.
all This word contributes to the sense begun by the
previous word, 'at1. It is possible to read these
two words together as contributing to the sense of
the previous picture, and completing that sense.
But that sense was already complete. These two
words therefore provide a specifically additional
sense which retrospectively attaches itself to
that picture. In completing that picture for the
second time, they also complete the stanza for the
second time.
1^ No previously spoken word contributes to completing
the sense of this word, accordingly it does not
point backwards. It does, however, point forwards
to other words which will complete it.
hope This word contributes to the sense begun by the
previous word, 'I'. It could indeed be regarded as
completing that sense even though 'hope1 requires
an object to complete its sense. For it would be
possible to regard the first stanza of the utter¬
ance as completing that sense by being what the I
'hoped'. However what follows provides an explicit
object of the 'hope', so that I shall disregard this
possibility here. The 'hope' can be regarded as
requiring further words to complete its sense. I
propose here to so regard it.
that This word does not complete the sense begun by the 'I
hope'. Accordingly, this sense and the sense which it
has begun point forward to other words which will com¬
plete it.
is This word contributes to completing the sense of the
previous word, 'that', though not to the earlier two
words, 'I hope'. As it does not complete either sense,
both senses point forward to other words which will
complete them.
clear This word completes the sense of the previous two words,
'that is'. These three words together form a self-
contained unit of sense, namely 'that is clear', which is
accordingly a third picture. This third picture, 'that
is clear', itself completes the sense of the two words,
'I hope'. Thus 'I hope' plus 'that is clear' together
make up a fourth picture. However this is, I propose,
really two pictures of which one is contained within the
other. These two together form a self-contained unit of
meaning comprising two atomic units, that is, a second
stanza.
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Thus the utterance as a whole comprises two stanzas,
each comprising two pictures. Each stanza is a self-
contained sensible unit, comprised of two pictures which
are self-contained sensible units. However, the sense of a
stanza is not simply some kind of addition, of the senses
of its constituent pictures, and neither is the sense of the
whole utterance simply some kind of addition of the senses
of its constituent stanzas. It seems, then, that ray pro¬
cedure ■ has only performed, half the task of a phenomenological
approach to the utterance: namely, the analysis of the utter¬
ance into its constituent units. The further task remains, of
showing how these constituent units are combined together in
a synthesis.
Nonetheless, the findings of the analysis are worth
reporting in their own right. I propose an algebraic and
diagrammatic notation to simplify presentation of its
findings. The algebraic notation employs roman numerals.
I use upper case numerals to designate stanzas, thus: 'P, 'II'
I use lower case numerals to designate pictures within the
stanzas of which they are part, thus: ' Ii ' , 'Iii', 'Hi1,
5 Hi i1. In the event of a single picture being a stanza on
its own, this can be designated with a zero, thus: 'IIIo'.
The diagrammatic notation employs brackets. I use square
brackets to designate stanzas, thus: s[ ]'. I use round
brackets to designate pictures within the square brackets
designating the stanza of which they are part, thus: '[( )
( )!*, or in the case of a single picture stanza, ' ( )]'•
In the event of one picture being contained within another
picture, as in the utterance here treated as an example,I
enclose sets of round brackets one inside the other, as
appropriate. In addition, words which are constituent parts
of stanzas without being parts of pictures are written in
block capitals, thus: 'WHEN'. Finally, a 'false ending' to
a picture such as occurs after 'talking' in the present




It. is also necessary to identify utterances as a
whole. For a given speaker, I employ arable numerals
followed by an asterisk, thus: 81"-'. Where necessary,
the speaker may be identified by prefixing this number with
his initial letter, thus 'CI*8. The asterisk appears so
that, should it be necessary to refer to a specific stanza,
this can be done by prefixing the utterance identification
to the stanza or picture identification, thus: 8 C1"" Iii 8 ,
8 CI""Hi 8 , etc.
Accordingly, the analysis of the utterance just com¬
pleted may be summarised in the following display:
I
i i i
[WHEN (we do compositions) (we don't have any talking at all
II
i n
[ ( I hope ( that is clear )
Mr. Cramond's utterance CI
I propose to express this analysis in terms of the
notation which I have devisbd. I shall employ the ampersand,
T&8, to designate a hypothetical relation known concretely,
but not yet expressed synthetically. Then the utterance
comprises two stanzas, in a relation which has not yet been
explicated. That is,
CI* = I & II (1 )
Now, each of these stanzas has an internal structure
of two pictures whose relationships have not yet been
explicated. So:
CI--" I = i & ii (2a)
CI-"II = i & ii (2b)
The advantage of the diagrammatic and algebraic nota
tion is, that it provides an absolutely explicit formula¬
tion of my analysis of the utterance.
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S ynt h e s i s i n g
My analysis has succeeded in questioning the unity of
the utterance. It has in fact fragmented that utterance.
Is the vision of language which I am proposing then one of
free-floating 'atoms' and 'molecules1 of sense, as opposed
to the coherence of conversation as it concretely appears
to its participants? It is not. The analysis thus far
completed represents only the first stage of the linguistic
phenomenological procedure. The analysis has concerned
itself with the sense of the utterance. It has disregarded
24
its reference." But how could it acknowledge and investi¬
gate reference, if 'reference' was a feature of the external
world to which the utterance referred? Undoubtedly, it
could not. But I should like to propose an alternative
conception of reference to this, a conception of reference
to intra-linguistic entities. What could such entities be?
They are, the transcendent 'realities' sustained by speech.
And what is definitive of such transcendent 'realities'?
I propose, that the repeated relation between one word and
another, is what establishes these 'realities' as the
object of a linguistic phenomenological enquiry.
The analysis of the utterance was concerned with the
internal relations of 'pictures' and 'stanzas', 'atoms'
and 'molecules'. Now I should like to address the synthesis
of these units. Concretely, we were aware of a 'synthesis'
- the utterance as a whole - before even conceiving of an
analysis. But this concrete 'synthesis' is somewhat
suspect. To be precise, it is a hypothesis. Nonetheless,
it is the only possible beginning of an attempt to put the
pieces back together again.
The task of synthesis, then, is to establish the nature
of the ampersands in each of these three equations. Syn¬
thesis could, of course, show that the relation was nul,
but this would be the outcome of a phenomenological investi¬
gation, not a prior cominonsense judgement.
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Consider then Ii and Iii. What relation between them
can be discovered, if any? Anothc, w..^ of asking this
question is, in what way is picture lii different from any
picture which could grammatically occupy this position?
The most striking way in which picture Iii distinguishes
itself from 'any' picture occurring at that position in
the structure is, I propose, the recurrence of the word we,
and, on a closer inspection, of d<3, in the two pictures,
Ii and lii. What is the significance of this phenomenon?
A simple observation is, that the two pictures together
determine "we do" as their common theme. Neither could
determine such a theme on its own. By their overlap, the
two pictures establish as central for each picture the 'we
do', and by contrast as peripheral, in the one case,
'compositions', and in the other, 'not have any talking at
all'. This way of putting the matter suggests immediately
that other pictures, spoken on the same or on other occasions,
could formulate the same common theme, varying in each case
the peripheral matter. But in this case, the t we1' , or more
specifically the 'we do' , defines a topic to which both
pictures Ii and Iii, in short stanza I as a whole, refers,
a topic nonetheless defined in purely linguistic terms.
This topic is the -we_. It is at once possible to conceive that
an indefinite number of other stanzas might take the we as
their theme in the same way. In this case, these stanzas as
a whole would form a legitimate object of linguistic pheoo-
mological enquiry. I propose to refer to this object as the
voice of the' we.' It will be convenient to be able to identify
the stanzas which exhibit this voice in the notation. This
can be done lay the use of a subscript to the numeral indicating
the stanza, thus: 'I ' or where necessary, 'I i', and so on.
we ^ ' we '
But this observation has also clarified the manner in
which stanza I is constructed, and this deserves recognition.
I propose to identify this as a specific technique for the
construction of stanzas by relating pictures together. I
shall call it reverberation, indicating by this term the
repetition of certain crucial words in the two pictures,
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thereby constituting a named theme definitive of the
stanza. This technique should also be acknowledged in the
notation. I propose to mark it by a Multiplication* sign
thus: '.' Employing this sign, it is now possible to re¬
write equation (2a) so as to eliminate the ampersand:
C1 ~x" I = i . i i (3a)
we
Now consider stanza II. If this combination is a
stanza, then it seems to be one constructed on somewhat
different principles from those identified in the case
of stanza'Id What is the relation between pictures Hi and
Ilii? If the I, in picture Ili is a character in a cosmo-
logical realm, or a 'puppet' in a reality conjured up by Mr.
Cramond's speech, then what is picture Ilii? The answer is
plain: this picture portrays the I's consciousness, the
consciousness which Mr. Cramond endows to his puppet. But
then, the relation between a character and its consciousness,
which we have here, is somewhat different from the relation
between two formulations of the same named theme, which we
found in stanza I. I propose to say, that whereas pictures
Ii and lii were on the same 'level', pictures Ili and Ilii
are on different 'levels'. This suggestion seems confirmed
by the fact that gramatically, picture ii is, as it were,
contained within picture i. What, then, is this difference
between levels? In the present case, it is the difference
between the I which simply 'hopes' and the 'hopings' them¬
selves. What is this difference? I propose, that it is a
very familiar difference: it is the difference between lived
experience in the first case, and reflective thought, in the
second. Admittedly, the distinction appears here in an
unfamiliar guise: both Schutz and Sartre portrayed the
distinction as aspects of a reality external to language.
But here, the distinction arises entirely within language.
Plainly, now, the 'relation' between Ili and Ilii is
different in kind from that between Ii and Iii. Accordingly,
I propose to designate the relation between Ili and Ilii as
- Of) _
one of reflection. It would seem to follow that picture II
must be conceived as the same voice as Hi: but what voice
is it? Plainly, it is the voice of the'I,'even though no
T l'appears portrayed in Ilii. It is the voice of the' I'in a
reflective mode. So, we write, ' II ', or where necessary
'Il-j-i1, 1 CI-""I I jii 1 and so on.
The notation should also be able to indicate the
relation of reflection where necessary. This can readily
be done. I propose to borrow this notation from that employed
on the diagram. Round brackets, '( )', can indicate it.
Equation (2b) can now be rewritten:
C1*III = i (ii) (3b)
Finally, the relationship between the two stanzas,
roughly expressed in equation (l), must now be investigated.
Again this investigation must be based on the content of the
stanzas themselves. I propose that the utterance must be
interpreted in this way: 'that' in picture Ilii refers to
stanza I as a whole. How does this reference work? One
might be tempted to suppose, that picture Ilii simply sustained
the same theme as that addressed in stanza I. In this case,
'that is clear' would serve as another picture within stanza
I, and then by implication so would 'I hope'. The distinction
between stanzas would have been dissolved. Why is this an
inappropriate analysis? Because, I propose, it glosses over
avery crucial distinction. This is, that the way in which
the supposed 'same theme' is addressed in stanza I differs
significantly from the way it is addressed in stanza II. But
this is an inaccurate way of expressing it. More precisely,
this way of expressing the matter postulates a 'same theme'
which is itself external to the language which formulates it.
This is precisely what I wish to avoid doing. Focussing on
language itself shows that there is no 'same theme' addressed
in stanza I and stanza II - or, which amounts to the same
thing, to speak of such a 'same theme' is to speak in a
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third voice different from that of either stanza I or stanza
II, which then raises- the problem of the 'relation5 between
that third voice and either of these others. In short, in
the speech of stanza I, stanza I is not a 'thait1. Stanza I
is a 'that' only in the speech of stanza II.
How then does l'lii relate to I i f not by sustaining a
common theme? I propose, that the relationship is metaphorical.
That is to say, that stanza II reformulates the theme of stanza
I in its own words. But this can be expressed more simply: the
voice of the I in stanza II speaks of the voice of the we in
stanza I. Thus a plain distinction can be drawn between the
relations of reverberation and reflection on the one hand,
and that of metaphor on the other. The first two sustain
sameness as between voices, whilst the third establishes
dif ference.
The relation between stanzas must now be expressed in
terms of the notation. The relation of metaphor is manifestly
a more distant one than either of the other two. Yet it
resembles the reflection relation in an important way. Just
as by reflection picture Ilj refers to picture IIIi, and is
in this sense dependent upon it, so by metaphor stanza II
refers to stanza I, and is in this sense dependent on it,
so by metaphor stanza II, or more precisely picture Ilii,
refers to stanza I, and is in this sense dependent on it.
For this reason I employ a similar notation in each
case. Once again it is possible to borrow from the notation
employed on the diagram. For I have argued that the relation
of metaphor is constitutive of a difference between stanzas.
Accordingly it is appropriately and unambiguously designated
by square brackets, thus In this case,equation
(1) can be rewritten:
(4)
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Once again the advantage of the notation is, that it
provides an absolutely explicit formulation of my
interpretation of the utterance.
I Reality1
1 have now replaced the relatively vague and
external description of the reality which Mr. Cramond
conjured up in his speech with an exact 'linguistic®
analysis of the techniques which constituted that
rea1ity.
In iny concrete description of his talk Mr. Cramond
was judged to be portraying transcendent rules, posed
as existing for more than one subjectivity within the
situation-at-hand, indeed for all these subjectivities,
and posed as existing for more than one occasion on
which he spoke, indeed for all occasions, so that they
were 'social facts' in Durkheiim's sense of the word.**"'
Here I spoke of him as speaking of a reality external to
language. My analysis has now shown that there was no
need to do so. For now rather than descriptively judging
stanza I to formulate a transcendent reality and stanza
II to formulate the immanent appearance of that reality
within the situation at hand, it can he observed that
technically, stanza I is posed as transcending stanza II
which reformulates it. The relation which I have
expressed in algebraic terms as CI* = II^ [i itself
exhibits transcendence: the voice of the we is posed
as transcending the voice of the _I which formulates its
immanent appearance. ^^
The analysis tells us, that the utterance portrayed one
stanza, and then a second, which made reference to the first
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and was in this sense dependent on the first for its
intelligibility. Stanza I would have been complete on
its own. But the addition of stanza II brings about a
change. Now, neither I nor II is a blunt assertion. I
want to say more than this. Now, from within the stand¬
point of stanza II as speech, stanza I is 110 longer speech.
Rather, in purely linguistic terms, stanza I is trans¬
cendent: speech no longer concerns the truth of the
reality of stanza I : it concerns only the truth of the
appearance of stanza I, which is now tacitly posed as
really true. In the shift from stanza I to stanza II, I
am proposing, our speaker has 'changed gear1, has changed
the topic of speech, has changed what was speech previously
into a reality which transcends speech.
I propose, that in the relationship of reference which
is constituted by the techniques of reverberation, reflec¬
tion, and metaphor, is to be found the very source of the
notion of 'transcendence' i.e. reality as a phenomenon
over and above mere appearance. This source is linguistic.
The study of the linguistic techniques which gives rise to
this transcendence defines a mode of enquiry directly
comparable to that of 'ethnomethodology' the study of folk
methods for constituting a transcendent social reality, i.e.
everyday sociology. Less directly it is comparable with
'existential psychiatry' to the extent that that discipline
studies methods whereby speakers constitute a transcendent
psychological reality, i.e. everyday psychology.
But as against either of these disciplines, each of
which formulates its own version of reality and then con¬
strues everyday speech as formulating the appearance of
that reality, I propose my own version of reality as being
speech itself, and my enquiry as being, how speakers speak
of a 'reality' external to that speech, i.e. everyday
philosophy. A speech which consistently speaks of 'reality'
not of reality can be called 'pure' in Husserl's sense of
the term.
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This 'pure speaking' is Husserlian in the following
2 7
sense. It de-structs (destroys)" and re-constructs speech,
in a manner inspired by the ideal of presuppositionlessness.
The de-struction is so inspired in that it presumes nothing
as to the sense of the 'utterance', and instead seeks to
establish analytically the sensible unities which relate
2 8
together the spoken words. The unities so discovered
resemble familiar grammatical units, namely clauses, but
are not identical to these. The con-struction is likewise
inspired by presuppositionlessness in th. t it presumes
nothing as to the reference of the' utterance,' and instead
seeks to establish synthetically relations of dependence
and independence of reference between the sensible unities
established by analysis.
Whereas the descriptive account treated the utterance
concretely as a self-sufficient e_x n i h i 1 o creation external
to my description the theoretical account treats the
teacher's speech as the product of a way of speaking of
which my theorising must also be the product. This way of
speaking comprises the techniques whereby speech speaks of
'reality'. My refusal bo accept reality as the teacher
defines it implies my criticism of his speech.
Theological Speech
For me, the way of speaking which above all reveals the
quality of the teacher's utterance, is theological speaking.
The teacher's portrayal of a transcendent realm on the one
hand, illuminating and informing the immanent realm on the
other, is reminiscent of the Christian distinction between
heaven and earth. In order to explore this further conside
what it would involve to situate the teacher within the
discourse of theology, by contrasting him with a theologian
well-known in the sociological tradition, namely Calvin, as
presented in Weber's classic study, The Protestant Ethic and
the Spirit of Capitalism.
The world conjured up by the teacher's utterance,
comprises three realms, two inhabited by persons, the third
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being an impersonal formulation of the situation-at-hand.
Within this world, there are striking differences between
the persons portrayed.
Firstly, within this world only the _T shows concern:
it 'hopes' the situation-at-hand is such and such. By
implication, as 1 have already argued, this concern extends
itself to the realm of the we. However, this is not pre¬
cisely a concern for the we as such, but rather, a concern
that the logicality of the order governing the transcenden¬
tal we should be clearly visible in the situation-at-hand.
By contrast to the _I,the we itself exhibits no concerns.
Second, the utterance portrays the I_ as standing on its
own, and indeed as conjuring up other realms by its hoping,
whereas the we does not: it is, rather, encompassed within
a logical order into which it fits quite unproblematically,
without revealing any autonomy. Third, the we is portrayed
as actively engaged in its realm (as "doing"), whereas the
J_ is posed as pissively contemplating another realm, by way
of "hoping". Fourth, the _I is portrayed as present in close
proximity to the situation-at-hand, whereas the transcenden¬
tal we is remote from the immediate situation.
Compare the world conjured up by the speech of Calvinism.
This world comprises two realms, heaven and earth, each
inhabited by specific 'persons', God and man. There are two
classes of man, the Elect, who are chosen by God to be saved,
and the Damned, for whom God lias predestined eternal puni sh-
ment. Now Weber argues since no one could live with the
knowledge that he was damned, the Calvinist believer lives
with a fundamental anxiety: is he, or is he not, one of the
Elect? This anxiety follows from the believer's decision
to take Calvinism seriously. Compare this anxiety with the
implications of a decision to take the teacher's utterance
seriously as an exhibition of his world. First, within the
Calvinist world, only God shows concern. "Man, by his
fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of
50will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation". Man
is to put no trust in his fellow man, but only in God.
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However, God's concern is not precisely for man as such,
but rather a concern that the logicality of the order
governing the transcendental realm of the elect should be
clearly visible on earth: "The elected Christian is in the
world only to increase this glory of God by fulfilling His
commandments to the best of his ability. But God requires
social achievement of the Christian because He wills that
social life shall be organised according to His commandments,
31
in accordance with that purpose". Second, it plainly
follows that God stands on his own, and indeed conjures up
other realms, whereas man is encompassed within a logical
order into which he fits quite unproblematically. "To apply
earthly standards of justice to His sovereign decrees is
meaningless, and an insult to His Majesty, since He and He
32
alone is free, i.e. subject to no law". Third, man in
this scheme of things is to devote himself to ever greater
activity for the glorification of God upon earth - whereas
God himself abstains from active involvement in the affairs
of the world, having predetermined its entire course of
development at the beginning of time. But fourth, in a
different sense, God is close to the predicament of Man
here on earth, whereas the transcendental realm of the
Elect has always a problematic relation to the situation
at hand: every man experiences anxiety as to his own
membership of it.
Now plainly there are enormous differences of detail
between these two formulations of the world. How could it
be otherwise, when I am setting a sixteen word remark side
by side with a full length study of a major intellectual
movement? But one may take heart from the fact, that
Weber's own description is an ideal type, concealing
equally enormous differences between expressions of the
tradition which he assembles together as his version of
Calvinism. I propose that it is possible to explore what
the samenesses, and what the differences, are between
these ways of viewing the world. The samenesses come to
view first. In each case, the speaker (the teacher in the
one case, Calvin in the other) conjures up a 'rational',
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explicitly rule-governed realm, which is posed as trans¬
cending the situation at hand (life on earth) in terms of
space, in terms of time, and in terms of persons. In each
case, a personal figure is also conjured up, who is concern¬
ed to reveal the nature of this rational order here on
earth, where however it can never actually be made manifest.
In each case, other personal figures are conjured up, who
have no concerns themselves, but are unproblematically
subsumed within the rational order in the transcendent realm.
In each case, then, a fundamental anxiety communicating
itself to those who are invited to believe in this world
in that whilst it is impossible for them to actually live
out the part of unconcerned personal figures within the trans¬
cendent realm, this is the only form of existence which is
held out as a possibility to them.
Consider now the differences. Although each conjures up
two realms, a situation-at-hand and a transcendent realm,
t'he names which the teacher gives to the characters who
inhabit these realms serve to disclaim any distinction
between them: 'I' and 'we' are both situation-at-hand names
which serve to deny transcendentalism in either case.
Calvinism also conjures up different realms, but here the
reverse tendency is to be seen: a denial of the situation-at-
hand in favour of a transcendentalist view of the world:
"God does not exist for men, but men for' the sake of God".
Both sets of names, then, exhibit a claimed reductionism,
the one characteristic of the religious commonsense of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the other characteris¬
tic of the secular commonsense of the present time.
Linguistic phenomenology is critical of theological
speech. Such criticism is impossible from a sociological
point of view for the reason that, since Durkheim, sociolo-
gical speech has itself been theological. From my point
of view, Mr. Cramond in his speech mis-represents the
situation. His speech overtly portrays a situation in which
the we and its realm is real, by contrast to which the 1^ and
its realm formulate only the mere appearance of that reality.
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From my point of view, by contrast, the I_ is located at
the level of reality, whereas the we_ is only a figment of
the I's imagination.
This judgement is not simply a dogmatic assertion
of the here and now over the enduring, as an expression of
methodological individualism. Rather, what distinguishes
the I and its realm from the we and its realm is this:
the I is posed as acknowledging the distinction between
reality and appearance. The precise purpose of the Ij s
speech is to call into question whether the reality of the
transcendent we appears immanently: 'I hope that is clear1.
Therefore in relation to those to whom he speaks,
Mr. Cramond's T offers itself as part of a discourse. The
I is posed as part of a realm within which presumably many
men may speak with different voices. The _T invites
participation in this sense. By this means, the I_1 s realm
may be enriched in ways which Mr. Cramond cannot anticipate.
By contrast, the we_ cannot be enriched, and in fact cannot
be changed in any way. For the realm of the we is not open
to participation by others present, i.e. the boys. The
construction of the teacher's remark enables him to formul¬
ate this we in its unproblematic realm, and then to shift
out of that realm into the realm of the Any discourse
which may then occur occurs at this level : no invitation
is extended to the boys to speak of the we.
It is clear why this must be the case. The spectacle
of himself and the boys competing to articulate the voice
of the we would destroy the basis of the order which Mr.
Cramond seeks to sustain in the classroom by speaking of
the we in the fi.rst place.
Appreciation and Criticism
The distinction between the two approaches can now be
portrayed in more general terms. The descriptive analysis
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found the teacher to be constituting social facts in his
speech, social facts which the descriptive analysis itself
likewise constituted. Thus the familiar spectacle arose :
in my speech I competed with Mr. Cramond to articulate
better than he his version of the transcendent reality.
This is definitive of the descriptive approach: whether
the reality concerned is 'sociological1 or 'psychological',
in the terms which I have distinguished, is immaterial.
This descriptive approach incorporates assumptions which
have already been discussed, notably the assumption of
unique private languages which are in every case no more
than a fairy tale. The modus operandi of this approach is
"well expressed in the famous statement of the social
psychologist W.I. Thomas:
If men define situations as real,
they are real in their consequences.
Such an approach uncritically accepts, that is to say
appreciates, whatever reality any speaker may care to
35
summon up in his speech.
My theoretical approach is by contrast a critical
approach, in this sense: where speakers are found speaking
of a reality external to language, I criticise their speech
and seek to show how such a sense could be summoned up by
speech itself. My criticism of the speech of the teacher
amounts to the fact that I write about what he is really
doing in terms of my notion of 'reality' which differs
from his. In so doing then I exhibit my version of 'reality'.
My writing about the speech of everyday speakers, then,
is a translation of their speech into mine. But have I not
precisely criticised others, notably Laing and Coulter, for
such translation? Not so. My criticism was not directed
at their translating the speech of others per se. On the
contrary, I propose that all speech in response to the
speech of others is a translation in this sense. Here once
again my conception follows from Husserl's. In his terms,
- 109 -
Cognitive mental processes (and this belongs to
their essence) have an intentio , they refer to
something,they are related in this or that way
to an object.36
This 'intentionalty' was the very object of Husserl[s pheno-
menological enquiry. I would propose a translation of both
* consciousness1 and 'object* into 'speech', and say accord¬
ingly that speech refers to speech, is related in this or
3 7
that way to speech. From this view, we are all engaged
in translation, and this translation is the very object of
linguistic phenomenological enquiry. But 'translation' was
precisely what Coulter, and Laing, denied doing. Coulter
claimed to 'seek out and state the logically unavoidable
procedures and presuppositions which members can make,
irrespective of guessing any situated reading a member does
make*. Laing states that 'the art of understanding those
aspects of an individual's being which we can observe
requires us to relate his actions to his way of experiencing
the situation he is in with us'. Coulter disclaims the
problem of relating his own speech to the speech of the
welfare officer by claiming direct access to a social reality
standing behind his speech. Laing disclaims the problem
of relating his own speech to the speech of the individual
by claiming direct access to a psychological reality standing
behind his speech. Accordingly both of these speakers are
7 8
realistic. I by contrast am 'realistic*.
But is my conception not equally suspect? It must be
said at once that there is a permanent danger of 'realism*
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degenerating into realism. All that is required is that
a single word understood in a 'realistic* sense comes to
be taken realistically, i.e. as a slogan. Take for example
the word 'realistic*. The slogan, "'realism* is real" is
easy to devise. In this case, to guard against 'realism*
being taken as reality it would be necessary to place it
within quotation marks, thus ''realism*'. Plainly this
procedure could continue indefinitely. What way is there
out of this regression?
The regression arises from the aspiration to literal¬
ism which is itself a commitment to realism (without
quotation marks).40 c , . . ,buch an aspiration expresses itself
as the search for a form of words which can be upheld
as reality (without quotation marks). I have tried to
show that no such form of words can be devised.
Dialectic
We live in a reality to which speech can never corres¬
pond. Yet all we can say of it must be said in speech!
This paradox defines what may be called a dialectical
("through speaking") account of reality, though of course
1 dialectic* is a word notoriously open to sloganising. It
follows that only by enquiring into the character of speech
can we enquire into the character of reality. But how can
such an enquiry be conducted? There is no problem about
this. 'We* are already engaged in such an enquiry. ,We*
speak, and thereby exhibit the character of speaking. The
only problem is, that we do not acknowledge we do so: for
we think we exhibit the character of reality. That is we
take our speech seriously. By contrast, I propose to take
speech ironically, believing that any formulation in speech
of reality is itself a formulation in a speech which is
other than the reality which it can formulate, and that
therefore its reality can be apprehended only when it is
acknowledged as speaking of trealityt.
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Chapter Five
MR. CRAMOND'S VISION OF HEAVEN
Irony
Ironic speech about 'reality1 must guard against a
lapse into realism. Realism arises, when the relation of
speech to speech is forgotten, with the consequence that
speech is conceived to be about 'things1 external to
speech. Accordingly, a way to guard against realism is
to hold the relation of speech to speech in view always
as the topic of speech itself. The ironic speech of the
present enquiry does not arise ex nihilo as the first word
on the subject, nor does it pretend to be the last word, a
way of silencing further speech. It arises, rather, as a
'philosophical' critique of 'sociological' and 'psycholo¬
gical' speech. The critique is the relation between these
speeches, and not my speech sui generis. Accordingly, I
shall provide two accounts, descriptive and theoretical,
the first speaking appreciatively of the reality conjured
up in speech, the second speaking of the 'reality' summoned




I intend now to-'Examine further the speech of Mr. Cramond.
Consider, then, a second remark of his made a little later
in the same lesson. He told the boys:
"'Somebody talking. You know what will happen.
No five minute break. Something else, ...'"
One can immediately make an impressionistic description of
the reality here sustained. The 'persons' portrayed here
are somebody and you. One can ask in what relationship
do they stand to one another, and to the impersonal features
portrayed? The somebody appears in a simply factual
assertion. The you however, like the 1^ earlier, is portrayed
as reflecting on the situation, 'you know [no five minute
break, something else] will happen'. In each case, the
inner picture claims an inescapable inevitability, external
to human choice: 'when we do such-and-such we don't do some¬
thing else', 'no something, something else will happen'. In
each case, (Tie outer picture portrays a human figure contem¬
plating this inner picture. The 1 'hopes' khat the we does
is clear. It seems that the 1^ has a certain freedom of
interpretation, a certain looseness in its involvement with
the world. By contrast the you 'knows' what will happen.
The you seems to have no freedom: it seems to be dominated
by the world. This, then, seems to be a fourth principle:
4- You know the rules.
This second utterance, then, further elaborates (Tie proper¬
ties of the definition sustained by the first, in a way
which also claims to go beyond the immediate occasion on
which it was spoken, i.e. to be external to speech.
Thus, the description of the social reality sustained
by the second utterance can be harmonised with that of the
first. In fact what this involves is the construction of
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a Weberian 'ideal-type' representation of the single
reality sustained by Mr. Cramond over many occasions of
2
talk. The 'sociological' account thus 'ideal-ises' that
talk.
My theoretical account of the utterance begins with
an analysis which renders problematic its apparent unity:
10
( Somebody talking )
11
i i i
[ ( You know ( what will happen ) j
IIIo
[ ( No five minute break ) ]
IVo
[ ( Something else )
Mr. Cramond's utterance C2--
The analytical equations, which express the above
diagram algebraically, are:
C2* = I & II & III & IV (1)
C2*I = lo (2a)
C2":;"II = i & ii (2b)
C2»III = IIIo (2c)
C2*IV = Vo (2d)
The breakdown of the utterance follows the procedure
demonstrated in the last chapter. However, in the case of
the previous utterance, every picture was a grammatical
clause. Here, this is not the case, but there is no doubt
that they are self-contained atomic units of sense, i.e.
pictures.
Consider now the synthesis of these atomic and mole¬
cular units. The relation between pictures Hi and Ilii i
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quite familiar. It is a case of the relation of reflection
as identified in utterance CI*. This establishes not only
the link between these pictures but also the fact that the
resulting stanza exhibits the voice of the you, in the same
way that stanza C1*II exhibited the voice of the ][.
Accordingly it is possible to write:
C2,tIIyou " dii) (3b)
The other three 'second set' of equations, namely 2a, 2c,
and 2d, may be regarded iis identical to the corresponding
'third set' of equations, 3a> 3c, and 3d respectively.
This leaves temporarily unresolved the identification of
the voices of these pictures. In every previous case the
voice was established as a feature of the relation between
pictures, not individual pictures themselves.
Now consider the relations between the constituent
stanzas of the utterance as a whole. These relations will
he relations of independence or dependence of reference
between stanzas, following the synthetic procedure adopted
in the case of utterance CI*. The first stanza, To, of
utterance C2*, is apparently aitonomous. But the second is
not. Even though this stanza might be intelligible on its
own, in which case 'what' would be its reference, this is
not the case in the present utterance. For stanza IIlo
metaphorically reformulates the 'what', and so does stanza
IVo. These two relationships permit a more precise account
of the structure of the utterance as a whole than that
presented in equation (l). It is possible to write:
C2* = I & II [ III & IV]
But is this the fullest account of the structure that can be
given? The equation itself suggests a search for a further
relationship, between stanzas III and IV which share the
identical relationship to stanza II.
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These two stanzas are grammatically similar. Each
exhibits two concepts linked together without a verb:
•No / five minute break*, 'Something / else*, as opposed
to the pictures previously encountered which have been
grammatically complete clauses. Once this identification
is made, it is apparent that stanza 1 shares the same
property: 'Somebody / talking1. Indeed it is possible to
hypothesise a deeper similarity. Within each of these
stanzas there is a structure of three concepts, namely, a
quantifier plus two others: ' Some / body / talking ',
'No / five-minute / break* , ' Some / thing / else * . Then
in one case at least an additional relation exists: the
prefix some is repeated in the first and last stanzas, a
relationship which, when it occurred between whole words,
I named * reverberat.on' . Intriguingly, the linguistic
phenomenological approach here promises to penetrate beneath
the traditional grammatical categories not only of sentences
and clauses, but also of words.
I propose that between these three stanzas, a relation¬
ship exists, though one which is looser than those previously
considered. Specifically, it is a relation more of form than
of content. Accordingly this relationship does not permit
the identification of a voice as the aggregate of speeches
making reference to the same named theme. I propose to
designate this relationship one of resonance, and to
indicate it in the notation by means of a dash, thus: * - * .
In this case a more satisfactory representation can be
given of the utterance as a whole. It is:
c2"~ = i & ii r hi - iv l
you L J
But this is not a complete account of the structure. Again
the equation itself suggests the search for a further
relationship. In fact, a relationship of metaphor exists
between I and II. For 'somebody* within the realm portrayed
by 'somebody talking*, is precisely a metaphorical
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reformulation of 'you! in 'you know what will happen'.
This judgement implies an interpretation of the 'realities'
portrayed by Mr. Cramond. I propose that within the realm
of the 'you', there is no somebody, there is no-one who
does not 'know what will happen*. Accordingly, whoever the
somebody might be is included within the 'you*. According¬
ly 'you* metaphorically reformulates 'somebody*. Now a
further account of the utterance structure can be givnn.
It is :
C2- =11 [ I - HI - IV 1
you L J
As yet, it is impossible to identify the voice of the three
stanzas I, III, and IV: and this may only be possible when
further utterances are considered. However, a preliminary
interpretation of the utterance is possible. I can now
replace the vague, 'sociological* description of the reality,
posed as external to language, which Mr. Cramond conjured up
in his speech, with an exact linguistic analysis of the
techniques which constituted that 'reality*. First note
the direct parallel between the two utterances so far
considered: C2- = II f I - III _ IV1 , and C* 1 = IIT |'l 1.
you L J' I L we1
If, as I argued previously, the first exhibits the
very definitive form of defended speech, then so in almost
identical terms does the second.
What then is the significance of utterance 2*? Since
the similarities are so clear, it may be more fruitful to
focus discussion on the differences between the two utter¬
ances. In the first, the I_ is portrayed formulating the
immanent appearance of the transcendent reality of the we,
whereas in the second, the you is portrayed formulating the
immanent appearance of a different transcendent reality.
What is the character of this second transcendent
reality? An answer to this question must concern the way
in which the language of the utterance summons up a sense
of 'reality*. How does this language, the language of
'Somebody talking*, 'No five minute break*, and 'Something
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else', compare with the language of 'When we do composi¬
tions we don't have any talking at all'. I propose that
a familiar distinction within sociolinguistics captures
the distinction precisely: in Basil Bernstein's terms,
whereas the former is 'restricted', 'context-bound', the
i
latter is 'elaborated', 'context-free'. Whereas C1>"I
we
aspires to explicitness, C2* [I - III - IV ] aspires to
inexpdicitness. In short, whereas the speech of the we
aspires to be complete rational speech, the speech of
somebody aspires to silence.^
Consider the teacher's utterances, conceived as speech
about speech. In his first remark he states, the position
in terms of the we, and then steps back from this: the I
is brought to bear to clarify the message of the we. The
we's speech is thus posed as privileged: a message from
the Gods which requires some care in its interpretation.
But his second remark contains no explicit message. The
you does not formulate 'what will happen' : it rather
asserts that this is already 'known'. Likewise, 'No five
minute break'and 'Something else' do not formulate it:
they rather create suspense, leaving the imagination free
to wonder. In short, these stanzas are reluctant speech:
they stand in for no speech, silence.
The very first of these brief stanzas suggests why
this should be the case. 'Somebody talking' is not some¬
thing that Mr. Cramond wishes to acknowledge within his
own scheme of things, the scheme he articulated in the
first utterance. It is imposed upon him from outside: and
in his way of speaking, Mr. Cramond exhibits that this
matter is exterior to his own version of reality. In short,
'restricted code' speech is speech purporting to be non-
speech because it purports to present the exteriority of a
system of meaning. By contrast, 'elaborated code' speech
is speech aspiring to be complete speech because it pur¬
ports to present the interiority of a system of meaning.
In contrast to the sociological description, then,
which unproblematically assimilated this utterance to the
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reality which it portrayed Mr. Cramond as sustaining in
his first remark, the philosophical account fragments the
utterance not only from the previous utterance, but also
within itself. It proposes a radical separation within
the utterance between the speech of the vou and the speech
of somebody, etc. and again between this utterance and the
previous one.
But in so doing, it throws new light on the sociological
problem: the problem of anomie, or rather, the problem of
'anomie'. For, in Mr. Cramond's 'restricted code' pictures
is to be found the concrete linguistic representation of
'anomie'. At this point it is helpful to make reference
to three 'philosophical' treatments of the problem of social
order which seem to bear on the linguistic style which Mr.
Cramond exhibits in the construction of these remarks. The
first of these and most familiar in view of the recent
direction of my discussion, is to be found in theological
speech.
Returning to the parallel between the speech of Mr.
Cramond and that of Calvinism, can one not find in the
somebody portrayed here the Damned of Calvinism, the
anonymous but definitely present person or persons unknown
who are not a part of the rational order of the transcendent
realm? In these terms the you would be the community of
Believers whose affirmation of their knowledge sustains
the church. And the impersonally phrased "what will happen'
expresses the predestination to which all Believers sub¬
scribe. Thus in precise opposition within Mr. Cramond's
scheme, one finds the two traditional worlds of the Christian
doctrine, secularised, brought down to earth, in name only.
To be more precise about this: stanzas I, III, and IV
exhibit the asocial realm of 'hell', whilst stanza II
exhibits the you contemplating this asocial realm from
within the safety of 'earth'. The difference is exhibited
in the grammatical structure of each part of the utterance.
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The second treatment is also familiar: it is Sartre's
discussion of consciousness:
Transcendental consciousness is an impersonal
spontaneity. It determines our existence at
each instant, without our being able to conceive
anything before it. Thus each instant of our
conscious life reveals to us a creation ex
nihilo. Not a new arrangement, but a new
existence. There is something distressing for
each of us, to catch in the act this tireless
creation of existence of which we are not the
creators . "
Is it not then the case, that just as Mr. Cramond portrayed
the 1^ as contemplating the 'heavenly1 realm of the trans¬
cendental rationalist utopia, so he portrays the you as
contemplating the 'hellish' realm of the immanentist
existentialist vision?
Finally, consider Mr. Cramond's two schemes in the context
of the classical discussions of social order in the writings
of Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Is it not the
case that on the one hand the we in Mr. Cramond's speech
embodies precisely the 'general will' of Rousseau's
7consensual utopia, whilst posed against it on the other
hand in the realm of somebody etc., is an expression in
language of the Hobbesian state of nature, in what are in
g
fact precisely 'nasty, brutish, and short' utterances?
Whilst acknowledging the suggestiveness of these
historical parallels, I intend to focus the present dis¬
cussion on Husserl. The philosophical interpretation
suggests that the outcome of Mr. Cramond's theorising is
the constitution of realms identical in range and character
to those constituted by Husserl in his phenomenological
philosophising, and adopted by his followers, direct and
indirect. The familiarity of thes : realms suggests that
this is not at all accidental, but that these alternative
ways of speaking are deeply embedded in our language.'
This suggestion can be strengthened by further analysis of
Mr. Cramond's speech in order to discover the extent to
which he sustains the philosophical and theological realms
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throughout his classroom utterances.
"Everybody sitting"
At the beginning of a lesson later in the term, Mr.
Cramond. told the boys :
"'Right, everybody should be sitting in their
own seats. As a general rule, we'll have no
roaming around, because that's not a very good
idea. And there'll be a lesson for those who
forget ...1"
A sociological description suggests the following definition
of the situation. Here again, the we is governed by 'a
general rule'. The rule is apparently non-negotiable and
emphatic. It is also expressed in terms of everybody. In
addition, there is a statement of impersonal inevitability,
"there'll be a lesson for those who forget", governing the
case where the 'general rule1 might be 'forgotten'.
/
Interestingly, the I_ is absent from the whole utterance.
Analysis of this utterance presents little difficulty,
and the following is the outcome:
Io
[ RIGHT, (everybody should be sitting in their own seats )
II
X XX
[AS(a general rule (we'll have) no roaming around)]
IIIo
[BECAUSE ( that's not a very good idea ) ]
IV
X XX
[AND ( there'll be a lesson for (those) who forget ) J
Mr. Cramond's utterance C3~x~
The analytical equations are:
C3* = I & II & III & IV (1)
I — lo (2a)
II = i & ii ' (2b)
III = IIIo (2c)
IV = i & ii (2d)
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It is necessary to comment on a new feature found in this
utterance. In the case of stanzas II and IV above, there
is an overlapping of pictures, ascertainable by the
analytical method. In the case of stanza II, 1 as a
general rule we'll have1 is a self-contained atomic unit
of sense, in other words, 'we'll have a general eule'.
The word 'as' preceding it has the logical function of
leading the listener to expect two pictures, A and B, in
the relation, 'as A,B', so that the complfete stanza is
made up with a second picture which is also based upon 'we'll
have'. This second picture is 'we'll have no roaming around'.
I propose that this overlapping is no more than a variant of
what I earlier called 'reverberation', that is a grammatical
device made possible by the repetition of a word or phrase
in two adjacent pictures. It occurs in a similar way in
stanza TV.
According to this interpretation the relations between
pictures Hi and Ilii on the one hand, and IVi and IVii on
the other, consist of reverberation. But what voices rre
constituted by these reverberations? In stanza II, the
reverberation is on the words 'we'll have'. This consti¬
tutes the voice of the w<3. The structure of this stanza
is then:
C3*IT„e - M* (3b)
In stanza IV, the reverberation is on the word 'those'.
This word then defines the voice of stanza TV, so the
structure of this stanza is:
C3*IVthose = i.ii (3.1)
The other two 'second set.' equations, namely 2a and 2c, may
be regarded as identical to the corresponding 'third set'
equations,leaving unresolved for the time being the question
of the voices of stanzas I and III.
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Now consider the overall structure of the 'utterance'.
Stanza I is apparently independent of all others, in terms
of reference. Likewise, stanza II. But having noted this,
reformulates stanza I. But there is a crucial difference
between this metaphor and the previously encountered cases.
The present metephor merely places side by side two ways of
putting the same thing with no hierarchical difference
between them: they stand as genuinely alternative formula¬
tions. By contrast, in each case previously considered,
the reference of one stanza was dependent upon that of
another. This is indeed a metaphor, but can be expressed
differently in the notation. Instead of writing A = A [B],
which shows the dependence of the reference of A upon that
of B, I shall write simply, [Aj [B], placing the two side
by side to indicate their interchangeabi1ity as a result of
the metaphor.
Now consider the next stanza. Here is a 'mandatory'
metaphorical relationship as opposed to the 'optional' one
just considered. Stanza III requires reference hack to
stanza II, on which it is dependent: 'that', reformulates
'roaming around' in the previous stanza. Now consider
stanza IV. The reference of this stanza is not autonomously
determined. For, what is it that 'those' may forget? One
is tempted to assume that it is the 'general rule'. In
this case, stanza IV metaphorically reformulates stanza II.
Then the overall structure of the utterance is:
In this equation 'III' appearing above 'IV' indicates that
interchangeably each metaphorically reformulates stanza II
The significance of placing [II] side by side with [i] has
already been indicated.






On this interpretation, the utterance exhibits a
familiar form: that of the constitution of a transcendent
reality though here in a double form, whereby two inter¬
changeable formulations of the 'reality1 are combined with
two interchangeable formulations of the 'appearance' of
that reality. But now, how do these 'realities' and these
'appearances' relate to those previously encountered in Mr.
Cramond's utterances?
One of these realities is familiar already: that of
the we. In utterance CI", the we was portrayed in a stanza
on its own, overlooked by another stanza, that of the jt.
In the present utterance, the we seems at first sight over¬
looked by two other stanzas, namely 'that's not a very
good idea' and, 'there'll be a lesson for those who forget'.
But is it really the case that both of these refer to the
we? Certainly, 'that's not a very good idea' does so:
this stanza could not refer to 'everybody should be sitting
in their own seats' which of course j_s a good idea from Mr.
Cramond's point of view. .Apart from this argument with
reference to content, there is another with reference to
form: 'that's not. a very good idea' reverberates with 'that
is clear' in utterance CI*. This suggests that here the
same voice overlooks the we as previously, namely, the
voice of the I in a reflective mode.
But in this case, what of the other reality, unidentified
as to voice on the basis of evidence internal to this
utterance. Consider external evidence in this case too.
The stanza, 'everybody should be sitting in their own seat'
is reminiscent of Mr. Cramond's earlier reference, in
utterance C2*, to 'somebody talking'. I suggest that this
is a case of reverberation, constitutive of a voice which
should then be identified as 'body'. In utterance C2*, the
'body' speech was overlooked by the voice of the you, saying,
'you know what will happen'. But in terms of content that
stanza had a close resemblance to the present stanza IV,
'there'll be a lesson for those who forget'. Apart from
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this parallel in terms of content, there is another
with reference to form: 'will' is a word which reverberates
in both stanzas. It is not an insignificant word. Accord¬
ingly to my account of the theology of Mr. Cramond's speech,
it carries the whole weight of the impersonal inevitability
of retributory punishment within the Calvinist hell. I
conclude therefore that the same voice overlooks the body
as previously, namely the voice of the you in a reflective
mode .
So contrary to the first hypothesis proposed, what
'those1 may forget is not the transcendental 'general rule'
at all, but rather the immanent application of it, namely
'everybody should be sitting in their own seats'. This
is of some importance in the interpretation of Mr. Cramond's
scheme of things. I propose that it is inconceivable that
the 'general rule' should be forgotten: qua transcendent,
the existence of such a rule does not depend on its being
remembered by 'those' present at hand. Rather, the sphere
w:i thin which 'forgetting' is a possibility is another
sphere altogether.
The utterance is then to be heard as if it were worded
as follows:
Right, everybody should be sitting in their own
seats. As a general rule we'll have no roaming
around because | I think] that's not a very good
idea. And [you know] there'll be a lesson for
those who forget.
This is to say that the I and you are in the background, the
reality behind the appearance of the speech. Thus the
interpretation has taken a clear step away from mere des¬
cription of the concrete utterance. Instead its object is
theorised by the explicit procedures of the enquiry.
This theoretical object indeed makes possible a fuller
kind of description. The present utterance gains a 'hard¬
ness' from the fact that the reassuring 'earthly' _I and you
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do not appear explicitly. By this means, its content is
made more emphatic, and the utterance is given a power
which it would otherwise not possess, the power of a sui
generis transcendent 'reality1.
The algebraic presentation of the analysis must now
be revised. The equation giving the structure of the
utterance as a whole becomes:
C3* = IIIT r II 1 r I, , 1 IV (4)1 L weJ L bodyJ you
Here the notation [i] IV is reversed in order to place [II]
and (i] adjacent to one another. This introduces no
ambiguity in displaying the relation of I to IV. Now what
is the significance of this theoretical account of the
utterance? This account enables the utterance to be treated
not as a unique creation ex nihilo, nor simply as confirma¬
tion of an ideal type of the reality portrayed by him, but
as a consistent exhibition of his theorising, precisely
aligned with other instances already considered. Indeed,
the theoretical elaboration by which this utterance has
been comprehended itself enables a fuller treatment of
previous utterances to be made. For now it is possible to
complete the equations denoting the structure of utterance
C2'"". The voice of stanzas I, III and IV of that utterance
which previously could not be identified, is now seen to be
the voice I have called 'body'. The structure of the
utterance is then to be expressed as follows:
C2* = 11 T i _ hi _iv, 1 (4)
you L body body bodyJ
Thus each of the three utterances so far considered is seen
to exhibit a consistent structure in two senses. First,
each utterance is itself constructed in the same way,
employing metaphorical reformulation to posit one voice
as transcending another. Second, the voices and the
relation established between them are the same in the case
of each utterance spoken by Mr. Cramond.
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I want to suggest that the structure exhibited by
Mr. Cramond's speech as here recorded will turn out to
be not unique to him, but in fact an expression of
theorising within the Western tradition of philosophy per
se, in which we, or rather 'you' and 'I', 'we' and 'body1
are located, though they come together, no doubt, in an
originai way within Mr. Crairond's talk. In his vision,
the I and the you are sharply distinguished even though
they both inhabit the realistic 'earthly' realm from
which they contemplate the unreal realms beyond. Contrary
to Garfinkel's suggestion, they are not both everyday
sociologists. Rather, the you is portrayed as the theorist,
and the body as the inhabitant of the natural order, and
the I as theorist and we as inhabitant of the social _
order. The situation is a little more complex than
Schutz allows for: whereas for him, the scientist conjures
up a world of puppets, here within the speech of one
individual are to be found at least two scientists, and
correspondingly at least two sets of puppets. The
difference between these worlds is striking and explicit: the
world of the we is explicitly rule-governed by intelligible
social, conventions. As such its order is timeless,
transcendent. The world of the body on the other hand is
brutish, inexplicit, impersonal: an 1 mmanent here-and-now
world. Yet in its very immanent facticity it is itself
transcendent: it is posed as ek-isting the you which 'knows'
it, just as the social world is posed as ek-sisting the I
which 'thinks' ik.'() In order to assess the generality of
these findings, consider further empirecax exampjes.
"Did you hear what I said?"
Almost as soon as the teacher had made the last
pronouncement, Alec Rialto got up out of his seat to talk
to Colin Forrest. Mr. Cramond spoke to him as follows:
"'Iley! Did you hear what I said? Get over there,'"
indicating that the boy stand out in front of the class.
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I noted, "Rialto stands, shrugs his shoulders, . .
grins, and looks sheepish". Having left him standing
there for only a minute or two, Mr. Crainond said, "'Now,
son, sit down and don't disobey orders in future, right?
Use your ears'". Sammy Mason now spoke to Alec, saying
"'He's a good lad, that's why he didn't give you the
lash. Other teachers would have'".
Even from the descriptive, point of view, this is
complex. In his remarks Mr. Cramond sustains a joke or
fantasy, namely that Rialto had not heard his remark
because he had not used his ears. In this way, he protects
the integrity of the definition of the situation which he
had earlier constructed from the threat passed to it by a
boy's action which could have been construed as contradict¬
ing that definition. For, in the terms of the joke, an
excuse is provided for Rialto's action.'^ This was por¬
trayed, not as an infringement of the rule against 'roam¬
ing around', for which inescapable consequences had been
portrayed, but against another rule (roughly, that one
should use one's ears), for which no inevitable consequences
had been postulated.
However, this interpretation was not the only one
offered, by Mr. Cramond's remarks to Rialto. Another
definition runs through these. The expression "don't dis¬
obey orders, right?" retrospectively suggests a redefini¬
tion of the previous remark as "orders". This expression,
together with "Get over there" and "Now, son, sit down" are
themselves "orders", in contrast to the previous remarks
made by him. It seems characteristic of these orders that
they are expressed with little of the elaboration found in
those previous remarks. They appear here when Mr. Craniond
was responding to a particular boy, rather than to the
class as a whole.
Once again the appreciative approach finds the
teacher's speech original, even unique, and so cannot help
to establish rationally how it was possible for him to
-128-
say what he did. I propose to consider this conversation,
section by section. The first remark to the boy can be
readily analysed as follows:
I
i i i
[ HEY! ( Did you hear. ? ( what ) I said )
II
( Get over there )
Mr. Cramond's utterance C4~"
The analytical equations are:
C4" = I & II (1 )
I = i & i i (2a)
II = Ho (2b)
The relation between the two pictures making up stanza I
is a form of overlapping, a technique which I previously
identified with reverberation, i.e. as establishing a
sameness as between accents of reality of two adjacent
pictures. But here I propose this is not the case. The
overlapping word 'what1 is a specifically problematic
word within each of the two pictures. What is thereby
established is not identity between voices, but a problem¬
atic relation, which relation is the issue of the speech.
3 propose to call this relation reciprocity, and to signify
it in the notation by the use of an oblique, It is
plainly a close relation to the technique of reflection.
What voice does this relation constitute? I propose that
it does not conjoin the two voices, but it does bring them
face-to-face. This can be indicated by referring to it as
the 'i/you1 voice. In this case:
C4*Tl/you = 1/11 (3a)
Equation 3b can be regarded as identical to equation 2b,
though this leaves uninvestigated the question of the voice
of stanza II.
Now consider relation between the stanzas. But there
is no referential connection as between I and II. For the
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first time, an 'utterance1 has been encountered which
comprises two disparate parts. The notation can record
this fact by designating such an absence of relation with
a double oblique thus: '//'• Then the 'utterance' as a
whole is:
C+* = h/you U110
But this is still incomplete: the voice of IIo is not yet
determined. But this is readily done by searching for
relations between this stanza and the earlier speech of
the teacher. 'Get/over/there' resonates with the stanzas
'Some/body/talki ng', 'No/five-minute/break' and 'Some/thing/
else' found in utterance C"x"2 . Accordingly, it exhibits the
same voice as them, the voice designated 'body'. The
utterance as a whole is then
C"* = h/you U rI%ody <4)
What is the significance of this structure?
The reference to the previous utterance is intriguing,
in that here Mr. Cramond speaks of a you and an I_ orienting
to the speech of utterance C4"::~, after 1 had theoretically
argued that they were present in the background of that
utterance. My interpretation was, that in that utterance
the voice of the we was contemplated by the voice of the 3_
in a reflective mode, and the voice of the body was contem¬
plated by the voice of the you in a reflective mode. Now,
when trouble has arisen at that reflective level, Mr. Cramond
changes gear and switches to the 'down to earth1 mode of the
you and the What is the significance of that realm? What
realm is it that is inhabited by both the you and the _I,
from within which they reflectively glance in opposite
directions?
From the point of view of sociological description, the
separate existence of this realm presents a difficulty. For
the voice of the body has been identified with the Hobbesian
- 1 30 -
state of nature, and the voice of the we with Rousseau's
consensual solution to this problem. There is then within
the sociological vision no place left to identify with the
1 2
voice of the I and you. In theological terms however the
matter is more readily resolved. In these terms, the realm
of the we is identified as 'heaven', and the realm of the
body as 'hell'. Then there is no difficulty in identifying
the realm between these two, from within which each can be
viewed, as being manifestly 'earth'.
This argument is given greater precision when expressed
in terms of Husserl's phenomenological investigation. The
epoche characteristic of each of these provinces of meaning
can be sharply distinguished. The realm of the we is the
one wherein each consciousness is certain of the correspond¬
ence between itself and every other possible consciousness:
the utopia of Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity,
and of Schutz's pure we-relation. The impersonal realm of
the body on the oilier hand is the one where each conscious¬
ness is utterly uncertain of the correspondence between
itself and every other possible consciousness - though it is
certain of its correspondence between itself and the natural
world. With no II present this is the hell of Husserl's
immanentist subjectivity, and of Sartre's encounter cons¬
ciousness alone in a world of things. But in the speech
of the everyday phcnomenologist Mr. Cramond another realm
is portrayed, a realm which seems to have escaped the
attention of the professionals in this field. This is the
realm of the J_ and the you, the realm of earth, of 'reality'.
It is characterised by an epoche different from that of
either of the other two realms to which, up to now, we have
been confined. What is this epoche? It is one which acknow¬
ledges, that reality appears to you differently to the
manner in which it appears to me, yet it is nonetheless the
same reality, a reality which can be apprehended only in
appearance. If the realm of the we expresses, exhibits, the
epoche of the socio1ogist, whilst that of the body exhibits
the epcche of the psychologist, this realm exhibits what I
have consi stently referred to as the epoche of the ph i.losopher.
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The professional phenomenologists, along with the
professional sociologists and psychologists, have left
uninvestigated, or to he more precise unexplored, that
elusive level of 'real!ty', which makes its appearance
consistently within the speech of the everyday philosopher
whom T have called Mr. Cramond. They have spoken in extra¬
ordinary language, whereas in his speech ordinary language
1 ?
is revealed. In apprehending this fact, I have learned
from Mr. Cramond of possibilities available to all speakers,
within the structure of our language.
But 1 do not wish to foster illusions about this. Mr.
Cramond does not persistently exemplify ordinary language,
or what 1 have also called 'pure speech1. On the contrary,
he himself continually departs from it. In so doing, he
himself becomes an everyday sociologist or psychologist;
alternatively stated, a transcendentalist or immanentist
phenomenologist. In apprehending this fact, I learn from
Mr. Cramond which of the structurally possible ways of
speaking he employs himself.
There are thus two aspects to a linguistic phenomeno-
logical investigation. On the one hand speech exhibits
the structure of language: this structure is the object of
a theoretical investigation which will criticise that speech
in seeking to show how that speech was possible in general.
On the other hand, speech exhibits a specific location
within the structure of language. This location is the
object of a descriptive investigation which will appreciate
that speech in seeking to show hhow it makes use of structural
possibilities to fashion one way of speaking in particular. ^
Understandably, in view of the prior need to learn the
outlines of the structure of speech common to all, the task
of describing Mr. Cramond«s particular location within that
structure lias been somewhat neglected in the course of the
argument thus far. But the utterance now under considera¬
tion provides ample opportunities with which to address this
question. Consider the sequence running from utterance C3*,
'Everybody should be sitting in their own seats', to utterance
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C4* which followed it: 'Did you hear what 1 said? Get
over there'. Synthesis has confirmed the intuitive feel¬
ing that there are two breaks ('existential leaps', in
Schutz's term), within this sequence. The first occurs
as between utterance C3* and utterance 04*. Utterance C3"
was simultaneously located at both transcendentalist social
order and immanentist natural order levels. The first
stanza of C4"::" brought the utterance down to earth. That
is, it involved a shift to< the 'reflective' level within
the discourse. What occasioned this shift was, the action
of the boy in getting up out of his seat. This action
caused the reality of the natural and social orders
asserted in C3'" to be called into question, i.e. to fail
to correspond with appearance. In acknowledgment of this
fact, the teacher shifts the accent of reality of his
discourse to the one wherein the problematic relation between
appearance and reality can be addressed. (Precisely the same
shift was involved in the conversational practise of Gar-
finkel's Experimenter, as discussed in chapter three).
Having momentarily revealed the possibility of discussing
this problematic relation, Mr. Cramond shifts again, this
time back to the immanentist natural order now formulated
in its more familiar 'restricted code', the three-word
stanza, 'get over there1.
Mr. Cramond's speech operates on three levels: a natural
order, a social order, and a problematic realm. It appears
that, within his scheme, the social order stands as the
pinnacle of legimitation of his regime, but that if the
appearance of this reality is not upheld, he switches to the
problematic realm, and thence to natural order. There is,
then, no reason to be mesmerised by the seeming rationality
of his 'we' realm: neither the rationality, nor the realm,
are self-supporting. Certainly his speech exhibits a
'gloved fist' technique, that is 'coercion' underpinning
'consensus'. But from my point of view neither of these
visions are to be treated at face value: they are both
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Utopian. What interests me is whether and how debate
with the teacher can continue at what I. have called the
'realistic', or 'philosophical' level. To explore this
point further, consider the remainder of this conversation.
The teacher's next remark as analysed, is as follows:
Io
[" NOW SON ( sit down) ]
IT
1 . J-i
[ AND ( don't disobey orders 1 in future,) right? ) ]
IIIo
( Use your ears )
Mr. Cramond's utterance C5":'"
The analytical equations are:
C5" — I & II & Hi' (1)
I = lo (2a)
II = i & ii (2b)
III = IIIo (2c)
Consider the relationship between pictures Hi and Ilii.
Had the picture Hi concluded at 'orders', then this picture
could have been identified as a 'restricted code' natural
order stanza resonating with others of that type. The fact
the picture is constructed so that it could conclude at
this point itself establishes this possible interpretation
as it were 'in the background', or 'in reserve'. But
retrospectively, a transformation is brought about. 'In
future' increases the length of the picture so that it no
longer resonates. Picture Ilii, 'right?', calls into
question the correspondence between Ili and reality,
modifying its epoche so that it can no longer be a mere
assertion. Its acient of reality thereby becomes problematic:
it is brought down to earth and offered as a 'philosophical'
contribution to a discourse, equivalent to fyou] don't dis¬
obey orders in future, right?'. Its voice is then that of





Equations (3a) and (3b) are identical to 2a and 2b, though
this leaves indeterminate the voice of stanzas 1 and III.
But there are no relations of reference as between these
stanzas. In this case, the structure of the utterance is:
C5* = lo // IIT/ // IHoI/you ' '
But I propose that this interpretation inadequately grasps
the unity of the utterance. That unity, I suggest, is based
upon the 'hidden1 structure of stanza II as revealed by
theoretical reconstruction, rather than its concrete
appearance. For if the inner phrase, 'don't disobey orders'
is acknowledged as a possible picture in its own right to be
designated Hi', it then becomes clear that the utterance as
a whole exhibits a unity. For it then comprises three 'res¬
tricted code' impersonal stanzas which resonate with one
another. In this case, 'in future, right' brings not simply
stanza II but all three stanzas 'down to earth'. 'In future,
right?' can be regarded as attaching itself to each of the
three pictures. For of course, the whole point of the
exercise was that the boy should 'sit down in future' and
affirm that this was 'right'. The question invites the boy,
who is posed as situated at the 'earthly' level, to affirm
the teacher's natural order, which is posed as situated at
the 'immanentist' level.
The voice of the three immanentist stanzas must as usual
be designated as that of 'body'. This allocation receives
intuitive support in the case of stanza III which, character¬
istically for this province of meaning, formulates a personal
matter in impersonal, i.e. bodily, terms, 'use your ears'.
In this case the technique whereby the elaborated part of
stanza II attaches itself to the restricted part is one which
has not been previously encountered. I propose to refer to
it as ellipsis, and to designate it by a plus sign, '+',
written as a prefix to the additional part of the stanza
concerned. Like metaphor, this technique establishes a
difference as between voices, but unlike metaphor it does
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so by dividing a stanza against itself. In this case the
structure of the whole utterance can be represented as
follows:
C5- = T Iu , - II, . - HI. . 1 +II-r/ ••• (4)L body body body-1 I/you
This is a not insignificant observation. The philosophical
method has found order, in a remark which sociologically
speaking exhibits anomic features.
"He's a good lad"
I have proposed that throughout his utterances, namely
in the stanzas which locate speech at the 'earthly5 level,
the teacher theoretically invites participation by the
boys in discourse with him. It is important to ascertain
whether, and in what terms, boys actually do so participate
A kind of participation is exhibited at the conclusion of
the present conversation. I propose to treat Sammy Mason's
remark exactly as I have treated those of the teacher. Its
analysis is as follows:
lo
[ ( He's a good lad ) ]
II
x 1 1
| ( That's (why) he didn't give you the lash) ]
IIIo
[ ( Other teachers would have )
Sammy Mason's utterance Ml*'
The analytical equations are:
Ml--- = I & II & HI (i)
I = To (2a)
II = i & ii (2b)
III - IIIo (2c)
Pictures Hi and Ilii are linked by reciprocity involving
the shared word, 'why'. This treats as problematic the
reality underlying the appearance portrayed in Ilii, 'lie
didn't give you the lash'. Accordingly this is an 'earthly
stanza. Its voice cannot be identified immediately. So,
all that can be said so far is:
M111 = i/ii (2b)
The other 'third set' equations are the same as the
' second set' .
Now consider the relations between the stanzas. 'That.'
in stanza II metaphorically reformulates stanza I, making II
dependent upon I for its reference. Again, stanza III is
dependent on stanza II for its reference. It seems that
stanza III 'tacitly' repeats the wording of stanza II to
complete itself. But such 'repetition' is not exact, for
the result would be ungrammatical, i.e. 'other teachers
would have give [sic] you the lash'. Therefore I propose
this 'tacit repetition', is an instance of the technique of
ungrammatical ellipsis, earlier discovered, which is equiva¬
lent to metaphor in establishing a difference between voices.
The utterance as a whole is then:
Ml* = [ [ I ] II ] +III
It is suggestive to see the utterance in this light, for
in two senses this analysis is reminiscent of those produced
of Mr. Cramond's own utterances. First, the utterance as
here analysed exhibits precisely the structure of trans¬
cendent defended speech in the form it lias been found since
Mr. Cramond's first utterance. In the present case this
structure appears in a double form. But secondly, the
analysis breaks down the utterance into three parts which
correspond directly, though loosely, with the three ways
of speaking found so far in Mr. Cramond's speech, namely
'heaven', 'earth', and 'hell'. For the first of Mason's
stanzas, 'lie's a good lad' plainly formulates an idealised
utopia which could readily be described as 'heavenly'.
The third of Mason's stanzas given a resolution of its
ellipsis, formulates an equally idealised but unpleasant
state of affairs which could therefore be described as
'hellish'. By contrast to both of these, the second of
Mason's stanzas formulates the situation at hand ('lie didn't
give you the lash'), and treats this formulation as an
appearance to be related to reality. It can therefore be
described as 'earthly'.
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It must he said at once, that on the evidence of
just one stanza, Mason's versions of 'heaven' and 'hell'
(and presumably 'earth' as well) differ from those of Mr.
Cramond. 'This difference can he given precise linguistic
expression. At least within this utterance, the inhabitant
of Mason's transcendental heaven is not a we hut a he. It
may be suspected that this 'he' lacks some of the sophisti¬
cation of Mr. Cramond's 'we'. So far at least no rational
rules or other devices have appeared to order the he's
realm. Indeed it is not clear that 'he' has any realm to
speak of. 'He' is simply, a 'good lad'. The inhabitant of
Mason's immanentist hell is not, so far as we know, a 'body'
but an evocative 'person'nonetheless, namely, 'others'.
Both of these realms, then, are populated by 'third'
persons. The same is true, at least in this utterance, of
the 'earthly' realm which like the 'heaven' is inhabited
by a 'lie' . (There is no reason to presume it is the same
one). Now it is possible to display the structure of
Mason's utterance as a whole. It is:
M1* " [ [ V 1 "he 1 + ["other (4)
Plainly, a fuller investigation of Mason's response to Mr.
Cramond even in this single utterance would require a
linguistic phenomenology of Mason's speech as a whole.
Regrettably this task cannot be pursued at the present time.
There are many senses in which Mason's remark fails to
exhibit participation in the discourse spoken by Mr. Cramond.
His remark is spoken so ps to lie inaudible to Mr. Cramond.
Grammatically it in no way binds into the structure of the
teacher's preceding speech. It formulates 'what happens'
not in terms of the speech of the teacher nor in terms of
Rialto's actions in relation to that speech, hut in terms
of an entirely different matter: the fact that 'he didn't
give you the lash'. But I propose that all of these are
superficial matters compared to one outstanding aspect of
the situation. That is, that Mason's remark makes no
reference to the phenomenological structure whereby the
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teacher expresses himself in language, nor presumably does
he expect the teacher to refer to his. If this is generally
the case then no rational discourse between teacher and pupil
in the classroom context is possible.^ But I should like
to discuss a remark by a boy which apparently did contribute
to such a discourse.
"Mr. Cramond gives out comics"
During the course of a conversation in which he discussed
several teachers, Johnie Johnson made the following point:
Mr. Cramond sometimes gives out comics and chess
and that. He does it for a purpose, 'cos he likes
to see boys sharing. If they keep it up, you get
a good community.
I propose the following analysis of this remark:
10




I (He does it for a purpose) 'COS (He likes to see|boys sharing)
\
III
[IF (they keep it up) ]
IVo
[ ( you get a good community ) ]
Johnie Johnson's utterance Jl"::"
The analytical equations are:
Jl* = I & II & III (1)
I = Io (2a)
II = i & ii (2b)
III = IIIo (2c)
IV = IVo (2d)
The second stanza is bound together in a familiar manner:
picture i reverberates with picture ii on the word 'he'.
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This is accordingly the voice of the he. In this case:
Jl*Hhe = i.ii (3b)
Apart from 3b, the 'third set1 of equations are identical
to the 'second set', with the result that the voices of
stanzas I, III, and IV cannot yht be determined. I am
proposing that although pictures IIIo and IVo are bound
together by the logical 'if', they do not constitute a
single voice stanza since there is no sensible connection
internal to their wording.
Consider now the relations between stanzas. 'He' in
stanza IT refers to 'Mr. Cramond' in stanza I, accordingly
stanza II is dependent upon stanza I. 'They' in stanza III
is dependent on 'boys' in stanza II, accordingly stanza III
is dependent upon stanza II. 'A good community' in stanza
IV, I propose, metaphorically reformulates 'boys sharing'
in stanza II. However no dependence is thereby constituted:
this is an 'optional' metaphor, between equals. Now the
over-all structure of the utterance can be displayed, even
though the voices of most stanzas are not yet identified:
ji» = r r i i IT, ^ ] 111L L 1 he (boys) J r JV -j
In this equation, 'III' is placed above '[IV ] 1 to indicate
that both interchangeably reformulate stanza II. As in the
previous utterance, spoken by Mason, there is here a
hierarchy of dependence. This hierarchy establishes 'Mr.
Cramond' as the inhabitant of the transcendent realm, 'he'
as inhabitant of the 'earthly' realm, and 'they' as inhab¬
itant of the immanent realm. This identification on a
purely formal basis receives confirmation at the level of
content. Mr. Cramond giving out comics is indeed the
utopian state of affairs which this utterance is praising.
The 'he' realm does indeed exhibit many characteristics
which are familiar properties of the 'earthly' realm,
notably the attribution of consciousness to the person
there portrayed, i.e. the ability to reflect and conjure
up realms of its own. Finally, the 'they' realm does indeed
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exhibit many characteristics which are familiar properties
of the 'hellish1 realm, notably its portrayal of persons
in 'bodily' terms and in 'restricted code', as in this
case, 'they keep it up'.
But I should like to say more than that the structure
here exhibited is familiar in general. I should like to
propose, that this structure portrayed in speech by John
Johnson, is familiar as a representation of the speech of
Mr. Cramond in particular. This proposal may be simply
stated. 1 suggest, that the he portrayed in Johnson's
utterance is not the so-called 'empirical' Mr. Cramond, but
is the I portrayed in Mr. Cramond's speech. In so speaking,
Johnson exhibits an orientation to Mr. Cramond's linguistic
phenomenology. That is to say, he speaks of speech, he does
not purport to speak of reality. By contrast 1 propose that
in his utterance, Sammy Mason exhibited no orientation to Mr.
Cramond's linguistic phenomenology, i.e. speech. He purport¬
ed to speak of reality. From my point of view he spoke only
of a 'reality which was a product of his own linguistic
phenomenology, namely 'a good lad'. (An enquiry into Mason's
speech might trace the speech which was the origin of this
'reality': I suggest that it would not be the speech of
Mr . Cramond).
Mr. Cramond says, 'when we do compositions, we don't
have any talking at all. I hope that is clear'. I have
argued that in such an utterance, he poses the voice of the
I orienting towards the voice of the we, 'hoping' to see
the transcendent rational community of the we made immanent
upon earth. John Johnson says, 'he likes to see boys
sharing'. I propose that in this stanza, Johnson recreates
Mr. Cramond's T orienting toward the community of boys
sharing', which he 'likes' to 'see', i.e. to be made
apparent.
But to what end would Johnson so recreate, or mimick,
Mr. Cramond's speech? In effect I have so far shown Johnson
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appreciating, that is describing, Mr. Craraond's speech.
This 1 have suggested is the work of his stanzas I, II,
and III. But Johnson also criticises, that is to say
theorises, Mr. Craraond's speech. This I propose is the
work of stanza IV.
Stanza IV, I have argued, is an optional metaphor,
on equal terms with stanza II as a whole. Here lie puts in
his own words what, for him, Mr. Cramond's rationality
involves. Tn the absence of other speech by him
one cannot be certain, but I propose it lie identified as
the voice of the you. Then the utterance structure as a
whole can be displayed:
^ tt^Mr. Cramond] ^he (boys) 1 ,^they . . . (4)L you(community)J
The utterance I take it sets up a parallel between the
relation of the you to the community on the one hand, and
that of the he and the boys on the other. But if, as I
have argued, this lie is none other than the _I_ of Mr. Cramond,
then Johnson is comparing speech with speech, and so
'reality1, within speech itself.
For me, plainly, Johnson's speech is good speech,
'pure speech'. To stress only one aspect of this 'purity',
Johnson locates both his own speech and that which he is
criticising as 'earthly' speech. It is plain in his
utterance that such 'realities' as Mr. Cramond observes
are observed from within this 'earthly' level. In so
relating speech to speech within his own speech, he contri¬
butes to man's historical pursuit of rationality.
But despite the subtlety of Johnson's response to Mr.
Cramond's speech, I fear that the most significant aspect
of his remark is that it was spoken outside the context of
Mr. Cramond's classroom itself. Within that classroom,
the boys were rarely given an opportunity to participate
as speakers, despite the apparent 'rationalism' of the part
which they were allocated within the world as portrayed in
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Mr. Cramond's speech. I should like to conclude by
considering three instances of speech between Mr. Cramond
and individual boys, in order to explore the significance
of this observation.
"You1re a distracting member of the class"
The teacher was reading a poem on the Pied Piper of Hameli
He had different boys read each verse. After one verse had
been read by a boy, Mr. Cramond turned to Jones, saying,
"'Shut up, Alan. You're a distracting member
of the class. You know that, don't you?'"
Jones replied: "'Me?'"
As before, we can immediately give a sociological
description of this talk. There are two distinct vous
portrayed here: one within an inner picture, the descriptive
statement "You're a distracting member of the class", the
other portrayed in an outer picture, reflecting on the
statement, "knowing" it to be true. Jones is invited to
affirm the whole, and with it Mr. Cramond's familiar
definition. Mr. Cramond's location of his 'orders' within
his definition of the situation is interesting. In the
terminology of Max Weber'the definition serves as a
'legitimate order' in terms of which the imperative is
understood. The imperative is legitimated by assimilating
the particular situation at hand to the familiar definition
which is consistently and repeatedly reasserted on every
possible occasion. Mr. Cramond treats an incident which
could have posed a threat to his order as the occasion for
reasserting and so strengthening that order.
Now consider a theoretical investigation of the talk.
Analysis of the conversation produces the following display:
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11
( Shut up ) Alan )
Ho
r( You're a distracting member of the class) ]
III
i 1 i
|" ( ( You know that ) don't you? ) |
IVo
[ ( me? ) }
Mr. Cramond's utterance C5"::"
The analytical equations are:
C5* = I & II & III & IV (!)
I = i & i i (2a)
II = Ho (2b)
III = i & ii (2c)
IV = IVo (2d)
Stanza I is bound together in the familiar technique of
reflection. This establishes its 'earthly' character:
the otherwise harsh accent of reality of the imperative
is softened, i.e. made problematic, by the Christian name
which follows it. This can be identified as the voice of
the l/you, so that:
C5"'II/you = (i)ii (3a)
Stanza III is likewise bound together by reflection.
The otherwise emphatic accent of reality of picture i is
called into question by picture ii. The two pictures also
exhibit reverberation on the word 'you'. Consequently,
C5-" III = (i )ii (3c)
you
- 144 -
The other 'third set1 equations are identical to the
corresponding 'second set' ones. The voices of stanzas
II and IV remain unknown for the time being.
Consider now relations of reference within the conversa¬
tion. Stanza II metaphorically reformulates stanza I, insofar
as 'you' is a synonym for 'Alan'. However, I propose that
this is not a mandatory metaphor establishing dependence but
is rather optional, and so sustains equal independent
relations between these stanzas. The criteria) here is
that what is an object, in this case a person, within
one stanza is likewise an object within the other, so that
the 'metaphor' is simply a change of name. By contrast
dependency arises when what is speech in one stanza is an
object in another. Stanza III metaphorically reformulates
stanza II, in that 'that' refers to IIo as a whole: this
establishes the dependence of III on II. Finally, IVo
metaphorically reformulates 'you' in Illii. This however
like that between stanzas T and IT is merely a matter of
a change in name of what remains an object: accordingly it
is an optional metaphor which establishes independent
relations.
Now the utterance structure as a whole can be displayed:
This analysis suggests how the missing voices should be
assigned. Stanza II is transcendent. It portrays the 'you'
therefore I propose to designate it with this voice. However
it must then be distinguished from the 'earthly' you voice.
What kind of a you voice is it then? In terms of content,
the 'you' is portrayed as a bad object. This would suggest
that the vision of hell is being invoked. Additionally,
in every previous remark considered, Mr. Cramond has portrayed
the you as contemplating the natural rather than the social
order. Accordingly, so it is here. By contrast stanza IV
stands alone. It metaphorically reformulates the problematic
'earthly' you of stanza III. Accordingly, its voice is so
- 145 -
designated. Then the utterance structure as a whole is:
C5- = riT/ i rr 11 i 111 i riv i (4)L I/you-J LL you1 you J L youJ
Now, what is the significance of this result? 1 propose
that the contrast between the portrayal of the situation by
Mr. Cramond in his utterance, and that by Alan Jones in his,
is worth remarking. Within his scheme, i.e. stanzas II and
ITT, the teacher portrays the you, as 'knowing1 that 'you're
a distracting member of the class'. Ingeniously, then, Mr.
Cramond at once labels the boy, and thereby calls into
question his proper membership of the classroom situation,
and portrays the boy as himself subscribing to this labelling.
Thereby lie affirms the boy's proper membership of the classroom
situation insofar as he denies it, and denying it insofar as
I 7
he affirms it. The boy's reply, 'Me?', could therefore be
taken in many ways. It could refer to the transcendent you
of stanza II, in which case it would be a transcendent 'me'.
Or it could refer to the earthly you of picture ITIi, in
which case it would be an earthly you. Again and most simply
it could refer to Mr. Cramond's final 'you', the one in
Illii. Or, it could call into question the whole relevance
of the utterance to himself at all, by referring to 'Alan',
in stanza I. But there is yet another- possibility. If
Jones lias grasped: the predicament which Mr. Cramond's
utterance places him in, then his 'Me?' could be at once
a reference to the 'you' of II and the you of III, hellish
and earthly.
In short, as a result of the way in which the teacher
has constructed his utterance, it is impossible to distinguish
whether tire boy's response exhibits simply an attempt to
question whether the remark is directed to him at all, and
so to deflect it, or whether it exhibits a deep immersion in
and comprehension of the predicament into which Mr. Cramond
has placed him by speaking it. The teacher himself appears,
in his speech, to be unconcerned as between these two. If
so, then his elaborate speech does nothing to encourage the
pursuit of rationality by those to whom he speaks.
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I should now like to turn to consider the case of two boys
who did themselves participate in one of Mr. Cramond's
transcendental discourses, namely his voice of the we, and
consider his response to their speech.
"Daft Alec Ria'lto"
Another incident involving Rialto occurred towards the
end of my period of research. On this occasion, Mr. Cramond
entered the room with a stack of books which lie gave out. 1
noted, "the boys soon realise they're all different". He
then told them,
Before the end of term we are each going to read
a book. All these books are reasonably interest¬
ing - some of them are very interesting. We'll
have a period of reading this morning, and we'll
have one each week from time to time. Now, I
hope you'll understand I don't like you reading
aloud in your neighbour's ear - you know what 1
mean by that.
I do not propose to embark upon an analysis of this utterance
at this stage. Suffice it to say, that it exhibits the
familiar features of Mr. Cramond's cosmology, involving the
we in a transcendent social fact 'heaven', counterposed to a
transcendent natural facticity which I have called 'hell',
with in between the realm of reciprocity as between the I
and the you. As soon as the teacher had made this announce¬
ment, Rialto asked him, "Where do we start?". Many facets
of this remark could be examined: for present purposes,
however one will suffice. In his remark Rialto himself
explicitly participates in the teacher's w<3 province of
meaning, the 'heavenly' collectivity. It is in that light
that I believe the teacher's reply should be considered.
The teacher replied,
Now that's just like daft Alec Rialto. When I
eat my dinner, I start with my pudding first.
If you come down to McGratli House, you'll see
that I eat my custard with my potatoes.
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Uproarious laughter greeted this remark. It was 'obviously'
a joke, and at Rialto's expense. A sociological analysis
of this joke would I suggest, focus attention upon the
relationship Mr. Cramond sustains between his speech and
Rialto's. On this reading the joke works in the following
way. In a world wherein one can intelligibly ask where to
start reading a book, there can be no commonly agreed order
of reading. In such a world there need be no commonly agreed
order of doing anything, e.g. eating. In such a world Mr.
Cramond eats custard with his potatoes. The laugh however
is not on him but on Rialto who is revealed to have acted as
if he inhabited such a 'daft' world. Such an analysis then
would accept the serious substance of Mr. Cramond's joke,
namely that the boy's question was unintelligible. Such an
analysis, like any sociological analysis, would appreciate,
not criticise, the speaker.
But I propose that from a philosophical point of view there
is no need to capitulate to the teacher's definition of the
situation in order to comprehend the joke. On the contrary
the analysis is the occasion for criticism of his definition
of the situation. Consider then how the philosophical treat¬
ment proceeds in the case of this utterance.
Analysis reveals the following:
1°
/" NOW (that's just like daft Alec Rialto ) J
II
j i i
[_ WHEN (I eat my dinner) (l start with my pudding first )J7
III
i ii
/"IF (you come down to McGrath House)(you' 11 see that^I eat
iii
my custard with my potatoes)) ]
Mr. Cramond's utterance C7"::"
The analytical equations are:
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C7* = I & II & III (1)
I = lo (2a)
II = i & ii (2b)
III = i & ii & iii (2c)
Stanza lo is on its own, however its voice is familiar. I
suggest the 'that1 establishes that here is to be found the
voice of the J_ in the reflective mode. Equation 3a would
be identical to equation 2a.
Stanza II has a familiar structure of reverberation.
Therefore this stanza establishes itself as exhibiting the
voice of the _I. In this case:
C7:: I I , = i.ii (3b)
Stanza III is more complex but consists entirely of
familiar relationships, of reverberation and reflection.
Accordingly it exhibits the voice of the you reflecting
upon the _T, thus:
C7 "III = i.ii (iii) (3C)
you
Then the structure of the utterance as a whole can be
considered. Stanza I is autonomous. But stanza II
reverberates with picture Illiii. Accordingly stanzas II
and III are related together by reflection. The utterance
as a whole is then:
C7- = IT // ( IIT ) III (4)I ' ' I you
But now, consider that stanza I here portrayed is,
according to my analysis, a portrayal of the I in the mode
of reflection. If this is correct, the I is posed as
reflecting on Alec Rialto. If th is is written into the
equation representing the utterance structure, then it
becomes:
IT , , // (IIT) IIII (Alec Rialto) I you
- 14l) -
The conclusion is inescapable: the 'nul1 rleation at the
centre of this utterance is not so neutral as it appears.
It rather has the role of a mirror in being the axis around
which a reversal is built into the utterance, of this form:
as I is to Alec Rial to so you is to _T
Now what is the relation between _t and Alec Rialto in this
utterance? Simply that to the I_, Alec appears 'daft'.
What is the relation between you and the In his joke,
the teacher portrays precisely the J_ as daft in its actions
before the you.
I propose then that the structure of the teacher's
utterance, which itself is only possible in terms of the
structure which he persisteiily sustains, is crucial to a
comprehension of the teacher's joke. More precisely, the
joke consists of an inversion of his usual structure.
Whereas that usual structure involves the we being upheld
as an ideal before the _T, here the I. is upheld as a scape¬
goat before the you. But what brought on this reversal?
Simply, Alec Rialto's formulation of his question in terms
of the we. I propose then this conclusion: faced with a
boy's participation in his we speech, the teacher consti¬
tutes his system as having been turned upside down. Retro¬
spectively then, it is the boy who is constituted as having
turned the system upside down. In such a way does Mr.
Cramond defend Iris system of speaking'.
In the same conversation another boy also made a we
contribution. Immediately following the teacher's rebuttal
of Rialto, Clason enquired, "Sir, do we put our names in
the books?" To this the teacher answered,
There's no need to do that. I'll give you out
slips of paper you can write your name on and
use for bookmarks.
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On this occasion it was apparently not possible for the
teacher to exhibit the fantasy nature of the boy's question,
for he had in fact pinpointed a genuine problem arising from
the teacher's proposal that the boys each read different
books over a period of weeks. Analysis reveals:
10
// ( There's no need to do that) J
11
1 13
/"(I'll give you out (slips of paper) you can write your
names on and use for bookmarks )J
Mr. Cramond's utterance C8~::~
No further examination is needed, I suggest, to establish
that, faced with a contribution to his wti discourse which
the teacher could not invalidate, he abruptly switches out
of that discourse, first into the natural order mode
('there's no need ...'), and then into the 'earthly' 1/you
mode .
"You know (he order of events"
We can see, then, that the subtle complexity of Mr.
Cramond's speech is no aid to the maintenance of a discourse
with the boys, indeed quite the reverse: lie employs his
social, skills most effectively to exclude the speech of the
boys from participating in the structure of voices
which lie sustains. It must be said that, in terms
of sustaining social order in the classroom, that his
methods were highly successful. Consider one last incident
which illuminates the nature of this success. On one
occasion, Mr. Cramond's room was in use for- an examination
which he had to supervise, so that the boys of J2 had to
sit in a girls' classroom next door. Mr. Cramond told them:
Right, now. I think we know the order of events.
You've got to get on by yourselves today, and I
don't want to see anybody off their seats.
Sociologically speaking, we find that here the familiar
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definition is reasserted. In the inner picture, the
definite we is posed as knowing 'the order of events',
watched over in the outer picture by the less certain JE.
On the other hand the you is portrayed as quite dominated
by external necessity: ' you've got to The I. appears
again later in the utterance, again in an indefinite outer
picture contemplating a definite factual state of affairs.
The boys asked whether they could read books but the
teacher said, " get you something to do", and brought
in games of draughts, and comics. Then he left. Ten
minutes later he returned. He at once pointed to Mears,
saying:
"'Right, next door. You were off your feet.
You know the order of events. You were well
warned'".
Next door Mears was belted.
From a sociological viewpoint we find that as in
utterance C5";;" above, the imperative is contained curtly
in the first three words. The remainder of the remark
legitimates the imperative by locating it within the
familiar definition, which is thereby re-affirmecl. Three
pictures portray three yous, thereby achieving some rhetori¬
cal force. They are not all the same you however. The
first and third portray the you descriptively: they refer
to a factual state of affairs. The second picture by con¬
trast portrays the reflective you, in its familiar stance
of 'knowing' Mr. Cramond's definition of the situation.
l 8
Had one adopted a 'dramaturgical standpoint', ' and attempt
a description of Mr. Cramond's role performance, one might
have had to view this interaction as a breakdown in the
teacher's impression management. Even after being' well
warned', one might have noted, the boy still acted contrary
to the command. But in view of our focus on the teacher's
own portrayal of the situation, we come to a different
conclusion, namely that the incident provided the teacher
witli yet another opportunity for re-asserting his definition
- I 52 -




[RIGHT, NOW ( I think (we know the order of events) ) ]
II
i ii
[ ( You've got to (get on) by yourselves) TODAY ]
III
i /■ i i
[AND ( I don't want to see(anybody off their seats ) j
V
Mr. Cramond's utterance C9"~
The analytical equations are:
C9* = I & II & III (1)
I = i & ii (2a)
II = i & ii (2b)
III = i & ii (2c)
Stanza I is structured by reflection in the familiar way:
C9~" I-j- = i(ii) (3a)
Stanza II is structured by the familiar device of
reciprocity, whereby two pictures problematise the accent
of reality of one another. Accordingly
C9*H = i/ii (3b)
you '
Stanza III is also structured by reflection, though in
an unfamiliar way. However, here we do find the voice of
the I, so the equation is:
C9--III-J- = i(ii) (3c)
Equation 3b is identical to equation 2b. Now consider
the utterance structure as a whole. There appear to be no
relations of reference within the utterance. In this case
the structure is:
C9" = IT // III // IIITI ' ' you '' I
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But I suggest that this equation does not capture
the complete structure of the utterance. For within
stanza I, the 'earthly' I_ is posed as reflecting upon
the 'heavenly1' we. Symetrically opposite to this, in
stanza III, the same 'earthly' I is posed glancing in a
direction unusual for the I of Mr. Cramond, though as we
shall see much the commonest direction for the I of
another teacher to glance in: in the direction of the third
person 'anybody' which is by reverberation identifiable as
the voice of the 'body', the hardly mentionable realm of
'hell'. In this case, the utterance has a completeness
which has not yet been expressed. A better representation
would l^e :
C9* = IT, ^ // II // HIT/, , ^ (4)I(we J 11 you '' I(body J
If it is understood that the we here inhabits the heavenly
realm, and the body the 'hellish' realm, then the utterance
lias a perfect symmetry: formulated upon 'earth', it articu¬
lates the viewpoint of the I, the you, the we, and the one,
on the matter in question.
Now consider the teacher's response to the action of
the unfortunate Mears. Analysis of his utterance reveals
the following structure:
10
£ RIGHT, ( next door ) ~]
11
i i i
( You were 'v off your seat ) J
III
i / ii




l~ ( You were ' well warned ) J
v
Mr. Cramond''s utterance CIO"
The analytical equations are:
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cio-"- = r & ir & hi & iv (1)
I = lo (2a)
II = i & i i (2b)
III = i & ii (2c)
IV = i & ii (2cl)
Stanza lo simply presents a 'restricted code' imperative.
As such it pertains to the 'hellish' natural order.
It must be said at once that on a purely grammatical
basis, no subdivisions would be made within stanzas II, III,
IV. The division first appears as an optional possibility
as a result of the analysis of stanza II. By analogy a
parallel division is found within stanza III and again within
stanza IV. In each case, the construction of the stanza is
identical, consisting in the voice of the you engaging in
reflection. The equations are:
"you = i(li> <3b>
TIIyou " i(li) (3C)
"you = iUi) (3t0
Consider now the structure of the utterance as a whole.
No reference as between stanzas is to be found in this
utterance, but the last three stanzas reverberate with one
another. The overall structure of the utterance might be
represented thus:
CIO-" = I, , // II .III .IVbody you you you
But this equation does not capture the complete structure of
the utterance. For within stanzas II, III, and IV, the you
is posed in relation to other realms. In stanza II, the you
is portrayed, cis it were, in bodily terms, 'off your seat'.
In III, the yon is portrayed reflecting on 'the order of
events' which it 'knows'. In IV, the you is posed as 'warned'.
I propose that these three express the you's relation to each
of the three realms conjured up within Mr. Cramond's speech.
II expressed the you's 'bodily' orientation, that is its
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orientation towards •hell'. Ill expresses the you's
'spiritual' orientation, that is, its orientation towards
'heaven'. IV expresses the you's orientation to other
speech, that is to say, its 'earthly' orientation. I
propose this can be expressed in the notation as follows:
CIO-"- = I. . // II ,, , v. Ill , x.TV , v.... (4)body' ' you(body) you(we) you(youj
In his remark to Mears, the teacher's utterance reiterates
the structure of his utterance to the assembled class a
little earlier, with the difference that on this occasion
the structure is defined specifically with respect to the
you. Having specified Mears' situation in terms of every
available mode of speech, the teacher felt able to enforce
physical punishment.
Defini ti on
The sociologist is struck by the fact that Mr. Cramond
was able to treat the sequence of events in the daily life
of the classroom as a continuous series of occasions for
1 9
sustaining his definition of the situation in speech.
This'definition' could be regarded as an elaboration of
. 20
Goffman's 'presentation of self" idea, but going beyond
it in two ways. Firstly, Mr. Cramond does not merely
present his own 'self. Certainly, the _I is prominent in
his remarks, and it has certain distinct characteristics:
it 'hopes', 'thinks', and 'wants'; its presence is concerned,
but detached. But the !_ is no more prominent than other
'persons' in his portrayal, notably the we and the you,
who each have equally well-defined features. And the I
is just as likely to be absent from a particular portrayal
when they are present as the reverse. Secondly, Mr. Cramond
does not portray 'persons' in a vacuum. He situates his I,
we,and you in a context. This context, as we have seen,
comprises 'rules', and inevitable laws ('what will happen'),
which together Mr. Cramond calls ' the order of events' . He
portrays this 'order' as having an existence external to
the'persons' in his world, as being a 'social fact'.
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In contrast to this, my philosophical hypothesis is
that these realms are in no sense the ex. nihilo creation
of Mr. Cramond's speech. They are rather the latest
secularised versions of what Heidegger calls ' onto-theo-
logical' categories which have shaped the Western tradition
2 1
of philosophical speech for thousands of years. My test
of this rather large hypothesis will be an investigation of
the speech of other teachers and boys within the classroom
setting. If I am correct, then in an important sense we
shall learn nothing new from them. The same basic structure
wili be reaffirned
, in each case though perhaps with
differences in emphasis which it is hard to anticipate,
having so far examined systematically the speech of only
one individual.
From the linguistic point of view, the very words
involved in this distinctions are of interest. Compare
the etymologies of 'definition'1 and of 'tradition1 as the
motifs of the two approaches which I am contrasting.
The Concise. Oxford Dictionary states that definition mean¬
ing "stating the precise nature of a thing or meaning of
2 2
a word" stems from the Latin finitio, to end or finish.
By contrast tradition, having the first meaning "opinion
or belief or custom handed down, handing down of these,
2 5from ancestors to posterity" stems from the Latin dare,
to give. Then the notion of speech as definition is
appropriate if one's conception of speech is as mysterious
ex nihilo creativity on the one hand or as rigid scientific
termino-logy on the other.
By contrast, the notion of speech as tradition is
appropriate if one conceives of speech as passed on, given,
from one generation to the next. I have suggested that
words, in their varied aspects, are the aspect of 'what is
passed on' of specific concern to a linguistic phenomenology.
Such an enquiry has a historical object, therefore, from




From the descriptive point of view, Mr. Craraond's
speech sustains one particular unique definition of the
situation, and in so doing exhibits his skilfulness.
Should he fail to do so, that definition would no longer
exist: the result would be anomie. But from the philo¬
sophical point of view, Mr. Cramond's definition of the
situation is not unique, and therefore there is no reason
to conceive that it would fall should his social skill lapse
on any occasion. Rather, insofar as the philosophical
approach has delineated successfully the structure of any
possible 'definition of the situation' within speech, then
alternative speech by any other speaker would sustain the
same structure. On this view, the metaphysical tradition
which Mr. Cramond's speech exhibits is not so much fragile and
in need of defence, as so all pervading that our difficulty
2 5
lies in conceiving how to liberate ourselves from it.
Any programme for such liberation must demonstrate its
own possibility from within this philosophical structure. I
have proposed such a programme. It involves fastening
attention on a neglected and elusive level within speech,
namely the realm, located between the theological realms
of heaven and hell, which I have identified as 'earth'.
Though Mr. Cramond refers to it, his own preference is to
escape from it. The outcome is his presentation of the
world in terms of a dualism, 'heaven' versus 'hell', 'social
order' versus 'natural order', a dualism matching those
familiar within existing phenomenology, sociology, and
psychology. By contrast, I have remained sceptical of
realities which they have defined, and so I am sceptical
of those which he defines, and defines in much the same
terms. In contrast to the search for the certainty of
extra-ordinaritKs which leads both Mr. Cramond and the
philosophers, sociologists, and psychologists away from
the problematic realm of ordinary speech, I propose a
searching out of that ordinariness where it can be found.^
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Chapter Six
MR. LEE 'S VISION OF HELL
Paradigm
Following a theoretical argument which established the
need and the place for linguistic phenomenology as a
critical investigation of the portrayal of 'reality1 in
speech, I have set out in some detail the manner in which
a paradigm case of an empirical investigation of 'every¬
day1 speech can be conducted. It is plain, that however
detailed, the very detail revealed in speech by that study
shows that that study is no more than preparatory. It
would be fruitless at this stage to simply accumulate more
and more facts about the speech of disparate individuals.
Accordingly, I should like to address a more strategic
question in the concluding chapters of the present enquiry.
I should like to address certain modes of speech which
might at first sight seem, for various reasons, so different
from the paradigm case as to render the phenomenology which
it exhibits to be implausible or impracticable.
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My conception of what linguistic phenomenology can
achieve has necessarily been inspired for me by the speech
of one individual, Mr. Cramond. But in case that paradigm
might be thought too narrow, such as to lead to the
imposition of that one individual1s way of speaking upon
all, I now hope to indicate the approach the discipline
would adopt to speakers markedly different from Mr. Cramond.
The three cases I have in mind are, firstly, a teacher whose
way of speaking exhibited the exact opposite to Mr. Cramond's
mode, an immanentist mode of speech. By showing the fruitful-
ness of the approach in the case of such a speaker I hope to
establish that it is in no sense biassed towards the
1 rationalism1 which it purported to be criticising, but in
fact can shed light on an 'existentialist1 speaker equally
well. Second I should like to consider a teacher who
exhibited neither rationalist nor existentialist modes of
speech, and indeed was not sufficiently skilful to sustain
social order within the classroom setting. Accordingly, his
lessons provided an opportunity to observe and analyse what
is, sociologically speaking, 'anomic' speech. In this way
I hope to offset another possible line of criticism, namely
that despite its claim to criticise extraordinary speech
my approach is in fact only an appreciation of social order
in another guise. Finally, I should like tentatively to
test the generality of the method by applying it to a
speaker far removed from the classroom setting. I have in
mind, as an intriguing context within which to explore the
approach, the writings of Edmund Husserl which themselves
inspired it. Such an exploration should permit the more
precise formulation of a matter which I have so far addressed
only loosely, namely in what sense my 'linguistic' approach
is a translation of an approach developed by Husserl in
an entirely different context, namely that of consciousness,
or in what sense my approach may in fact be more faithful
to his method than he was himself, insofar as in writing of
'consciousness' he conceived himself to be writing of a
reality external to the language in which he was writing,
whereas from my point of view he was rather writing of a
'reality' in writing.
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These explorations will be neither as detailed nor as
rigorous, as those of the previous chapter aspired to be.
But they will not degenerate back into mere description.
On the contrary they will be informed by the discipline of
linguistic phenomenological method even where they do not
fully practise it. In particular, they will be concerned
to investigate a phenomenon thus far neglected by ethnome-
thodologists, existentialists, and others engaged in
research into language, namely the distinction between
reality and 1realityt as a feature of speech itself.
With this aspiration in mind, I return now to consider
the classroom context.
"It 's not very nice to come back to the classroom"
I now present a teacher whose mode of presentation of
himself in the classroom 'felt' distinctively different from
that of Mr. Cramond. considered in the previous chapter. I
hope to show that this 1 feeling1 can be accounted for by
a linguistic analysis, which locates his speech within the
same structure as that occupied by Mr. Cramond, albeit in a
different position. In this way I intend to show how what i
at first sight the rich complexity of available alternatives
in fact reflects the impoverishment of real choices availabl
to speakers within the structure of our existing language.^
But first let us experience the 'existential leap* which the
boys of J2 experienced seven times a day throughout their
school lives of shifting abruptly to the discourse of
another teacher.
I first met Mr. Lee at lunch ('school dinner1) on my
first day in the school. He told me that J2 was 'a very
good class'. As an illustration of this point, he told me
that he had offered three selected boys extra homework on
Wednesdays, Thursdays and Tuesdays. The following week,
several other boys had come to request extra work for them¬
selves. I attended one of his lessons that first afternoon.
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It followed the swimming period, so that the boys entered
the classroom in one's, two's, and three's over a ten
minute period. Mr. Lee greeted them with the following
remark:
I know you've just had swimming, and its not
very nice to come back to the classroom, but
the sooner you get used to it the better.
Come 011, and we'll get some work done.
It can be said at once, in a descriptive observation, that
the teacher poses the ^ as contemplating, and 'knowing' the
situation of the you in a way which defines the you's
situation for it. The you is told it had 'better' get used
to this situation. Then, in a switch of voices, the we is
invoked as being the mode in which the lesson will now go
forward. This observation is interesting enough, but it
remains sociological in the sense that it fails to explain
why this particular definition of the situation, out of
indefinitely many possible others, should be put forward
at this point by this teacher. A theoretical investigation
of this utterance can provide an outline of Mr. Lee's way
of speaking which will serve as the context for a briefer
treatment of his subsequent utterances.
The analysis of this utterance presents problems of
ambiguity greater than any previously encountered. The
si inplest way to deal with this is to presen t one inter¬
pretation, and to discuss possible variations from it.
I propose the following analysis:
I
X XX
^ I know (you've just had swimming )
I'
X X X
AND (its not very nice to come back to the classroom )
I*
x v
BUT (the sooner you get used to it the better)J
II
/ ( Come on ) J
~~
III
AND ( we'll get some work done) J
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I i & Li & 1 ii & iv
IIIo






The first two pictures of stanza I present a familiar
technique, but in an unfamiliar context. The link between
them is one of reflection. This then implies that the you
is a figment of the reflective consciousness of the _L, and
not 'on a par' , i.e. on the same level, as the _L as was the
case in Mr. Crainond's speech. Recall that in Mr. Crainond's
speech, the 11s'consciousness 1, or rather in my preferred
term, 'speech', formulated the here and now situation at
hand. This would seem to be the case here also: Mr. Lee's
you is not a subject conscious of the world, but an object
in the world. It may be hypothesised that within Mr. Lee's
way of speaking, the you will not be attributed with a
consciousness, with speech. Certainly there is as yet no
evidence of a voice of the you. What is found here is
the voice of the I.
This much is definite. Hereafter, ambiguity is ines¬
capable. Picture Iii is definitely within the scope of the
reflection of the J_ in pLcture Ti. Hut it is unclear whether
tbii s scope extends any further, in particular, whether it
extends to both what I have called Iiii and Iiv. If it
does not extend to Iiii, then perhaps this picture should
not be regarded as part of stanza I at all, but as beginning
a new stanza on its own. But there are other grounds for
linking Iiii with lii. Although picture Iiii itself has no
word in common with li or Iii, it reverberates with tit' in
Iiv, and Iiv reverberates with 'you' in lii, accordingly
tiiis suggests that Iii, Iiii, and Iiv are 'on a level' with
one another. But there is an alternative interpretation.
This is that the 'it' in picture Iiv does not reverberate
with the 'it' in picture Iiii, but metaphorically reformul¬
ates that picture. In this case, Iiii and Iiv are both
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separate stanzas from stanza I, and Iiii formulates the
transcendent natural order which the you in Iii and in
Iiv articulates on earth.
To attempt to eliminate these ambiguities in a defini¬
tive interpretation would be to do violence to the utterance.
Rather I propose that the ambiguity is a constituent feature
of the utterance, with which the linguistic phenomenological
method is well able to deal. What does it involve, then, in
the present case?
The internal structure of the stanzas is, I propose, as
follows:
L1 I
^ = i(ii.iv.iii) (3a)
The ambiguity, I suggest, subsists in the fact that what
are here designated as Iiv, and especially Iiii, i.e.
pictures within a stanza, may be equally well regarded as
making a stanza in their own right. It is even possible to
identify whht the voice of this picture would be. Insofar
as Iiv and Iiii reverberate together, it is on the word
'it1, which accordingly defines the voice of what may be
named as stanza I*. This stanza may be defined by the
supplementary equation,
L1 * 11 . , — iii.iv (3a®)
1 u
The equations 3b and 3c are identical to 2b and 2c res¬
pectively, leaving unidentified the voices of stanzas II
and III.
Consider now relations between the stanzas here distin¬
guished. If a relation exists between stanza 1^ and stanza
IVthen it exists via the relation of both to the you
pictures. Stanza I reflects on the you, stanza I' rever¬
berates with the you: the overall relation is then one of
reflection. As between stanza I and stanza II there is no
relation, but a relation exists between I* and II. It is
one of metaphorical reformulation: 'come on1 reformulates
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,you get used to it'. This is an 'optional1 metaphor,
establishing no relations of dependence. As between II
and III there is similarly an 'optional' metaphorical
relation: 'come on' can equally reformulate 'we'll get
some work done'. Thus stanza II, 'come on', is ambiguously
situated between stanzas I' and III in a way not unlike the
ambiguous location of picture Iiv between pictures lii and
liii. It is now possible to represent the overall structure
of the utterance:
L1* = IAi ( ''it > ] [ 11 1 [ 111 J
The voices of stanzas II and III have yet to be identified.
But this synthesis is itself suggestive as to their identifica¬
tion. The voice of the _L in stanza I is, as I have shown,
intimately bound up with the impersonal i_t voice. It can at
once be hypothesised that this is the voice of immanentist
natural order. Facing it, as it were, is what is readily
identified as the voice of the we, in stanza III, the voice
of transcendentalist social order. And the realm which we
have seen has ambiguous status between the two is plainly
also familiar: it is the 'earthly' realm within which Mr.
Lee's 'come on' imperative is pronounced. The overall
structure is thus:
LI* = [q ( rit) ] [nearthJ [uiwe] (4)
It is apparent that whilst this structure precisely re¬
iterates the range of realms which was to be found in the
speech of Mr. Cramond, there is a dramatic reversal in the
part played by each within his scheme. In Mr. Craniond's way
of speaking, the voice of the \ye is elaborated into the
organising principle of his complex utterances, whereas the
voice of the b°^Z restricted in form and content, and
has a residual part to play in grammatical structure. In
Mr. Lee's utterance the opposite is the case. In and around
the impersonal 'It' voice, he erects an elaborate structure,
whereas the we voice is dismissed briefly in a restricted
reir.a rk .
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Of particular interest is the transformation in the
relation of the ][ and the you which comes about in Mr.
Lee's speech. Whereas these two play symmetric though
unequal parts in Mr. Cramond's scheme, in Mr. Lee's speech
all symmetry has disappeared. How has this come about?
On the basis of Mr. Cramond's speech, one would have been
prepared to assume that the location of the I. and the you
together in the 'earthly' realm was an essential structural
feature, yet it is violated by Mr. Lee. But what has
happened makes sense, I propose, if we learn from our
earlier encounter with Sartre's transformation of Husserl's
transcendentalist scheme into an immanentist viewpoint.
The immanentist reduction, which Sartre took from the early
Husserl, entailed a bracketing of the intersubjective social
world, and a consequent retreat to my unique consciousness.
In linguistic translation, this reduction entails a retreat
to my unique voice, the voice of the 1, and a bracketing of
the voice of the we. As Sartre shows, the result is that
the other's subjectivity can no longer be apprehended: the
other is now simply an object for my consciousness, or here,
for my language. So too is the natural world. But the
status of this consciousness as 'mine' is somewhat problem¬
atic. For Sartre, consciousness is absolute consciousness:
it is transcendent: it transcends 'me'. 'There is something
distressing for each of us, to catch in the act this tireless
creation of existence of which we are not the creators'.
Thus in contrast to the complacent relationship existing
for the rationalist between his consciousness and the we,
the existentialist experiences an alienated relationship
between consciousness and his _E. I propose to explore this
relation a little further in the speech of Mr. Lee. Consider
then another remark, by which he opened the third of his
French lessons which I observed.
The Ideology of the 'I'
Mr. Lee told the boys:
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Open your books at page 25, please. I don't
want to see any feet in the aisle. All feet-
under the desk. We looked at pictures 1 and
3- I' ni going to set up the tape-recorder and
I don't want a squeak from anyone while I'm
doing that. There'll be trouble for anyone
who talks or whispers now.
Sociologically, we may describe what we find here. Impera¬
tives are given without justification, then the 'wants' of
the I are invoked to give a variety of instructions. Finally
an impersonal threat of punishment is made. This account is,
again, informative enough in its way, but it in no way suggests
limits as to what the teacher might possibly have said or done
with his speech either qua this particular individual speaker,
or' as a speaker in general. The exploration of these issues
requires a philosophical, i.e. theoretical, investigation.
I propose the following analysis:
I
i i i
[ ( ( Open your books at page 2,5) please )
II
1 L 1
[ ( I don't want to see ( any feet in the aisle ) )
i i i
( all feet under the desk ) j
II lo




[(I'm going to set up the tape-recorder) AND (I don't want
/
{ a squeak from anyone)
\
i i i
WHILE (I'm doing that )
V
1 XI
[(There'll be trouble for (anyone who) talks or whispers now)
Mr . lee's utterance L2 *
Here and henceforth i will not explicitly work through
the synthesis of these constituent units as a whole but
will restrict myself to discussing features of particular
interest.
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This utterance, as analysed, is revealing of the
specificity which each of the three realms takes on within
the speech of this particular teacher. First, the realm of
the we is again markedly undeveloped. To be more precise,
Mr. Lee's we is merely descriptive, by contrast with the
theoretical wee which was to be found in the speech of Mr.
Cramond. Second, the earthly realm within Mr. Lee's speech
is highly restricted. In Mr. Cratnond's speech, a lively
'l/you1 relationship was sustained within his speech, even
if in practise the boys in the classroom rarely participated
in it. But within Mr. Lee's realm, no discourse at the
earthly level is possible at all. So far as we know at the
moment, only imperatives make their appearance there. These
imperatives then define what for me is the reality of Mr.
Lee's speech: the voices of the we and the I_ formulate only
the 'ideoLogical' legitimation of those imperatives.
Nonetheless, Mr. Lee's ideology is of interest per se.
In eight pictures in the present utterance, he reiterates
his preferred vision of the world. A recurrent motif here
is the I contemplating 'anyone'. I propose that there Mr.
Lee gives direct expression to the Sartrian vision of the
individual alone in a world of things. Striking is the way
in which in pictures Ilii and Iliii personal matters are
formulated impersonally. As in certain of Mr. Cramond's
utterances bodily imagery, here 'feet' is prominent. This
reaches a climax in picture Illii, 'I don't want a squeak
from anyone'. Now consider the final stanza. Mere the
anyone portrayed alone is an impersonal world, a world
which treats the anyone in the same terms as does the ^L.
It seems that the _E and the impersonal facticity work hand
in hand.
I propose that this is indeed the tendency present
within Mr1. Lee's style of speaking, a tendency which tends
to contradict the separation of the 'earthly' ][ from the
factical 'hell'. On this hypothesis 1 can make a further
interpretation. For in the previous utterance, in Mr.
I.ee's scheme, the you is also 'up against' this facticity.
It would seem then that for Mr. Lee, both I_ and you
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inhabit a realm coterminous with the facticity, and both
of them are likewise involved with it. But in what way are
they so involved? Here there is a very obvious distinction
to be made. For whilst, so far at least, the I_ lias not
come into conflict or even direct contact with the facticity,
the you has had brushes with it, and the anyone is directly
involved with its inescapable determining force. It would
appear then, that in a sense which remains unclear, the 1
is on the same side as the facticity, that in some sense
the one is the metaphorical reformulation, or the agent, of
idie other. In order to explore this relationship further,
let us consider some further examples of Mr. Lee's speech.
At the beginning of a lesson in my seventh week in the
school, Mr. Lee's first words to the boys were as reported




[ ( ( Close that door ) please )
i i i
(Stop that noise) ]
II
i ii i
[ ( ( I'm warning you,) J2 ) ]
11 To
[(Eight members of A2 have been punished last period by me) ]
IV
i i i
| (I hope ( I'm not going to have to start on you ) )
Mr. Lee's utterance L3~::"
Consider the last stanza, which I propose, contains an
interesting new element of Mr. Lee's scheme. Here the I_ is
posed reflecting upon a world which contains both I_ and you.
However this portrayal is no longer descriptive, as is Hi.
Rather, the _T is here portrayed caught up in the impersonal
demands of the facticity: ('I'm not going to have to ...').
Here is intriguing confirmation of the hypothetical inter¬
pretation which I advanced earlier; the tendency is for both
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the I and the yon to be portrayed as inhabiting a natural
world which imposes its impersonal constraints on both of
them alike. Or is it alike in both cases? To be sure, it
seems that both the 1 and the you are portrayed as sharing
a realm with the impersonal facticity. But the you had
only 'better1 get used to it. The facticity it would seem
can only react to the you. By contrast, at least tentative¬
ly, the T is here portrayed as the active agent of the
facticity, as 'having to' do its bidding. The intriguing
conclusion can then be proposed - to be tested by recourse
to further examples - that the _T' s freedom within Mr. Lee's
world is in fact considerably less than that of the you:
the ^ is the agent of the facticity in the world, whereas
the you is free, except that it is pursued by the facticity.
Consider, in this connection, the following remark. At
a point in a lesson when some boys continue to talk, Mr.
Lee remarked,
10




[ (I don ' t want to make ' an example of anyone)
i i
(it's a long time si nee' I had to) |
Mr. Lee's utterance L4"::"
The remark portrays the _! as subsumed within the
facticity: the I_ 'wants' not to be so subsumed: in this
sense the _I pleas with the free you not to allow the
facticity to drag him away: only the you by voluntarily
cooperating can pern it the J_ its freedom.
Here a direct comparison with Mr. Cramond's scheme
can be made. Mr. Cramond's 1 is in a sense the representa¬
tive on earth cf the transcendent social order: the I inter¬
prets and contemplates the we1s rule governed procedures.
Here in Mr. Lee's portrayal is an opposite situation. His
J_ is the agent on earth of the immanentist natural facticity:
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the ][ does the facticity's bidding. Thus whilst each
speaker supports his 1 here on earth in the immanent
2
realm by posing a transcendent reality the mythologies
whereby each sets up his transcendent reality have differ¬
ent implications in each case.
In an equal but opposite manner to that of Mr. Cramond,
Mr. Lee was able to inhibit the participation of the boys
in his preferred mode of speech. Strictly speaking, within
his own terms, the realm of natural order, unlike the
community of the we in Mr. Cramond's scheme, was not
constituted in speech. Speech was only an imperfect
representation of it. Thus Mr. Lee's talk is special talk.
It is nor.-talk, one might almost say physical talk.
A simple example which confirms this key feature of Mr.
Lee's definition of the situation is the following. Gerald
Sinclair was asked a question in French. He was unable to




[(its very hard remembering )
IIIo
[WHEN (you've not been paying attention)]
Mr. Lee's utterance L5"~
Here stanza IIo formulates the impersonal facticity of
'hell', whilst IIIo portrays the 3'Clu as located within this
facticity. As in previous utterances of Mr. Lee's, this
you is ambiguous as between a formulation of the immanent
situation at hand, and a formulation of the transcendental
factical reality.
By means of this remark, the situation of the boy is
identified as one which quite generally affects all you's
within Mr. Lee's scheme. In that this general situation
is thus spelled out, it must be presumed that within Mr.
Lee's scheme the boy, even the you in general, does not
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kriov/ this feature of its situation. Thus Mr. Lee
poses himself as communicating his knowledge of their
situation in general, one which he shares with them, to
the you, the boys. Compare this with Mr. Cramond's por¬
trayal. In every case of conversation with individual
boys lie individuates them by name. But more than this,
he portrays the point of his speaking to them to be, to
draw attention to their individual divergence from the
presumed features of membership of the class which in other
boys he takes for granted. For example, 'daft Alec Rial to1
who doesn't know where to start, and Alan Jones who 'knows'
he is ' a distracting member of the class '). In summary
Mr. Cramond need only speak to individual deviants to
remind them of what everyone already knows. lint Mr. Lee
needs to speak to the whole class to tell them matters
which, but for his telling, none of them could be relied
upon to know.
A plain example of this occurs in the course of the
following episode. On one occasion, Mr. Lee discovered
that he had not brought the right text books into the lesson
with him. fie told the boys, " Right, two boys to come witli
me, the rest of you remain in silence". Before leaving the
room, he said,
. . I
j 1 r 1 j. i
[(l think (most of you are aware ( ( one of the greatest
i v
crimes is being out of your seat) so far as I'm aware ) )
Mr. Lee's utterance L6"~
In this formulation, the definite facticity formulates
is what is 'one of the greatest crimes so far as I'm
aware': thus the I is the knower of the facticity. Tote
sure the you, or rather 'motet of' the you is 'aware', but
not of what is a great crime itself, rather, of what the I
is aware is a great crime. And even here, this awareness
of "most of" the you is itself only what the I thinks, and
therefore tentative.
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With this the teacher left the room, leaving the
door wide open. Whilst he was away, Cannon arranged,
"Everybody - start humming". Before the teacher returned,
I noted, "Now all are humming quite loudly". On his return,
I noted, "Humming still quite loud - teacher is giving out
hooks and gives no sign of recognition at all". He told
someone, "Take your anorak off".
Then Alistair Jackson told him he had nothing to write
with. Here the teacher revealed another facet of his
cosmological scheme. He told the boy,
I
x 1.1 _
£ ( Well you should have) AND (you'd better borrow one)/
j 11 i i
[(I can punish (you for) not having something to write with)
IF ( I wish) ]
Mr. Lee's utterance L7~:'~
Here the freedom of the _T by virtue of its relation to
the facticity is stressed: the action of the you makes possi¬
ble a choice for the I as to whether it will or will not
activate the facticity. This freedom or whim gives to Mr.
Lee's natural order an irrationality compared to the explicit
rule-governed rationality claimed by Mi-. Cramond. Though we
have noted Mr. Cramond1s exercise of discretion, e.g. in his
treatment of Rialto, this discretion was legitimised by his
coining of other distinctions bearing upon the enforcement
of the rule, viz. whether the boy had heard the pronouncement
of the rule or not. But here Mr. Lee specifically reveals
the exercise of punishment as being at his own whim.
Only after this incident did Mr. Lee refer to the
humming which had continued meanwhile. He announced,
To
£ (Stop this noise,) please )J
II
-L j_





[ BUT ( I prefer to punish the whole class ) J
TV
r
/ ( House meeting, or no house meeting, I'll keep you in)
i i
AS LONG AS ( I feel like it after half past three) J
( V
[ ( The choice is yours) J
In a codicil, lie added:
VI
i 11
/ NOW (I'm warning you (I'm not in the habit of making
threats and not carrying them out ) ) J
Mr. Lee's utterance L8""
Here the JE is posed as being 'well aware' of who the
individual offenders are but as preferring to deal witli the
whole class, the you. The you has the choice, whereas in
the first instance the I does riot. But if the you exercises
that choice, then the I is given a certain kind of freedom:
the freedom to continue the punishment 'as long as I feel
like it'. Thus while they are not identical, it is plain
that the T works hand in hand with its transcendental ally,
absolute impersonal power. Though trapped into being the
agent of this power, the I seemingly sustains pleasure at
its opportunities to exercise this obedience. This I is
then in every respect a devi1 in the theological vision of
hell of traditional Western Christian thought. By contrast,
Mr1. Cramond's I. had the role of Christ, or a priest at least,
in relation to the theological vision of heaven in that same
traditional vision.
Heaven and Hell
Neither Mr. Cramond nor Mr. Lee facilitated a rational
discourse as between his way of speaking and that of the
boys. The one constructed a defended,1 home base' for
himself in the realm of the we, the other in the realm of
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the it, from which the boys were excluded from
participation. These realms therefore served as independent
provinces of meaning in the terms described by Schutz,
whereby from the standpoint of any one such province taken
as real, all other provinces appeared contradictory.
From a sociological point of view, this is to say, our
two teachers appeared quite different to one another.
Sociologically, indeed, we can be more precise than this.
These two teachers exemplified divergent answers to the
well known 'problem of social order'. The answer given
by Mr. Cramond was the familiar Rousseau-esque 'consensus'
solution, whereby the we exemplifies the general will of
all its members, whereas the answer given by Mr. Lee was
the Hobbesian 'coercion' solution: the Leviathan represent¬
ing the impersonal force subsuming all. This interpretation
permits further discoveries. For both Hobbes and Rousseau
posit as prior to the solution of the problem of social
order, the 'state of nature'. For Hobbes this state is
'nasty, brutish, and short'. I have already observed that
this characterisation precisely describes the restricted
code utterances which appear most frequently as curt
imperatives, 'Shut up', 'come on', and as characterisations
of states of affairs such as 'Somebody talking'. In the
case of Mr. Cramond's speech I proposed that this 'restrict¬
ed' speech formulated the 'natural order'. But a more
intriguing possibility now emerges. It could be, that from
within his 'social order' perspective the 'state of nature'
and the 'natural order' shade into one another. They can
however be sharply distinguished, and must be when the
speech of a 'natural order' theorist such as Mr. Lee is
considered: his speech is anything but 'restricted'. For
it is now clear that the curt imperatives of restricted
speech formulate, not 'heaven' nor 'hell', but the state
between them which I call 'earth'. But they are not the
only kind of speech to do so. Paradoxically, these blunt
remarks, which in their inexpl'i.cit reluctance seem to
aspire not to be speech at all, co-exist in this realm
with a linguistic form which I have proposed is the epitome
of what full speech can be, namely, the interweaving
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'reciprocity1 of words which enables speakers to
entertain and address the problem.-tic 'reality' conjured
up by speech. If the former is to be characterised as the
'state of nature', the latter I propose exhibits the 'state
of civil society', a state which is something quite dis¬
tinct from the 'natural' and 'social'orders which lay
7
claim to Ihese titles within sociological speech. The
relation between these possibilities is displayed on the
following diagram:
we speech






abate of nature*—earth ►state of civil society
hell
'NATURAL ORDER' (Hobbes1 'Leviathan')
it & body speech
For me the reality of speech is exhibited at the 'earthly'
realm. Accordingly, where the earthly realm is occupied
by curt imperatives, as it exclusively is in the speech of
Mr. Lee, and is to a large extent within the speech of Mr.
Cramond, then these imperatives express the reality of
social life within that speech. In the context of such
speech, then, life is indeed 'nasty, brutish, and short'.
Butin lhespeech of Mr. Cramond are seen glimpses,though within
the speed) of Mr. Lee even these disappear, of another kind
of social life, one exhibiting reciprocity and a genuine
pursuit of rationality, in a speech about 'reality*.
Thus the phiIosophical approach does more than simply
appreciate the speech it encounters by locating them within
a typology, in the manner of a sociological description.
It criticises the speech by transcending the structure
within which they are located. It does so by proposing,
as a theoretical possibility, a mode of speech which is not
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yet empirically available within society, though persis¬
tent glimpses of it can be noticed as a result of the
philosophical analysis, glimpses which are seen hut un¬
noticed from the sociological point of view.
Sociological Speech
It is in the context of the account here given of the
world portrayed by Mr. Lee that boys' responses to him should he
situated, not only within but also outside the classroom
situation itself.
A 'sociological1 response on the part of the boys con¬
sisted in offering rival definitions of the situation to
the one put forward by Mr. Lee. Consider the following
incident involving John Cannon:
Cannon and Davies came in late. Cannon says
"dinner duty, sir" and walks down to his seat
with the air of one who has accomplished a
responsible task.
Cannon stands up, paces up the gangway, very
self-righteously justified. He has glue all
over his coat. Mr. Lee says: "It serves you
right for poking noses [sic] into other
people's business - that's not your seat". Cannon:
"I was just coming through to share with some¬
one". He goes to share with Mears, who refuses.
Mr. Lee says: "Go to the washroom and get it off".
Legitimate arrival late in the class is a way in which a
boy can offer a definition of the situation to challenge the
all-pervasiveness of the teacher's definition. But the'
teacher finds a way of treating Cannon's misfortune as a
way of reaffirming his usual definition of the situation.
The boy posed a problem for Mr. Lee, and delighted in
doing so. By appealing to an alternative definition of the
situation, in this case the school system of using junior
boys to lay the tables for 'school dinner', he was able to
exhibit the fantastic nature of Mr. Lee's 'reality'.
Fantastic in that it purported to define a complete
rational speech,"' whereas in fact every boy was aware
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that the reality of this system was delimited by the
spatial and temporal boundaries of Mr. Lee's lesson. The
boy's action in exhibiting a reality which contradicts the
teacher's claim is rational, that is intelligible in the
light of the search for a realistic outlook on the world
attributed to these speakers. Such pursuit of a rational
grasp of Mr. Lee's speech had to be carried out in opposi¬
tion to his own definition of the situation. For Mr. Lee's
defended speech made it impossible within the classroom
setting to come to terms with his speech. It must be said
that the same obstacles sfood in the way of the boys gaining
a grasp of Mr. Crainond's speech. Despite its greater
'rationalism', his speech exhibited no greater rationality
in my sense. Within Iris classroom, likewise, the boys
were excluded from the talk which constituted the order
within which the talk occurred.
Philosophical Speech
But without the classroom setting, a more 'philosophical'
response was possible. 'Mr. Lee' was in fact an endless
topic of the boys' conversation.
Typical of these remarks was Johnson's:
I
| (The French master)]
II
i 11
[(He tells you a lot of codswallop) (He just drums it info
you, like a drill master)]
Johnle Johnson's utterance J2"
I propose that this statement is wholly understandable
in terms of what we have seen of Mr. Lee. But what we have
seen is not at all the actions of Mr'. Lee, to which these
words of the boy overtly refer, but Mr. Lee's own words.
I propose that it is to these words that Johnson directs
his remarks: specifically, that it isto Mr Lee's I as an
object which lie puts before the class that Johnson is
referring when lie says 'he', not the empirically existing
Mr. Lee 'himself'. My account of Mr. Lee's I was as the
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instrument of the absolute and inevitable impersonal
forces of 'hell'. It is this instrument which, I
propose, Johnson formulates as 'just drumming it into
you1 and 'like a drill master'• For the drill master is,
precisely, the mere agent of procedures lacking any higher
rationality than the mechanical, which is precisely the
basis of the order to which Mi". Lee appeals.
A more elaborated response is seen in this conversation
between Sammy Mason and John Lawson:
10
Mason: [ (French itself is alright)
11
[ BUT ( Mr. Lee J ) ]
IIIo
[ (He's too strict! )
IV
1 IX
Lawson: [ (He thinks (he's no' strict ) ) ]
Vo
Mason: [ ( You feel easier with Mr. Conway)
VIo
[ ( Though he's strict ) J
VII
X XX
[ IF (you cannae do French) (Mr. Lee shouts at you)]
Sammy Mason's utterance M2~"
Mason's remark constitutes "Mr. Lee' as a transcendent
object. The grammatical construction involving 'but' is
interesting here. Stanza Io appears to set the scene,
"but' stanza II displays ex_ nihilo a feature retrospective¬
ly seen to have been specifically absent from the content of
stanza Io. Stanza III is then made referentially dependent
upon this stanza II. Lawson speaks of Mr. Lee in quite a
different way: he attributes to his puppet, 'he', a
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reflective consciousness, thereby bringing down to earth
Mason's transcendent object, and raising the issue of the
gap between appearance and reality which is not an issue
for Mason. In the concluding section, 'Mr. Lee' is still
(
an object, now in a realm governed by predictable laws.
Here Mason portrays 'Mr. Lee' as trapped: if you do such
and such, 'Mr. Lee' does such and such else. But this is
precisely a feature of the logic of Mr. Lee's way of
speaking according to my analysis. Accordingly, I propose
that Mason is not merely making an external characterisa¬
tion, but is displaying internal knowledge of the workings
of Mr. Lee's system of meaning: he is speaking of his speech,
The forms of mimickry of 'Mr. Lee' were often stereo¬
typed. But an attractive variation was the following:
Mentone to Mr. Howie, the maths teacher: "Sir, I'm
fighting Lee this afternoon after school. Will you
come and support me?"
Here in joke an attempt is made to enlist another teacher's
support against the unfortunate stereotyped 1 Mr. Lee'. How
was it that this stereotype arose in his case, but not in
the case of Mr. Cramond? How was it possible that the boy
could confide in this stereotype in discourse with Mr. Howie
when it was impossible to elaborate it within the discourse
of Mr. Lee himself? The second question demands an
investigation of the speech of Mr. Howie to which I shall
now turn, but the first has already been answered. 'Mr. Lee'
is constituted as a bad object by Mr. Lee himself. It is
the name given by the boys to the 1^ spoken by that speaker
and placed before the boys, in the theological 'hellish'
context which we have been investigating. The response
of the boys is itself made possible by, and itself a
skilful orientation to, the 'reality' which Mr. Lee him¬
self displays in his speech. Such an orientation was made
impossible for them within the context of Mr. Lee's speech
itself: accordingly, they exhibited such an orientation
without that context.
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In precisely the same way, Mr. Cramond was constituted
as a good object in the talk of the boys, who in so
speaking of him exhibited a skilful orientation to the
reality which he displayed in his speech. Such an orienta¬
tion was likewise made impossible for them within the
terms of Mr. Cramond's own speech. Thus, although perhaps
on rationalistic sociological grounds we might find Mr.
Cramond's speech preferable to Mr. Lee's, from a
philosophical point of view it is in no way superior:
the difference is merely one of content, whereas my
philosophical criticism is directed towards the form of
their speech, which they share.
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Chapter Seven
THE DOWN TO EARTH SPEECH OF MR. MARTIN
Order-ary speech
I have proposed that the structure of our language
implies the sustaining of three distinct realms of mean¬
ing within speech, corresponding to the theological
distinction between 'heaven1, 'hell', and 'earth', and
that whereas philosophy, sociology, psychology, and much
of everyday speech tip to the present time have conceived
reality to subsist at the first or the second of these,
I by contrast conceive reality to subsist at the third,
and conceive the 'realities' posed at the other two levels
to be ideologies, or fantasies, covering over the reality
of the third. In other terms, I conceive the first and
second to exemplify extra-ordinary speech which ek-sists,
stands outside, the ordinary speech which makes them
possible and from within which they gain their sense of
reality. Accordingly I propose a return to focus on
ordinary speech itself. My enquiry then conceives its
object, 'ordinary speech', as, more precisely, order-ary
speech. This conception is in accord with the original
sense of the word 'ordinary', which stems from the Latin
ordinarius, "order".^ A linguistic phenomenological enquiry
should seek to establish how order is sustained in and
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through ordinary language itself, without recourse to
the extra-ordinary realms already explored. I am committed,
then, to a view of ordinary language as itself more authen¬
tic than the extra-ordinary forms to which it has given
birth."
This being the case, 1" can only approve of a speaker
who exhibits a consistent refusal to have recourse to
extra-ordinary forms within his speaking. Such a speaker,
as I shall now show, is Mr. Howie the maths master. But
the kind of approval implied in finding his speech more
authentic is only to say, that it exhibits clearly its
sense of 'reality', and thereby offers that 'reality' as
open to question in ordinary speech which responds to it,
a questioning which is impossible in the case of the
"defended' extra-ordinary modes of speaking. I am thus
very far from saying that ordinary speech is beyond
criticism. On the contrary, it is in the character of
ordinary speech to be critical of itself. Accordingly,
in being ordinary speech addressing ordinary speech, my
speech will be critical of the speech of Mr. Howie.
I have already suggested as a theoretical possibility
the lines which this criticism must take. I have argued
that within ordinary speech itself, two distinct modes
have already made their appearance. They encompass the
extreme possibilities of speaking, ranging from on the one
hand the 'restricted' three, two and by extention one word
pictures which I have viewed as "reluctant' speech aspiring
to silence, to on the other hand forms of speaking which
may be called 'elaborated' wherein a sensitive orientation
to different formulations of 'reality' becomes possible
within speech. This range is precisely what should be
expected, in terms of my argument, that it is in this
realm that reality (the reality of 'reality') is to be
found. It implies simply, that within this realm 'reality'
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is an issue, whereas in the two other realms it is not.
In the two other realms 'reality1 is not an issue because
it has been determined by fiat that speech speaks reality
per se. But in this realm, wherein speech is permanently
under challenge, no such determination is possible.
Within this realm then will be found speech ranging
from the most sensitive to the most brutal. It is implied
that here will be found forms of speech which offend the
ear, and it is the fear of a proliferation of these forms
which attracts many to the safety and security of the
extraordinary forms. This safety is defended on the
grounds that the alternative is 1anomie'. Now the signi¬
ficance of my earlier demonstration, that 'anomie' is no
more than a 'reality', never a reality, becomes clear.
'Anomie' is the ideological label whereby extraordinary
speech defends itself against ordinary speech. I propose,
that whilst such speech can indeed guard against the
appearance in speech of offensive, even dangerous words,
the 'lower' forms of sociality which man has devised for
himself, they are equally effective in guarding against
the appearance in speech of the 'higher' forms: for they
amount to a refusal to address modes of sociality as an
issue in speech at all. For 'social order' theory, i.e.
transcendentalism, these modes are not addressed because the
existing society is held to constitute the best of all
possible worlds. For 'natural order' theory, i.e. immanent-
ism, these modes are not addressed because sociality, the
orientation to other speakers, is not conceived to be a
possibility at all.
The investigation of speech within Mr. Howie1' s classroom,
then, promises to throw open to discussion the ways in
which order is talked about as an issue within the conversa¬
tion so ordered, ways which have been unavailable to talk
in the classroom previously portrayed.
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"Would you all stop talking, please?"
As in the case of Mr. Lee, I shall present a full
theoretical interpretation of Mr. Howie's first conversations,
in order to set the scene for a briefer treatment of subse¬
quent exchanges.
The following occurred in my fourteenth week in the
school.
"Teacher enters lesson, ten minutes late.
Alistair Munroe: 'Boo! Boo!'
(no one else joins in)
Teacher: 'Right, would you turn to page fourteen PLEASE!'
Cannon: (shouts) 'Where's Barrie?'
Teacher: 'Right, would you all stop talking, please?
N Cannon, sit down'.
(no change in overall level of noise)
'Now, just before we went away '
Various boys: (interrupting) 'Are we going away?'
Teacher: (continues ignoring interruption) 'We were
talking about sets'
Boys: 'Sex! Se*.'
Teacher: (interrupts uproar) 'Scott, why is your book
not covered? And Davis, yours as well'.
Davis: 'I just got it'.
Teacher: 'You didn't just get it today.
The next thing I want to talk about is the intersection
of sets'.
Cannon: 'What was that word you used?'
Some explanatory comments may help in setting the scene.
Mr. Howie was habitually late for lessons, largely because
like other teachers in their first year at the school he
was allocated many lessons in the Annexe, a quarter mile
from the main school buildings, yet was allotted no time
to walk between the buildings. When he arrived late, boys
usually hissed or booed. On this occasion, however, Alis —
tair Munroe, an unpopular boy, was not supported in his
booing. The point about covering books was a frequent
bone of contention between the boys and teachers. A school
rule stated that all boys were responsible for providing
_ 1 8 C _
paper covers for the books with which they were issued.
The rule tended to be enforced only in the case of new
books.
What does a descriptive approach reveal about Mr.
Howie's way of s p e aking? As before, I shall look at the
'persons' his words portray, and at the 'context' within
which he situated them. For the first, his remarks portray
a yuu, a we, and an I_, as well as several named individual
boys. How are their characters described in his words?
The you, the first to appear, is persistently indefinite:
r would you . . . please? 1 appears twice. So also is the _T
in the expression ' I want to talk about the _! appears to
have an uncertain relationship even to its own future
activities. Mr. Howie's we is more definite, but only in
a purely descriptive way. Overall, the persons portrayed
are far simpler than those portrayed by Mr. Cramond.
Consider for example the kind of consciousness which each
teacher attributes to his ''persons': tlose, in Mr. Cramond's
presentation 'hope', 'think', and 'know', all rather thought¬
ful activities which permit some subtlety in his definition
of the situation. Those in Mr. Howie's conversation, at
least that so far reported, mainly simply 'do' things. The
j[ alone is explicitly credited with a thought-process: it
'wants' a certain state of affairs. This term, also
employed by Mr. Cramond is not one which accounts intelli¬
gibly for the situation to which it refers. The boys are
invited, to 'talk about the intersection of sets' simply as
a 'want' of the _T. These wants seem to be the sole basis
of any legitimate order to which Mr. Howie appeals.
This interpretation is cnnfirmed when consideration is
given to the context within which Mr. Howie's persons are
situated. He offers no definition which claims to go beyond
the immediate situation and set up an enduring reality. His
world involves no external social facts to which the boys
could have independent recourse. The only recourse they
can have is to the 1, more precisely, to the I's wants from
- 186 -
time to time. Yet there is no reason offered why they
should do so, and in Mr. Howie's portrayal ('would you
... please?'), it is quite uncertain whether they will.
The world portrayed in Mr. Howie's speech, then, is a
world in which persons simply behave from moment to
moment as they please, a world in which only one person
has a clear view of what he wants, namely the _1, but that
person can offer no reason to the others as to why they
should want it.
Thus far, only the speech of the teacher has been
considered. According to the analysis, his speech posed
a dilemma for the boys in that it involved on the one
hand imperatives and other expressions of what the I_
wanted of the boys, while on the other hand it offered no
reason why the boys should conform with those expressions.
One way in which the boys responded to this dilemma is
exemplified in the sequence quoted. The boys treat his
commands as the occasion for conjuring up fantasies as
to what his definition might be - booing, 'going away',
and''sex' - all portray vague pictures. But however
vague, they have one property in common, namely that they
are beyond the pale of whatever definition of a maths lesson
Mr. Howie's might be portrayed as wanting. Their
production allows the boys, momentarily, to indulge
imaginatively in very different wants. Mr. Howie says
nothing to suggest why they should do otherwise. Indeed
his way of talking provides for the unlikelihood of their
wanting what his I_ wants.
The 'sociological' viewpoint examines the conversation
from the point of view of maintaining, or failing to main¬
tain, social order in the immediate face-to-face setting.
It finds the conversation reported above to be 'anomic',
i.e. unskilful. Consider now a 'philosophical11' approach
to the same conversation.
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The 'sociological' viewpoint purports to take as its
object the concrete conversation as a whole. The
'philosophical' viewpoint^ by contrast, explicitly con¬
stitutes its own object of enquiry, in this case the
language which makes possible the speech of Mr. Howie.
This implies that before making any attempt to see the
conversation as a whole, Mr. Howie's contribution to it
must be first analysed in its own right.
The following is an analysis of the conversation:
[ BOO! B00:! ]
I
1 3. X





[RIGHT, (( would you all stop talking,) please?)
IVo
[ CANNON, (sit down) ]
V
X XX
[NOW ( just before we went away ) (Are we going away?)
ii i
(we were talking about sets )
[ SEX!. SEX! ]
VI
x
[SCOTT, (why is your book not covered?) AND DAVIES,
(yours as well) j
VII
x x
[ ( I just got it) (You didn't just get it today) j
VII lo




[ (What was (that word) you used?)
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Mr. Howie's conversation HI*
The analytical equations are:
HI* = I & II & III & IV & V & VI & VIII & IX (1)
H1*I = i & ii (2a)
H1 * 11 = IIo (2b)
H1 * 111 = i & ii (2c)
H1 * IV = IVo (2d)
H1*V = i & ii & iii (2e)
HI*VI = i & ii i (2 f)
HI*VII = i & ii (2g)
HI*VIII = VIIIo (2h)
HI*IX = i & ii (2i )
Consider now the relations between pictures making up the
stanzas. In the case of stanza I, the relation is one of
reflection. This does not identify the voice of this stanza
however. For the present, note simply that:
H1*I = (i)ii
In stanza III the relation is again one of reflection, and
the wording here is in identical terms to that of stanza I.
The words 'right', ''would you', and 'please' are repeated.
There is thus a relation between stanzas which resembles
that of reverberation between pictures. I propose that
this establishes the voice of the you as between these
stanzas. Thus it is possible to write:
HI* I = (i)ii (3a)
you
II1 * III = (i )ii (3c)
you
Stanza V exhibits the familiar technique of reverberation
on the word 'we'. This accordingly constitutes a voice
of the we:
H1*V = i.ii.iii (3e)
we
Stanza VI likewise exhibits reverberation on 'your'. I
propose that the interrogative mode constitutes a problem¬
atic accent of reality, as is found in the you stanzas I
and III above, so that this stanza can be identified with




Stanza VII exhibits reverberation on the words ''just
got it1 The interchange here reported involves the 1
and the you in separate pictures of Vlli. From the
point of view of Mr. Howie's speech, then, this stanza
too exhibits the 'earthly' you voice. Then:
HI"" VII = i.ii (3g)
you
Finally, stanza IX exhibits overlapping on the words 'that
word'. The two pictures may be judged to be of one voice.
I propose it is the voice of the you already delineated,
with its problematic accent of reality and consequent
'earthly' status. Then:
HI"-" IX = i.ii (3±)
you
The remaining 'third set' of equations are identical to the
corresponding 'second set' equations, with the voices of
the respective stanzas still to be determined.
Now consider relations between the stanzas. I have
already pointed to a link between stanzas I and III which
resembled reverberation in its repetition of words. It is
not reverberation however since it does not occur between
adjacent pictures, and also it appears to involve repetition
of significantly more than the one word usually found bind¬
ing together the reverberation relation. Accordingly, I
consider this to be a new relation, and accordingly name
it repetition. As it achieves between stanzas what
reverberation achieves between pictures, I employ a similar
notation to designate it, namely the colon, thus: ' :' .




and it will be this unit which plays a part in the overall
conversation structure.
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Between all other stanzas, I propose, thare is a nul
relation with the exception of stanzas VI and VII, where
'your' in stanza VI resembles 'you' in stanza VII. I
propose that this is a second case of repetition. In this
case the unity formed by these two stanzas is to be written:
VI :VII
you you
and it will be this unit which plays a part in the overall
conversation structure.
It is now possible to display this overall structure
from the point of view of Mr. Howie's speech.
Ill- = I : III // IV // V // IV :VII // VIII
you you' ' ' ' ' ' you you '
However the voices of several stanzas remain to be determined
Consider these in turn. Stanza IV comprises the wording,
'Cannon, sit down'. To what voice should this imperative
be allocated? Intuitively, the voice of the 'you' in
stanzas I and III is very different from the imperative of
stanza IV, so much so that an 'existential leap' is exper¬
ienced at this point in the conversation. Is there any way
in which this feeling can be accounted for theoretically?
I propose that the following line of thought provides
such a way. In the case of Mr. Cramond's speech, an utter¬
ance was encountered which exhibited, I argued, the voices
of the .1 and of the we even though these persons were not
portrayed in the concrete appearance of the utterance. The
result of this absence was the ''feeling' that the remark
was 'hardened'. Theoretically speaking, I proposed that by
omitting the I_ or you, the speaker posed the resulting words
as a transcendent reality sui generis. My analysis was
apparently confirmed when, in a remark immediately follow¬
ing, the speaker produced both the I_ and the you in order
to address the problematic correspondence between the
appearance portrayed by the utterance and the reality of
life in the classroom at that point.
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Now, is it not possible to propose a precisely
parallel phenomenon here? Is it not the case that the
'hardness' of the imperative is explained by the absence
from it of any formulation of the accent of reality of the
imperative? In this case, the conclusion would have to he
reached, that the imperative takes on a transcendent
reality of its own. But in this case, such a transcendent
reality wouid not be extra-ordinary in the manner in which
either transcendentalist or immanentist realities are extra¬
ordinary, that is, by laying claim to a reality, be it
'intersubjectivity', 'subjectivity', or whatever which
endures the ongoing flux of speech. Rather, it would be
a reality specifically intra-ordinary, for its character
3
would rest not on its enduring, hut on its immediacy.
In this case it would be true to say that the imperative
exhibits a form of 'transcendency' specific to the 'immanent'
realm of ordinary speech itself. But this argument is not
restricted to the imperative. It rather applies to what
J have been calling 'restricted code' two and three word
pictures per se. Each of these exhibits a specific
departure from the structuring of elaborated speech. Ela¬
borated speech, whether of the immanentist 'I', the trans¬
cendentalist 'we', or the earthly 'you', builds sense and
reference out of the relations between speeches. Restricted
speech cuts this short: it offers itself as a reality sui
generis.
But this finding has already been anticipated: on the
basis of an examination of the speech of Mr. Lee and Mr.
Cramond it was possible to postulate two distinct modes
of earthly speech: the elaborated speech of the you, and
the 'nasty1 , brutish and short' speech of restricted code.
I propose that this distinction can he formulated as the
distinction between inferiority and exteriority, not
simply for an individual speaker, but for speech as a whole,
(it is thereby possible to see how Mr. Cramond's use of
restricted speech is but an aspect of this relation). I
shall indeed propose that, in the absence of a transcenden¬
tal 'reality' posed in extra-ordinary speech, this distinc-
i no _
tion between interiority and exteriority within the
'earthly' realm becomes a crucial organising feature of
Mr. Howie's speech.
It follows then in the case of the present imperative
it would be wrong to search for the 'voice' of this remark.
Rather it should be acknowledged that this remark, along with
other restricted contributions, is external to the structure
of elaborated speech which is the object of the present
examination of the conversation.
I propose to indicate this exteriority in the notation
as follows. Single picture stanzas are in any case designa¬
ted by 'o'. I propose to designate imperatives and other
two and three word pictures by "oo' to indicate they have
no place within the grammatical structure itself. In the
present case, then, IV = IVoo.
The voice of one other stanza has still to be determined.
Stanza VIII is, 'The next think I want to talk about is
the intersection of sets'. In the light of the speech of
Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee previously considered, there is no
difficulty in assimilating this stanza to the voice of the
1^. In this case, the structure of the elaborated part of
Mr. Howie's contribution can now be determined. It is:
HI* = I : III //V //VI :VII //VIIIT (4)
you you we' ' you you I
The outcome of the philosophical theoretical investigation
is somewhat remarkable: an elegant structure has appeared
where from a sociological/descriptive viewpoint only anomie
was to be seen. The key features of Mr. Howie's way of
speaking are to be seen in this display. They are, (l) that
his 'home base1' voice is the 'earthly' voice of the you, and
that at this level he is able to build structure by his
technique of repetition; (2) that from this 'ordinary'
language home base, he makes ''extra-ordinary' departures
into the familiar realms of the we and the 1^, but that these
are short lived in that they do not build structure, and are
rapidly brought down to earth again.
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Further clarification arises if, inspired by the
structure revealed in the diagram, one returns to the
original utterance to search for resemblances between the
two extraordinary modes of speech. It is at once observa¬
ble that repetition is to be found between these, on the
words or part-words 'talk about sets'. This suggests a
third striking feature of Mr. Howie's talk, namely (3)
the extra-ordinary realms of the 1 and the we, so sharply
contrasted in the talk of the previous teachers discussed,
here tend to merge into one realm within which the same
named theme can be addressed.
But so far I have considered the conversation solely
from Mr. Howie's speech. An examination of the beys 'speech,
conceived as responses to Mr. Howie's speech, provides
confirmation of the findings so far. Consider, then, the
stanzas and pictures produced by the boys. Cannon's
question IIo is a two word picture bearing no relation to
the teacher's preceding remark. As such it is exterior
to the structure sustained by interior speech. (it is
immediately clear that the teacher's 'exterior' imperative
is a response to this remark in its own terms, and that
thereby a 'restricted' conversation can carry on, as it
were, side by side with the elaborated conversation, with
little mutual interference. )
The next interruption by the boys is however of more
significance. When the teacher mentions, 'before we went
away' , and a boy asks 'are we going away', lie employs
reverberation to locate his question within the extra¬
ordinary speech which the teacher has inaugurated by his
remark. In posing a fantasy ('going away') within that
realm, the boy exhibits as fantastic not simply Mr. Howie's
remark, but extra-ordinary speech itself. The comparison
with Mr. Cramond's treatment of Rialto is direct. When
Rialto seriously entered the voice of the we_ in Mr. Cramond's
speech, the teacher jokingly departed that voice and
ridiculed Rialto for having entered it. When Mr. Howie
seriously enters the voice of the we_, a boy jokingly enters
that voice and ridiculed Mr. Howie for having entered it.
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This recurs in the next interchange when having raised the
topic of 'sets', the teacher is faced with boys saying 'sex!
sex!'. Once more it is the teacher's entry into the extra¬
ordinary voice of the we which is the occasion for the boys'
ridicule. At this point he retires, hurt, back to the
safety of his familiar you, the 'earthly' realm.
What is involved here? I propose that the teacher
having established the 'earthly1' mode of speech as his
home base, the boys are most reluctant to allow him to
depart from this base to impose extra-ordinary order upon
them: they skilfully orient to his conversation in order
to bring him back to earth.
In stanzas VI and VII a conversation occurs between
the teacher and a boy at the earthly level of 1/you.
In stanza VIII the teacher employs the voice of the 1_.
I propose that this _! is not the immanent !_ face to face
with others but the transcendental 1 in a world of its own,
as seems evidenced by the content of the remark, 'I want
to talk about ...' making no mention of other persons. The
fact that he here formulates in terms of the I a named
theme which he earlier addressed, in terms of the we, with
a speech in terms of the you intervening, implies that he
has been forced to retreat to this position, from the we
to the you, then the you to the 1, being unable to find a
realm within which he could secure the trust in the boys
that reality corresponded to appearances. Here too the
teacher is at once questioned and called to clarify the
sense of his commonplace remarks, that is to say, Cannon's
immediate participation in this realm skilfully brings him
back down to earth.
Thus contrary to the assumption of Garfinkel and Schutz
that every speaker can attain the certitude of the inter-
subjective 'natural attitude' and contrary to the assump¬
tion of the existentialists that the 1 can attain subjective
certainty alone, this teacher is able to attain neither
privileged realm in his speech.
- 195 -
This episode is revealing, both as to the way in which
the speech of teachers is conceived in particular, and as
to the way in which speech itself is conceived within our
society in general. For it is striking that when the teacher
actually introduces the named topic of the lesson ('the
intersection of sets') he does so by recourse to extra¬
ordinary speech. It is plausible to suggest that this
notion has theoreticity for all speakers in the classroom,
who conceive extra-ordinary speech to be the way in which
teachers are supposed to teach, a necessary pre-requisite of
teaching. Insofar as Mr. Howie is unable to achieve this
speech, he is unable to teach.
Secondly, the conception is clearly crucial to the
comprehension of personal relations in our society. In
hoping for an extra-ordinary realm of safety, the teacher
only aspires to a dream which is presumably widespread:
the dream of a realm of meaning, or more precisely in my
terms, of language, in which one will find certainty, and
so peace. My argument implies that this dream wherever
it recurs is a false one, damaging to the prospects of a
genuine dialectic, that is, historical pursuit of rationality
through speaking.
But if within Mr. Howie's speech extra-ordinary speech
is unattained, what reference to 'reality' is possible in
his speech at all? I want now to consider a conversation
free of all extraordinariness in order to investigate this
question. Contrary to sociological theory, which attributes
anomie to situations which lack extra-ordinary order, I shall
propose that indeed a 'reality' is discernible within this
situation, and that speakers can be seen to be skilfully
orienting to that 'reality' by the employment of specific
and identifiable techniques. Accordingly, philosophical
ethnomethodology can investigate the techniques whereby
speakers orient to a sense of 'reality' in a context where
the sociological ethnomethodologist can find no methods
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whereby speakers summon up what he calls ' intersubjec-
tivity'.
"Get stuffed"
In the middle of the maths lesson, Alan Jones loudly
called out to me, to enquire what the time was. The
teacher ordered him to leave the room. Jones replied,
"Get stuffed". The teacher said, "Leave the room" louder
than before. He then unlocked a cupboard, and took out
his leather belt, telling Jones to come outside with him.
Jones did so. After a short time, the teacher returned,
leaving Jones outside. A little later, Jones burst into
the room again, saying, "He's calling me names", indicating
Gordon Russell. This was plausible, since he could have
been watching through the glass window in the door. The
teacher said, "Get out, Jones". After some pushing from
the teacher, Jones did so, while someone shouted, "Alan,
I'll stick up for you, pal". A few minutes later, Jones
came in again, strode across the room, and hit Russell
lightly. The teacher again said, "Get out, Jones". Jones
replied, "Not if lie's calling me names. Don't push me",
very defiantly, and left the room again.
From a sociological viewpoint, in each of his utterances,
the teacher presents an unadorned imperative. No enduring
legitimate order is posed within which to make sense of his
commands. Jones replies in kind. He responds to the
teachef's first order with an expletive, and to subsequent
orders with defiance. Since the teacher offered no
definition of his position, he was unable to argue with a
boy who offered no definition of his. The two
confronted one another, with no common ground between their
remarks.
From the sociological point of view, then, we find
simply anomie in this situation, attributable to a lack
of social skill on behalf of the speakers, in particular
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the teacher. This conclusion is unacceptable philosophi¬
cally: letme ■ now sho'y what thp philosophical analysis will
make of it.
Analysis presents the following result:
Io
[ ( Get stuffed) ]
Ho
[ (Leave the room ) ]
Illo





[ALAN (I'll stick up for you) pal)
Mr. Howie's conversation H2~"~
I shall treat this conversation in the same way as
the previous one, that is, by first providing an analysis
specifically of Mr. Howie's part within the conversation,
and then consider other contributions as they relate to
that part.
The analytical equations are:
H2* — I & II & III & IV & V & VI & VII & VIII ... (2b)
xx
[ (( Get out ) Jones ) ]
VIIo














V i & ii
VI i & ii
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VII = VIo
VIII - VII To
(2g)
(2h )
Consider the internal relations of the stanzas.
Stanza I exhibits a relation of reflection between its two
constituent pictures. My treatment of the name 'Alan'
calls for comment. I propose that, intuitively, 'Alan'
prefixed to the imperative has no softening effect, by
contrast to 'pal' appended to it which does. My intuition
finds empirical support in the different words used:
'Alan' is a neutral term of address, whereas 'pal' is an
intimate term. The voice of this stanza is then the
familiar 'earthly1 you:
112 ""V = (i)ii (3e)
The same relation precisely is found in stanza VI.
Again I propose that the term of address following the
imperative softens it by reflecting back upon its accent
of reality to call it into question. In this particular
case, intuition is supported by another empirical observa¬
tion. In terms of its content 'get out' serves to deprive
Jones of his membership of the classroom setting. By
contrast, the appended names 'Jones' serves to reaffirm
that membership, confirming that he is addressable in
speech. Thus despite the sharp distinction between 'pal'
and 'Jones', the softening is achieved in precisely the
same fashion in each case.
But whfct is the voice of stanza VI? Let us refer to
it as the 'get' voice, a specifically restricted code.
Here I am obliged and able to introduce a subtler distinc¬
tion in my treatment of restricted speech than was possibl
earlier because this conversation of Mr. Howie's is almost
entirely made up of it. Then:
H2*VIget = (i)ii (3f)
Consider now referential relations between stanzas.
As previously, I consider only the teacher's remarks, to
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begin with. As between stanza IT, 'Leave the room', and
stanza IV, 'get out', there is metaphorical reformulation.
This however is 'optional' since either stands on its own.
As between stanza IVo and stanza IVo, a relation of repe¬
tition is found. Accordingly, the conversation as a whole
may be represented from Mr. Howie's point of view as follows:
H2* = [II] [ IV : VI ]
Now, what are the voices of these stanzas? The voice of
each is restricted by our previous standards. Nonetheless
some discrimination is now necessary. I propose to designate
that of II by 'leave': it is a three-word picture, and that
of IV and VT by 'get', it is a two-word picture. To mark
these wordings which seem important I append asterisks, thus:
leave'""::"!;", get''""" . In this case the structure from Mr. Howie's
point of view is:
»2* " ["leave***] [ IVget«' VIeet«] (4)
This equation establishes that within Mr. Howie's ordinary
speech, two distinct voices are to be found, namely those of
two and those of three word pictures.
Now consider the other contributions to the conversation
in this light. It is a straightforward matter to place the
first stanza spoken by Jones: this itself exhibits the
'get"":;' voice. But this stanza comes first in the conversa¬
tion. The suggestion must now be made that Mr. Howie is
inspired by Jones in his use of it. This suggestion
emerges from synthesis: for the relation of repetition
occurs as between stanza I, spoken by Jones, and stanza IV
spoken by Mr. Howie. It appears then that Mr. Howie's
technique of repetition is his way of orienting to the
speech of others, in an attempt to incorporate their words
into his own. But meanwhile consider other relations within
the conversation.
Jones' TIIo has no relation to any previous stanza.
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But Jones also exhibits the technique of repetition, and
repeats this whole stanza at VIIo. But that stanza does
not only relate to stanza IIo. It also relates to the
teacher's stanza VI.In it is found a familiar relation, that
of ungrammatical ellipsis: VIIo presumes the wording of Vli
to complete its reference, but 'Not get out if ...' is
ungrammatical, accordingly this does not sustain the voice
of stanza VI.
Finally, Jones' stanza VIIIo repeats the wording of his
previous stanzas IIIo and VII, on the word 'me'. I propose
then that the voice of III, VII, and VIII, is that of 'me'.
Accordingly the conversation structure as a whole can
now be displayed:
Remarkably, synthesis shows that from a philosophical point
of view this conversation, which appears utterly anomic
sociologically, is well formed and indeed in a certain sense
exemplifies good speech. I propose that the significance of
this speech can be expressed succinctly as follows: in this
speech, Jones and Mr. Howie compete to articulate the sense
of the transcendent exteriority, the voice of the 'get', in
interior terms. For whereas both speakers sustain jointly
the restricted two-word 'get' voice, they share nothing when
the message of th? t t wo-word picture is expressed in more
elaborated terms. Thus, a sameness is established between
their speeches only in terms of exteriority. In terns of
inferiority they are quite separated.
It is in this context that the remark of the third
contributor to the conversation must be understood. This
speaker introduces a new voice not found in the speech of
either of the other two participants, namely the 'earthly'
1/you »voice. Given the rival attempts by the two prota¬
gonists to deal with one another, this speaker offers the
weight of his interior mode of speech to articulate the
speech of Jones.
The orderliness of disorder.







of the conversation as here presented rests on narrow
and formal grounds. Accordingly, I should now like to
argue that this interpretation, itself no more than a
skeleton, throws such light on questions of content in the
conversation that it must be regarded as the indispensable
context for any proposed 'content analysis'. It might also
be argued that in denying the sociological attribution of
anomie to this conversation, I have simply reversed the
usual sociological assumptions, and am celebrating nothing¬
ness.^ In opposition to this suggestion I want to show how
my account of what these speakers are saying flows from a
critique of the sociological account. Specifically, in
ironic critique of ethnomethodology I want to demonstrate
the skill with which these speakers exhibit their orientation
to 'reality' as I have found it in the conversation. Doth
of these tasks can be performed by way of reflections upon
incidents in the conversation.
The boy responds to the teacher by saying 'Get stuffed'.
Sociologically, this remark is viewed an an expletive, and
as such as anomic. Note the distinction not drawn here
from the sociological point of view, namely whether the
remark's anomicity merely exhibits its absence of skill
per se or whether on the other hand the remark is specifica¬
lly generative of anomie, and as such perhaps skilful, even
elegant. Sociologically, as in commonsense, I suggest, these
two are confounded together: the type of person who would
produce an expletive is regarded as the type of person who
would speak anomically, i.e. would lack social skills, a
'dope', not a 'theorist1. ^ Manifestly, such a judgement
blinds itself to the skill which may be exhibited in the
production of expletives, and in the 'theorising' which such
production involves. I propose, indeed, that both are
exhibited in the present situation, in the remark by Jones.
The sociological viewpoint treats the expletive as out
-with the scope of ordinary discourse, as rudely, unskilfully,
revealing the edges of the stable properties of the social
world. I want to propose that in the present context the
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visibility of those edges was apparent before the produc¬
tion of the expletive. 1 shall propose that this
visibility is a precondition of the production of the
expletive, and its correct production in the present context
exhibits a skilful orientation to those preconditions on the
part of Jones. But before seeking to demonstrate this
point, let me point to a paradox in the notion of orderliness
which the sociological viewpoint, as I have here portrayed
it, exhibits. I propose that insofar as an expletive is
recognisable as such by any ordinary (order-ary) speaker,
then the production of the expletive must itself be orderly.
That is, the production of disorder must itself be an
orderly feature. It is for this reason that, philosophically,
I am unable to treat 1anomie1 at face value: for me, it
exhibits that it is other than it says it is,
Consider, then, the present case. Linguistic analysis
has clarified the situation. Jones's expletive is indeed an
orderly way of showing disorder, i.e. of stepping outside of
orderly discourse, and this orderly production of disorder can
be seen prior to any judgement as to whether the remark is an
expletive or not. Prior to an exam: nation of the content of
the remark, that is, its 'orderly disorder' can be seen by
inspection of its form. This is given by the fact that this
picture resonates with those two-concept, pictures spoken
by Mr. Cramond which, likewise, specifically stood outside
his version of ordered discourse. Such pictures have been
seen also in the speech of Mr. Lee, and also in the speech
of other boys. These are in every case including Jones'
remark here the remarks which, in purporting to deal with
disorder, in fact constitute 'disorder' within their speech,
that is, produce the reality to which they purport to be
reacting.
It is now becoming clear that, within the 'earthly'
realm to which speech is confined by a speaker such as Mr.
Howie, 'disorderly' speech has precisely the same organis¬
ing role to play as 'extra-ordinary' speech plays within the
talk of the previous teachers whom I have considered. The
linguistic phenomenological approich treats each of these
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productions of a reference to reality external to speech
in precisely the same way. It treats them as a reference
to 'reality' in speech brought about by identifiable tech¬
niques, and these techniques are the reality which is the
object of the linguistic phenomenological enquiry.
I have suggested that the technique for distinguishing
between 'orderly' and 'disorderly' speech is the one
acknowledged by Bernstein as between 'restricted' and
'elaborated' linguistic codes. However, to make use of
this distinction it is necessary to remove it from the
context to which he restricted it, and place it in another.
T propose that this distinction is a precise one between
7
two grammatical forms which are available to all speakers.
Bernstein distinguishes his concepts as 'context-free'
speech (elaborated) versus 'context-bound' speech (restrict¬
ed). However, for me this identification is misleading,
and in fact exhibits a refusal to appreciate 'restricted'
speech in its own terms, i.e. to understand the skilful-
ness which it exhibits, a rival version of ski 1 fulness to
that of 'elaborated' speech. Consider the present case.
The boy's first word is 'get'. This is a term of remarkably
general application in our language, capable of a multi¬
plicity of uses in a multiplicity of contexts (and by a
multiplicity of speakers). His second word, 'stuffed', is
not in itself common, but the two words taken together form
a well-known phrase, a cliche itself of very wide application.
This is immediately suggestive. It might be said that this
mode of speech is a mode which can be spoken by anyone.
More accurately, it is a mode of speech which aspires to
be speakable by anyone: this aspiration is its standard of
artistry. By contrast, as has been seen in the case of the
speech of Mr'. Cramond and Mr. Lee, it is plain that elaborated
speech aspires to individual uniqueness of expression: this,
then, is its very different artistic standard. But of these
two then it is the 'restricted' code exemplified by Jones'
remark which is context free.
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In what sense is this speech, as I have argued,
specifically outside ordinary (order-ary) discourse? I
propose that to understand this requires a fuller under¬
standing of what ordinary discourse is. Suppose that
ordinary discourse is an interchange between speakers each
of whom expresses himself in 'elaborated' speech, thereby
revealing to the other the uniqueness of his own particular
vision of the world. In this case, each speaker poses a
philosophical problem for the other, insofar as the speech
of the other exhibits a different appearance from that
which the world presents to himself. Accordingly, such
discourse is a remarkably demanding kind of speech, and at
the same time a remarkably exposing kind of speech. In this
sense it exhibits speech as speech. By contrast, the
restricted speech we are now considering is remarkably
undemanding and unexposing in this philosophical sense.
That is, the speaker's whole skill is devoted to dissolving
his individual uniqueness into a formula acceptable to all.
In this sense it exhibits speech as non-speech, speech
refusing to reveal itself as the speech of a speaker. It
is speech which strives to disclaim a philosophical commit¬
ment, to refuse to expose itself to the extent of revealing
its criteria of legitimacy. It aspires to be absolute
speech.
But to dismiss it as anomic, is precisely to accept
its claim to be absolute and so to exhibit absoluteness,
o
and so philosophical silence. There would be no better
way to appreciate Jones' speech than to be stunned to
silence by his obscenity. Rather, to criticise its claim
to silence is to hear it not as silence but as speech.
I propose now to examine the phrase 'Get stuffed' on
this basis. It is an imperative, but first consider the
infinitive form of the verb. Its richness immediately
escapes beyond one's grasp in all directions. 'Stuffing'
refers to sexual intercourse. A stuffs B is a way of
referring to a male A having intercourse with a female B.
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To begin with, the term 1 stuff1 Has a prior meaning of 'to
fill' as in 1 to stuff a cushion' or 'to stuff an animal'.
The conception of sex as 'stuffing' is derived from this.
Secondly, the concept of 'stuffing' is a male chauvinist
way of referring to sex, in that it literally implies an
active agent who does the stuffing, and an inanimate
entity (or corpse) which is stuffed. Thirdly, by extension,
presumably, the notion A stuffs B could refer to a male B,
if B were the recipient of homosexual intercourse from a
male A. This account is clearly preliminary, referring
only to the most obvious associations of the word. A
fuller account would systematically examine other usages
both in the present and in the history of the term and
its etymological derivatives.
In a word, the hoy's remark is magical. Its content,
like its form, is external to the ongoing discourse - one
might say, interpretively, it aspires to be as far removed
as possible from that discourse. Tntriguingly, whereas
the teacher's imper£itive, whose wording is unfortunately
not available, purported to remove the boy from sight, the
boy's imperative purports to place the teacher on display.
I propose that in this sense the boy's oath constitutes
itself as equal and opposite to the teacher's imperative.
But in this case, the significance of the boy's remark can
be plainly seen. His expletive mimicks the teacher's
imperative. It exhibits this sense: that the teacher's
imperative is worth no more than the boy's expletive: that
they are on a common footing.
I propose that this sense of Jones's expletive is not one
which can simply be 'appreciated': it is one which must be
affirmed. Within the standards of skilfulness appropriate
to restricted code speech, this is a skilfully, that is,
appropriately produced utterance. The teacher's imperative
purports to remove the boy physically from the classroom.
In terms of speech, the teacher speaking within the elabora¬
ted interior of his way of speaking purports to remove
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Jones to the exterior, to make him disappear.
The teacher purports to speak to the boy so to remove
him from speech. Such a speech is contradictory; it
depends for its intelligibility on the implied membership
of the boy within the community of speakers, yet overtly
it excludes him from such membership. Within everyday
speech the technique for handling this contradiction is
the employment of speech which purports to be non-speech,
namely restricted speech. Such speech is the speech which,
in purporting to speak of anomie, itself exhibits the
reality of anomie. That reality is not nothingness, but
the reality of restricted speech which lies outside
elaborated speech. Jones's expletive exhibits precisely
that there is such a discourse lying outside the elaborated
discourse of classroom speech, and that if Mr. Howie
consigns him, Jones, to that discourse then he must face
the implication. This is, that by revealing that other
discourse, Mr. Howie renders himself liable to be redefined
within its terms.
Thus Jones' remark portrays a claimed sameness between
his speech and that of the teacher (both are magical), but
exhibits a real difference (two different modes of speech).
By contrast, as will now be seen, the teacher's reply
portrays a claimed difference (two different modes of speech),
but exhibits a real sameness (the same structure underlies
both).^
Whereas the words of Jones' remarks are, separately
and taken together, capable of conveying indefinitely many
meanings, the words of the teacher's response are by con¬
trast highly specific. 'Leave' specifies a familiar prac¬
tical action, eminently possible within the present setting.
'The room' likewise specifies a familiar practical setting
which is again quite unambiguous. 'Leaving the room' is
an action which each person present routinely enacts at the
end of every lesson throughout every school day. Thus
'leaving the room' is a notion which is acknowledged as
having theoreticity in McHugh's sense: that is, it must
analytically be intelligible and practicable to everyone
present. The 'place' to which Jones is consigned by the
instruction is thus a place known and familiar to everyone
and openly acknowledged to be so known and familiar. By
contrast, the 'place' to which Jones consigned Mr. Howie
is one which only some present would admit to knowing
by referring to it in their speech. Thus a paradox appears:
although really, I propose, restricted speech, e.g. the
expletive, has theoreticity in that anyone could say it,
apparently, in the sociological attitude, it is elaborated
speech alone which has a theoretical part to play.
Sociological speech is thus blind to the philosophical
character of restricted speech. It labels such speech
'anornic', and looks to elaborated speech for protection
from it. Here, everyone knows that the 'place' Jones
refers to is not a place in the teacher's world: in this
sense the teacher's world protects them from it. They know
that it is a terrible place, and that even the mention of
its existence may cause the structure of 'elaborated'
speech to shudder. The restraint of the teacher's reply
comfortingly reaffirms the continued existence of the
familiar world of the classroom: Jones' bluff is called.
Just as his remark mimicked the teacher's and asserted its
mere magicality, so now the teacher's remark implies the
magicality of Jones': it exhibits that he has not 'got
stuffed', and the world is unchanged by Jones' curse.
What is more, as is appropriate in the way in which content
echoes form, Mr. Howie's remark will have longer lasting
effects - indeed, until further notice, Jones will have 'left
the room' (further notice which Jones later gives) -
whereas, a moment after it has been uttered, Jones' curse
has dissolved into nothing. Thus in uttering the curse he
is revealed to have enjoyed the merely ephemeral, momentary
entertainment of a fantasy with no substance. As against
this, the teacher has merely to reassert the serious,
because substantial, basis of his own position.
The teacher's 'leave the room' remark shows that Jones'
speech, which appeared to challenge the teacher's elaborated
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social order, has done nothing of the kind. Rather,
insofar as the teacher sought in his remark to exclude the
boy physically from the room, and the hoy's response
itself asserted a position in speech metaphysically excluded
from that of the classroom regime, Jones' remark can be
seen retrospectively to have wholly supported the teacher's
definition of the situation.
On his return to the classroom setting, Jones hhimself
employs elaborated speech. He here portrays persons. These
persons are engaged in intelligible activity: 'calling
names' is an activity which one person can routinely do to
another within our society. It. may be said al once that
'leaving' the room is likewise an intelligible activity.
However, drawing from Max Weber's well-known distinction,^'
I propose that 'leaving' is a mere action involving per se
no orientation to other persons. (Manifestly any concrete
act of 'leaving', as the one which occurred here, will
necessarily involve such an orientation - but so will any
action concretely). By contrast, 'calling names' is a
social act ion per se. It may be hypothesised that whereas
mere actions can be portrayed in 'restricted' code speech,
social action can only be formulated in 'elaborated' terms.
In this case, we grasp a deeper significance of Jones'
remark. Insofar as in his speech he portrays the unnamed
boy as 'calling him names' he portrays that within the
'elaborated' classroom regime from which he was excluded,
social action involving himself was already taking place.
Jones, in his speech, portrays that he_ as an object for
speech is already involved in, that is, interior to, the
classroom regime, prior to his physical return to the
interiority of the classroom from outside.
Thus once again Jones' remark, far from being 'anomic',
exhibits its skilful orientation to the ongoing sensibility
of the social situation, and in particular, to speech as it
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is practised in this setting. So the conversation
continues.
I propose that the 'philosophical1 analysis has
improved upon the sociological analysis in numerous ways.
Most crucially, it has shown that the sociological attri¬
bution of 'anomie1 as the absence of order, an attribution
which I have shown is as much a part of 'sociological1
ethnomethodology as it is of social order theory in
sociology, is inadequate. More precisely the notion of
anomie in this formulation is a vision of that state of
nature which rears its head insofar as the state of civil
society is not sustained in being. My analysis locates
the existence of such a state of nature in the restricted
modes of speech which purport to deal with, and so
produce disorder. The relation between order and speech
can thus be represented on the diagram earlier presented,
in the following way:
ORDER-ARY SPEECH
»- civil society
The ongoing relation between 'restricted' and 'ela¬
borated', 'exterior' and 'interior' speech then amounts to
the ongoing resolution of the problem of social order within
ordinary (order-ary) language.
Tronic speech
If restricted code expletives posed no challenge to
the teacher's restricted code imperatives, was there any
speech which did raise deeper issues for Mr. Howie's way
of talking? 1 propose that indeed there was. Consider the
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lo
Jones: [SIR (is this school going on strike? ? 1
IIo
Mr. Howie: [ ( They might) ]
(Class break out into cheering and pandemonium)
IIIo
Jones: [( When are you going on strike? ) ]
TVo
i ii
Howie: [(I'm not going on strike) (I'm only going to talk-
about maths) ]
Vo
Mears: |SIR (this is about maths) ) ]
VIo
[ ( When are we going to. get the maths exam?) |
Mr. Howie's conversation H3~"
This conversation is structured in the form of a chain
of reverberating/repeating pairs of pictures. Accordingly,
I have broken it down into one possible set of stanzas, and
will discuss further possibilities in" the course of the
analysis.
It is clear that all stanzas making up this utterance
are single picture stanzas with the exception of stanza IV
which is composed of two pictures bound together by
reverberation and thereby constituting the voice of the _I.
Accordingly, the structure of this stanza is:
IV
j = i . ii (2d)
The other equations are straightforward and need not be
written out.
Now consider the relations between stanzas. Stanza IT
metaphorically reformulates stanza I and is so dependent
upon it. Repetition joins stanzas Io and IIIo and picture
IVi on the words 'going on strike'. Repetition joins pic¬
ture IVii and stanza Vo, on the words 'about rnktlis' . The
relation between stanzas Vo and VIo is not one of repetition,
however, despite the appearance of the word 'maths' in each.
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It is a noun in the first and an adjective in the second.
The relation here is one of metaphorical reformulation:
'this' in stanza Vo refers to stanza VIo as a whole and
thereby renders stanza Vo dependent on stanza VIo.
Accordingly, the structure of the conversation as a
whole is:
H3" = II T I = I11 : IV: V [VI 11L I L weJ J
In this equation, several stanzas do not have voices
assigned. But the structure as synthesised it itself
suggestive as to the identification of these voices. I
propose that the chain of stanzas I, III, IV, V unambig¬
uously belongs to the 'earthly1 l/you voice. Stanza IIo
is separate from the others, but its structure is familiar.
It is a two-picture 'restricted' picture. Its voice is
uncertain but may be tentatively designated ' they*"-*' . In
this case, the structure of the conversation can be
explicated:
II3-"- = II,, riT/ : IHT / : IV T / : V /they"»" L I/you I/you I/you I/you
[VI„e ] 1 ••• <4
Thus the conversation as a whole exhibits a clear structure.
The voice of the voe transcends the earthly 'elaborated'
1/you voice which transcends the earthly 'restricted' two-
picture voice. But now, consider what part within this
structure is played by Mr. Howie, and what part is played
by the boys.
In the structure as here synthesised, only stanzas II
and IV are spoken by the teacher. Stanza I, which first
inaugurates the 1/you voice, and stanza VI, which shifts
to the voice of the we, are both spoken by boys.
Jones opens the conversation, thereby constituting an
'earthly' discursive voice. But Mr. Howie is reluctant to
enter this voice. His 'restricted' speech exhibits an
initial refusal to do so, a preference for the exteriority
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of 'silence'. This judgement in terms of the form of his
speech receives confirmation in terms of the content. It
exemplifies exteriority literally, for whereas Jones'
remark is phrased in terms of the here and now ('this
school'), the teacher's 'they' distances the topic from
the persons and place present at hand. The teacher's word
'might' is also characteristic of 'restricted' vocabulary:
it contributes no information in answer to the question,
for 'might' implies equally well 'might not'.
Nonetheless this sends the class into raptures. I
propose that in their cheering the boys skilfully orient
to the state of the conversation at this point, viz. their
cheering exhibits participation in a reality far removed
from that of the classroom. It is Mr. Howie who has
already constituted this reality as such by the form and
content of his previous remark.''
Jones' next question, directly challenges the teacher's
exteriorising of the conversation: it impinges on the
interior of his speech both in terms of form (elaborated)
and content (you). Now the teacher takes up the theme:
but it is Jones' remark which has made possible for him the
reference to the ' ][' : this is only Mr. Howie's name for the
'you' which first made its appearance in Jones' speech.
It may be suggested that at this point the teacher finds
himself speaking with the voice of the _I, which was provided
for him by Jones, and endeavours to build on this to
establish a safe immanentist home base: for himself: his
answer to Jones' question goes beyond that question and
establishes a timeless enduring reality. But immediately
Mears employs repetition twice in order to leave belli nd
the immanentist I and shift first to the 'earthly' realm
pure and simple ('this is about maths') and thence to the
voice of the we where his question demands that the teacher
follow him. The method by which he does so is of some
interest.
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In his speech, Mears employs a way of speaking not
previously encountered. He enters into the precise word¬
ing employed by Mr. Howie, namely 'about maths'. This
wording he formulates in a stanza on its own, a stanza
specifically 'earthly' in its formulation of the here and
now, by contrast to the immanentist tendency heard within
Mr. Howie's stanza, 'I'm (not) going to'. He empiloys this
formulation as a bridge to introduce Iris owr. wording, in
terms of the we. Thus, unlike either Mr. Howie or Jones,
Mears here speaks in words other than his own, and is not
thereby taken over by them, but demonstrates a flexible
ability to enter into and take over the discourse of
another voice.
In his speech, I propose, Mears exhibits irony, that
is, a preparedness to enter into the voice of another, in
order to draw out its own tendencies and to learn from it.
To do so he must make a distinction within his speech,
between appearance and reality, in a way different from
that employed by any of the three teachers whom I have
considered. Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee do make such a distinc¬
tion. But within their speech, the ability to entertain
divergent appearances is entirely curtailed by their prior
commitment to formulating the reality to which they relate
those appearances always in the same words. Their speech,
in short, is serious speech about reality. Mr. Howie does
not make such a distinction. His speech, however, is
serious speech about appearance. As a result he becomes
trapped by the speech of others which impinges upon him.
Thus Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee are transcendentalists whilst
Mr. Howie is an immanentist in my terms, that is to say not
in terms of consciousness but in terms of speech.
Mears' way of speaking exhibits an alternative to any
of these. Mears exhibits the indexicality of speech, that
is, the problematic relation between appearance and reality,
in such a way as to exhibit the failure of the teacher's
attempted recourse to the immanentist I. The teacher's
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'I'm only going to talk about maths' was, I propose, an
intended declaration of the beginning of the lesson: as
I have earlier argued, teaching itself is conceived to be
conducted within a context of extraordinary speech. The
word 'only' here was, I suggest, an attempted exhibition
of the certainty of this realm, as compared with the flux
of ordinary speech. Mears' remark ironically shattered
that illusion: his irony was directed against extra-ordinary
speech itself. In employing the indexicality of the teacher's
remark to turn it against itself, Mears exhibits that the
attempted escape from ordinary speech is illusory: that
speech is by its nature problematic and to be addressed as
such. Ironic speech is the way in which extra-ordinary
speech is addressed as down-to-earth speech. Mears speaks
of the reality of 'about maths' not seriously but in order
to exhibit its character as 'reality', that is, as speech.
Another instance of ironic speech employs a similar
device. Consider this conversation, involving John Johnson.
Io
i
Mr. Howie: [JOHNSON ( can you do this? ) ) j
i II ii iii
Johnson: [(l ken that^but (l dinnae ken (how to do it
(the way) you do it ) )
III
XI
Mr. Howie [ ( ( How do you do it,) then?)




Mr. Howie: [ALRIGHT BUT (there's still (a number of people)
i i
who can't do that)
Mr. Howie's conversation H4"::"
It is possible to dispense with a complete interpreta¬
tion of this conversation provided that certain practical
judgements are made. I propose that the teacher's stanzas
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I and III formulate the problematic 'earthly1 voice
of the you. Less certainly, stanza IV apparently perpe¬
tuates this 'earthly' mode. In stanza II, Johnson sus¬
tains an 1 voice reflecting on the problematic you voice,
thus :
H4--.II j- (you) = i . ii (iii/iv) (3b)
There is repetition linking stanza lo, picture Iliv, and
stanza III. Accordingly, the structure of the conversa¬
tion as a whole is:
H4* = HT ( I : II : III : IV ) .... (4)I you you you you
Here, then, Johnson introduces the appearance/reality
distinction neglected hy Mr. Howie by employing the tech¬
nique of reflection, a familiar form of speech for Mr.
Cramond and Mr. Lee, but seemingly one unavailable to Mr.
Howie. It enables Johnson to ironically enter into the
teacher's words, namely 'you do', which he repeats, and to
shift to his own words ('I ken that') while retaining a
relation to those with which he began.
The teacher's question was originally posed as being
self-sufficient, complete in its own right. Johnson's
reply questions the question: it distinguishes between the
question, which refers to 'the way you''do it' and Johnson's
answer, which refers to the way lie does it. Thus for
Johnson, the relation between appearance and reality,
between one person's speech and another's, is an issue in
speech. It is not so for Mr. Howie. He does not take up
the question of the gap between the two, between the
intelligibility of his way, and that of Johnson's way.
Instead, he simply takes Johnson's way, once it has been
demonstrated, as another way of doing it.
Though I have criticised their ways of doing so, both
Mr. Cramond and Mr. Lee were able to sustain in one voice
(reality) a single version of the order, social or natura.1 ,
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which they shared wit
boys spoke with many
by failing to acknowl
in his speech was una
addressed this proble
with Mr. Howie and wi
occasion to do so in
Cramond or Mr. Lee.
so .
"Shut up"
The examples I have in mind are in fact very simple
ones. One fairly obvious method of 'assisting' the teacher
to maintain order was to direct imperatives as unelaborated
as his own, to other boys one disliked. For example
Russell would shout "Munroe, shut up!". Mears nicely cap¬
tured the hypocrisy of his position on one such occasion
by commenting, "Russy shut up, and dinnae shout!" Here
both Russell and Mears speak in what is 'objectively'
'restricted' talk. But this 'objective' judgement does not
capture the point of Mears' comment. Mears, once again,
speaks ironically in a voice not his own. He enters into
the voice seriously spoken by Russell as reality, and
instead exhibits it as 'reality'. He does so by showing
that Russell's 'shut up' imperative is itself the occasion
for a 'shut up' imperative, which is only to say that the
ascription of anornie is itself anomic i.e. that the speech
which purports to deal with disorder is itself disorderly.
Russell, in the remark quoted, spoke his imperative
seriously, i.e. as reality. Consider by contrast another
imperative directed at boys talking in the maths lesson.
Mentone asserted himself over a group of such boys, saying,
in a remark which 1 present already analysed,
I . .
1 11
[ ((Shut up ) the lot of you ) ]
II
[ OR (you'll get a kicking ) ]
h the boys, despite the fact that the
1 ?
voices (appearances). Mr. Howie,
edge the appearance/reality distinction
ble to do so. The boys themselves,
m of order in their classroom speech
th one another, whereas they had no
their classroom speech with Mr.
I shall examine briefly how they did
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[ (Do you think I'm kidding? )) ]
Sociologically speaking, I suggest, such a remark
appears somewhat crude, i.e. ' irrationalist', involving
the threat of violence as opposed to reasoned argument.
But a philosophical examination shows it to exhibit an
elegant structure, and a 'rationality' specifically absent
from the speech of Mr. Howie.
An examination of Mentone's speech as a whole would
be required in order to definitively establish the struc¬
ture of voices making up this utterance. Tentatively,
however, I propose that though each stanza portrays a
you, they are not the same you in each case. The first
stanza, bound together by refleetion,exhibits the 'earthly'
you, as does the last. The first, however, appears in
restricted speech while the last, like the second stanza,
is elaborated. Evidence from other utterances in fact
suggests that his predominant voice is the voice of the _!
which is able to reflect upon the you as an object in its
world. Accordingly, the ambiguity between 'earthly'
description and 'hellish' theorising of the natural order
recurs in his speech as it does in that of Mr. Lee. The
present stanza II, I propose, exhibits the you situated
within the natural order, the sui generis nature of this
portrayal being enhanced by the absence of the _I from the
stanza. Mr. Cramond's utterance C3";:" ("Right, everybody
should be sitting"), -exhibited the same device.
On this interpretation,
of the predomi
here the you i
the J_ contempi
employment of
Alec Rialto" ) .
of this stanza




stanza III exhibits a reversal
Mentone's talk:
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I propose that just as the relation between Russell's
speech and Mears1 irony was one of reality to 'reality', so
is the relation between Mentone's stanza II and his stanza
111. That is, stanza III specifically exhibits that stanza
IT was not formulating a matter external to speech (external
to the I which, I have argued, 'spoke' it) as it itself
purported to do (the _T was absent), but was itself speech,
the speech of the I who appears explicitly in stanza III.
To put this in simpler and more familiar terms, having
asserted the transcendentali st extra-ordinary _1_ in stanza
II, Mentone employed irony to bring his own extra-ordinary
speech down to earth in stanza III. Here a direct contrast
can be made with the defended speech which was exhibited
in the very first utterance which I considered, and which
has a formal similarity with the ironic technique. Defended
speech, with its 'mandatory' metaphorical reference from
extra-ordinary speech to ordinary speech, slavishly establishes
the dependence of problematic earth upon the certainties
established in heaven or hell. Ironic speech, with its
'optional'metaphorical relation between ordinary and extra¬
ordinary speech, joyfully exhibits the confidence of 'earthly'
speech to speak as extra-ordinary speech does, and thereby
liberates itself from servi tude. ' ^
Tbere is no better way of re-establishing this contrast
than by comparing Mentone's 'ironic' extra-ordinary support
for Mr. Howie's ordinary speech with the 'serious' extra¬
ordinary support given to the maths master by Mr. Cramond,
after a particularly rowdy maths lesson had reached his
attention. He told the boys:
"'It's been brought to my notice that some boys have
been having a jolly good time in the maths class ...
If there are any more complaints, you'll be brought
down here for one or two little jobs like cleaning
the lavatories. If you don't settle down cind realise
that you need two basic subjects, Maths and English,
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for S.C.E., then you'll be brought right clown
here'".
(The reference to "S.C.E." here is to a Scottish Certificate
of Education examination somewhat equivalent to the English
'C.S.E.1,Certificate of Secondary Education).
Like Mentord s stanza II, this statement affirms the
'hellish' natural order within which the you is situated,
and like that stanza this statement portrays no I or other
speaker. Like Mentone's stanza III ('you think I'm kidding')
but unlike those of Mr. Howie, his speech makes intelligible
the present appearance of things ('some boys have been having
a jolly good time in the maths class'), but affirms that this
is not the underlying reality. But in Mr. Cramond's remark,
unlike that of Mentone, there is no possible ambiguity as
to the relative significance of the formulation of the extra¬
ordinary reality, and that of the ordinary appearance. In
Mr. Cramond's remark here, the 'good time' of some boys is
false, whereas the 'need' of the you is true.
It remains true that in Mi-. Howie's classroom, the boys
were themselves able to address the issue of social order
more persistently than was possible in other teachers'
lessons. I should like to conclude by considering one
conversation between Mr. Howie and the boys, on this question
"Why don't you get a bit of order in the class?"
Presumably the obvious question to put to Mr. Howie
was put to him by Russell:
I
1 XI
Russell: [(Why don't (you) get a bit of order in the class?
II
i 11
Mr. Howie: [(How do you suggest (I do that?))]




[ (Kick their. ) ]
IVo
[AND (Lash them) ]
Vo
[AND (punch them in the face) j
VIo
[(Get your lash out)
Mr. Howie i 11
out of your seat(very fiercely): [RIGHT, IF (I see (you
i i i
again)) (I'll belt you))
i VIII 11
Russell tells you?)Johnson: [(How do you have to do (what)
Mentone: [(I told him too) ]
The paradox involved in this conversation goes beyond a joke.
How is it possible for one speaker to impose order on all
others present in speech? I suggest that Mr. Howie's
failure to do so stems from his reludance to grant himself
that special position taken up by Mr. Cramond or by Mr. Lee,
which in either case involves the teacher distancing himself
from the pupils by setting up an extra-ordinary discourse
over and above the ordinary one within which they are situated
Mr. Howie, I propose, genuinely desires to speak with the boys
in this sense he is democratic, even egalitarain in spirit,
though in a way which he has not articulated. Despite his
failure, I believe that there is more prospect of a rational
mode of speech arising in and out of his way of speaking to
the boys, than there is in and out of the ways of speaking
adopted by Mr. Cramond or Mr. Lee. How could such a mode
of rationality arise, superior to either of these two modes,
from within Mr. Howie's way of talking? This is the question
asked of Mr. Howie by Russell.
What is striking in the discussion, here reported, is
that, although this conversation itself exhibits a responsive
interchange between speakers, conducted in 'elaborated' speech
at the 'earthly' level, every speaker presumes that once a
form of order is agreed upon, it will involve a departure
from this mode. But the word 'presumes' is too weak here.
This is not a matter of 'conscious' presumptions. It is
rather a matter of linguistic practises. To reformulate the
_ ?91_
matter, every speaker himself departs from elaborated
speech at the earthly level in order to exhibit his version
of order.
The first to do so is Russell. In answer to Mr.
Howie ^'s question "How do you suggest I do that?", Russell
exhibits an answer to the question rather than speaking
about an answer. 'Kick them', 'lash them', 'punch them'
are specifically 'restricted' two-word single picture
stanzas which mark a departure from the 'elaborated'
discourse to 'disorderly' speech. Mentone's remark like¬
wise, with its vocabulary of 'get' and 'out' which as has
been seen are characteristically 'restricted' words, perpe¬
tuates this mode of speech. The teacher then adopts another
tack. Unusually for him, he launches into an .immanentist
I_£you_) voice witli the familiar property for this realm that
the _I itself becomes trapped by the impersonal logic
summoned up in speech. (Compare Mr. Lee's utterance L3~''~,
"I hope I'm not going to have to start on you"). Johnson
at once employs ironic optional metaphor to bring the dis¬
course back down to earth. In so doing lie in fact calls
into question the order within which Mr. Howie himself
spoke his remark. Mentone sustains this theme, in doing so
asserting his own preferred voice of the _I. Order is no
nearer being finally established so that speech can continue
within its context: it remains an issue for speech.
Rationality
What is absent from all these conceptions is a notion
of order as a rational synthesis of divergent speeches,
a synthesis which could be persuasive of all because genuinely
emergent out of the speech of all. Yet such a synthesis is
in progress within the speech. I want to propose, that in
their discussion of social order these speakers exhibit an
orientation to order which transcends their explicit grasp
of that orientation in words. The paradox which arises
here arises identically for Hobbes. Hobbes proposed a once-
for-all solution to this problem. I should prefer to propose
that solving this problem is the ongoing work of speakers
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within society. My turn of phrase here plainly echoes and
is indebted to Garfinkel. 1 But in contrast to Garfinkel's
view, I propose that the problem which speakers are engaged
in solving is not the problem of sustaining the appearance
on earth of a transcendent heavenly reality called 'social
order'. 1 propose it is rather one of achieving the
transition from the state cf nature to the state of civil
society here on earth. The means to effect this transition
are, I propose, already at our disposal, only we do not
acknowledge them.
Hobbes's paradox is, that the discourse possible at the
actual moment of adopting the social contract, itself
momentarily exhibits a rationality superior to any discourse
possible either before, in the reified state of nature, or
after, in the reified state of civil society. I propose
that those speakers who abjure the Utopian solutions of
'heaven' and 'hell', 'social order' or 'natural order', find
themselves perpetually engaged iri making the transition from
the state of nature to the state of civil society. For me
this work is the reality of which 'natural order' and 'social
order' respectively present the reified appearance. Parsons
has pointed out that Hobbes' solution to the problem of
social order involves the attribution of a 'higher' forir of
rationality than he considers justified:
This solution really involves stretching, at a
critical point, the conception of rationality
beyond its scope in the rest of the theory, to
the point where the actors come to realise the
situation as a whole instead of pursuing their
own ends in terms of their immediate situation,
and then take the action necessary to eliminate
force and fraud, and, purchasing security .at the
sacrifice of the advantages to be gained by
their future employment.17
The appearance of life in Mr. Howie's classroom might
seem to support this pessimism. The speakers who strive for
this rationality, notably Mr. Howie and the boys in his
classroom, indefinitely defer agreement as to the contract.
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They pose themselves perpetually at the point of trans¬
ition from state of nature to state of civil society,
perpetually on the brink between exteriority and inferiority,
in this they stand in direct contrast to speakers such as
Mr. Lee who, unambiguously, situate themselves within the
state of nature, or speakers such as Mr. Cramond who
unambiguously situate themselves in the state of social
order. But for me, they are more genuinely rational in
their ongoing decision to do so. For, despite its greater
'rationality' in an instrumental sense, the regime imposed
by either Mr. Cramond or Mr. Lee is a denial of the
possibility of meaningful discourse involving more than one
speaker. Without holding out any solution to this problem,
Mr. Howie's discourse reveals constantly that this problem
exists.
As against Parsons' sociological pessimism, I propose
that a linguistic phenomenology inspired by Husserl's
philosophy must be committed to the view, which he articulated,
that men are indeed capable of • exhibiting such a 'higher'
rationality. It follows from, the logic of my argument
thus far that a necessary, though not sufficient, condition
for the attainment of such a rationality is that the
constraints of 'transcendent' social and natural order be
lifted from them. Husserl's critique of the everyday attitude
has been my source in an attempt to overcome these constraints.
Does he himself, then, exhibit this 'higher' rationality?
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Chapter Eight
THE EVERYDAYNESS OF HUSSERL'S TWO PHENOMENOLOGIES
The Language of Phenomenology
The linguistic phenomenology which I have practised
following the writings of Iiusserl has had some success in
pinpointing the alienating gap between two antagonistic
theological conceptions of 'reality1 which besets contem¬
porary everyday speech. But though I have not given their
language such close consideration as everyday speech I
have argued that this gap determines identically the
writings of phenomenologists, ethnomethodologists, and
existentialists themselves. It is now necessary to ground
this argument more rigorously. This is made possible b>
the developed linguistic phenomenological method. I propose
therefore that the writings of the phenomenologists pre¬
viously taken as a resource, now be opened to investigation
as a topic of linguistic phenomenological enquiry.^
Husserl developed his phenomenology specifically against
what he regarded as the hegemony of commonsensc (the 'natural'
attitude) in existing science and philosophy. lie posed his
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two phenoinenologicat reductions as radical departures,
previously unexplored, whereby a new and certain basis for
knowledge could be achieved. Yet I have suggested that his
two reductions correspond precisely to two modes of speech
which are of daily occurrence in everyday life in an
ordinary secondary school. How can thls be accounted for?
My proposal is, that far from having invested any radical
new departure, Husserl's achievement was to explore rigor¬
ously and explicitly realms of meaning which were already
available within the 'natural1 attitude, or more precisely,
within ordinary language.
I am proposing that Husserl1s phenomenologies, so far
from being remote from everyday life, are themselves
everyday in character. But have I not argued that these
reductions, and the modes of speech resembling them which
I discovered in the classroom setting, were extra-ordinary?
I have indeed. My proposal is that Husserl1s reductions are
extra-ordinary but everyday. It is necessary to clarify
this distinction.
Up to now this distinction has scarcely been acknowledged:
the assumption lias been made that everyday language is
ordinary language, and that languages of non-everyday settings,
such as those of sociology, psychology, or phenomenology,
were by the same token extra-ordinary. In contrast, I should
like to propose that the distinction between ordinary and
extra-ordinary language is to be found in any setting,
whether 'everyday1 or otherwise, and that this being the case,
the distinction between 'everyday1 and other settings is a
relatively unimportant one.
I should like to illustrate this proposal by turning nocr
to investigate a case of language far removed from the every¬
day setting, yet crucial to the argument which I have been
developing, namely Husserl1s phenomenological writings, and
in particular the three texts which I earlier discussed.
If I can show that within these texts, the distinction
between ordinary and extra-ordinary language is made in
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precisely the same way as in the classroom of 2D1, then I
shall have established a plausible case for my argument.
This will imply at the very least that Husserl's language
and everyday language are not qualitatively different
from one another. But there is another more powerful
implication.
Husserl claims that lis texts exhibit a presupposition-
less account of conscious experience, both descriptive and
theoretical. Whilst it is fashionable to be sceptical about
such a claim, it is not a simple task to give an account of
2
the presuppositions which he may exhibit. I propose a way
in which such presuppositions may be identified. If it is
the case, as I have argued in the context of classroom con¬
versations, that the structure of our language implies a
limited range of metaphysical positions open to speakers
(or writers) of that language, then it will foliow that
any speaker of this language will exhibit those metaphysical
positions. But it might be expected that a writer who
specifically laid claim to the ideal of presuppositionless-
ness would exhibit these positions more plainly than most,
for the reason that he would have eliminated from his speech
all the more concrete aims and aspirations.
This is indeed the hypothesis which I propose in the
case of Husserl. If my concejrtion is correct, then Husserl
may be praised for the clarify with which he has exemplified
existing metaphysical choices, even if his claim that they
are the only possible ones be rejected.
The mode of investigation which I propose to employ to
examine the character of Husserl's writing is that of the
linguistic phenomenology which I have developed. But is
this not a redundant enquiry, in view of the fact that I
have already presented a reading of that writing as a pre¬
lude to the present argument? Clarification of this point
will greatly clarify the proposal which I am making. The
reading of Husserl which I presented in chapter one like
those of Schutz, Sartr e, Garfinkel, and Lairg in chapters
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two and three, was not a linguistic phenomenological
analysis. What kind of analysis was it then? 1 propose
it was necessarily descriptive rather than theoretical,
appreciative rather than critical, sociological rather
than philosophical,that in short, it read the texts
concerned under the assumption of inter-subjectivity. Each
of these is but an aspect of another definitive property
of that reading: it read the texts as if they wrote about
a reality external to the language in which the texts were
written. The name of that reality, in the case of Husserl,
was consciousness.
It is clear how the new reading will differ from the
old. Rather than being read as writing about a reality out¬
side language, Husserl will be read as writing a 'reality'
in language. Rather than reading the text as the speech
of a single unproblematic subject, tire text will be read as
the product of diverse voices within the text which may
conflict with one another. The second reading will be
critical, philosophical, and theoretical.
But the question arises, which of the two will be the
better reading? In answering this question, I am not
appealing to some absolute standard. Rather, T should like
to appeal to a highly specific one. Which reading will be
truer to the spirit of Husserl's phenomenology itself? It
will not be '.possible to answer this question until after
the enquiry is complete, but nonetheless the nature of the
question may be clarified. Tire question asks which comes
first, consciousness or language? Up to now I have not
attempted to answer this question. To be sure I have myself
taken the view that language comes first, and tiiat 'consc¬
iousness' is only a 'reality' for language. But I have
assumed that this was my choice. In making it, I elected
to borrow the concepts which Husserl developed for the
description of consciousness, and apply them to language.
But now a more rigorous argument suggests itself. What if
it could be shown, that these concepts were linguistic
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concepts from the outset, and that in that sense
'consciousness' was demonstrably no more than a linguistic
construct? Such a demonstration would have to be made against
those who purport to speak of and for consciousness, of whom
Husserl is a key example.
Accordingly, 1 shall now explore the consequences of
reading Husserl linguistically. This reading may be taken
as a paradigm for the application of the linguistic
phenomenological. method beyond the sphere of speech in
3
which I have so far explored it, into the sphere of writing.
' Immanen t isn.'
I propose to begin by reconsidering the passage which I
have already considered descriptively, taken from section 27
of Husserl's Ideas, entitled "The World of the Natural Stand¬
point: I and my World about Me". These are reflections in
which Husserl engages prior to taking up the pheromenological
reduction:
j [Our first outlook upon life is that of natural human
we beings, imagining, judging, feeling, willing, 'from
the natural standpoing'. Let us make clear to our¬
selves what this means in the form of simple medita¬
tions which we can best carry on in the first person].
jj [I am aware of a world, spread out in space endlessly,
I and in time becoming and become, without end. I am
aware of it, that means first of all, I discover it
III immediately, intuitively, I experience it]. [Through±mP
sight, touch, hearing, etc., in the different ways of
sensory perception, corporeal things somehow spatially
distributed are for me simply there, in verbal or
[ IV j-] figurative sense " present" [whether or not I pay them
special attention by busying myself with them, consider¬
ing, thinking, feeling, willing], ]..[it is not necessary
that they and other objects Jikewise should be present
precisely in my field of perception. For me real
objects are there, definite, more or less familiar,
agreeing with what is actually perceived without being
themselves perceived or even intuitively present] ...
Vj [I find myself at all times, and without my ever being
able to change this, set in relation to a world which,
through constant changes, remains one and ever the same]. ...
[It is then to this world ... that the complex forms of my
..consciousness stand related ... Related to it likewise
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are the diverse acts and states of sentiment and
VI. disapproval, joy and sorrow ... decision and
imP action. All these, together with the sheer acts
of the Ego, [in which I become acquainted with
[Vlljjthe world as immediately given to me] are
included under the or:e Cartesian expression:
Cogito|.
I propose that in this passage, three voices are to be found,
respectively those of the we and the _E, together with an
impersonal voice. I have indicated the stanzas by means
of square brackets in the usual waj but have not distinguished
pictures as to do so would involve unnecessary complexity for
the purposes of the present argument. In the passage,
Husserl himself explicitly identifies two voices, insofar
as he begins in the first person plural and then states
that the meditations can best be carried on 'in the first
person' singular. The third, impersonal, voice arises as
a means of summing up the 'first person' singular experiences.
Following stanza I which introduces the passage in the
voice of the wcj, the _T speaks in stanza II. The I^'s first
'finding' is of a 'world'. However, in stanza II the I is
only'Aware' of this world 'immediately' and 'intuitively'.
In stanza III, the impersonal voice metaphorically reformulates
matters. This is an 'optional.' metaphor, as this stanza is
intelligible on its own. Stanza IV is an aside by the voice
of the _L. This is a 'mandatory' metaphor, that is, 'them'
in stanza IV refers to 'corporeal things' in stanza III. In
stanza V, the 1^ again speaks of a'world', but this time
this 'world' has new properties. It is a world which 'through
constant changes remains one and ever the same'. This
statement presents a problem. How can the 1 which is only
immediately and intuitively aware of the world reach the;
notion of a world which remains the same through constant
changes? I suggest that left to itself the _T could not.
But this T is not left to itself. It is engaged in a
dialogue with another voice, the impersonal voice. In the
preceding stanza, that voice has concluded, 'for me real-
objects are there agreeing with what is actually perceived'.
The impersonal voice is able to formulate a notion of
reality ('real objects') transcending appearance ('what is
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actually perceived'). This, I suggest, is the notion
which the J_ learns from in order to speak its notion of
a world remaining the same. But in this case, the voice of
the 1 in stanza V is dependent upcn the impersonal voice
in stanza III. In stanza VI, the impersonal voice itself
takes o\er the notion of 'world'. It formulates 'this
world', 'together with the sheer acts of the Ego' as,
together, 'Cogito'.
In a passage which follows shortly, this conclusion
is extended also to the voice of the we:
[Whatever holds good for me personally also holds
hood, as I know, for all other men whom I find
present in my world-about-me ... For each, the
fields of perception and memory actually present
aire different . . . Despite this we come to under-
I standings with our neighbours and set up in common
an objective spatio-temporal fact-world as the
world about us that is there for us all, and to
which we ourselves nonetheless belong]5.
This Husserl names as the 'general thesis of the natural
standpoint'. Thus the notion of 'world' is one to which
eiery voice can subscribe, a notion which each voice is able
to articulate as a result of its encounter with other voices.
What, then, is the significance of this word 'world'? For
Ilusserl, as I previously read him, the word referred to a
reality external to the language which formulated it. But
now this no longer seems to be a necessary conclusion.
What is it that every voice can come to comprehend as a
result of its encounter with other voices? I propose, the
fact that it is a voice at all is what becomes visible to
the 1, the impersonal, and the we, as a result of the en¬
counter with other voices. I propose, then, that Husserl's
word 'world' is to be translated into 'word', or in other
words, 'voice'.
In this case, I am attaching a new significance to
Husserl's 'general thesis of the natural standpoint'. It
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is, simply, the setting up in common with our neighbours of
'an objective spatio-temporal fact-voice as the voice
about us that is there for us all and to which we ourselves
belong'. This phenomenon is familiar: it is the voice of
the wej in other words, the 'heavenly' utopia known as
'intersubjectivity'.
But now, the phenomenological reduction itself is to
be defined in terms of this attainment of the voice of the
we, the 'general thesis':
| We put out of action the general thesis which
belongs to the essence of the natural standpoint,
we place in brackets whatever it includes respecting
the nature of Being: this entire natural world there-
I fore which is continually 'there for us', 'present to
our hand' and will ever remain there, is a 'fact
world' of which we continue to be conscious,^even
thougli it pleases us to put it in brackets].
What is involved here? I propose an interpretation of this
passage, and hence of the phenomenological reduction itself.
Having ascertained, through a dialectic undertaken entirely
within the 'natural' attitude, that each voice could learn
from each of the other voices that it was itself a voice,
Husserl now proposes that the phenomenological attitude
arises precisely by forgetting this fact. This could be
put more strongly: by 'repressing' or 'suppressing' this
fact. The significance of this from my point of view is
plain. It amounts to a forgetting by speech that it is
speech among speeches, in short, it amounts to a shift from
'realism' to realism, a shift from 'ordinary' ("order-ary' )
to extra-ordinary' speech.
The most famous result of this reduction, is already
familiar to us. Husserl argues:
[The stream of experience which is mine, namely,
of the one who is thinking, may be to ever so
I-m great an extent uncomprehended, unknown in its
past and future reaches],[yet so soon as I glance
towards the flowing life and into the real present
it flows through, and in so doing grasp myself as
the pure subject of this life ... I say forthwith
and because I must: I am, this life is, I live,
cogito].7
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This passage splendidly enacts what it speaks about: the
'incomprehension1 and 'unknowing' are as it were the
'experience' of the impersonal voice, themselves 'incompre¬
hensible' and 'unknown' to the voice of the T, which confi¬
dently speaks forth. For Husserl this passage speaks of
the gap between modes of experience. For me it speaks
the gap between modes of speech. The gap arises as a
result of the retreat of these two voices from one another,
a retreat brought about by the phenomenological reduction.
But now a strange reversal occurs. The J. has reached
its strident conclusion by forgetting other voices, in
particular the voice of the impersonal. But that voice has
not forgotten it. For the impersonal voice is now able to
metaphorically reformulate what the 1 has achieved:
[The thesis of my pure Ego and its persona] life,
which is 'necessary' and plainly indubitable, thus
I. stands opposed to the thesis of the world which
imp -r——:—-—rt1—■—r-T-1—a
is 'con tingent' |
What is my reaction to this finding? I agree with it
completely. But I do so in a very different way from
Husserl's. My agreement with this thesis of Husserl's
means that, for me, he has shown up the impoverishing
consequences of allowing a voice to suppress, censor, all
of its awareness of other voices, 'like' its own in ways from
which it can learn, but from which it can learn only by
acknowledging that they are 'different' from itself. My
agreement with his thesis means that, for me, Husserl's
exploration illuminates the possibilities of our language
when that language departs from the sensitive mutuality
which it can exhibit in ordinary speech, but that what it
finds there is in no way superior to what is to be found in
ordinary speech, but manifestly inferior in quality. He is
exploring, as it were, the deadness of language left to
itself. But how does he himself see it? For Husserl, this
possibility which he has reached is exciting because of the
certainty which it exhibits. 'The thesis of my pure Ego',
he tells us, 'is "necessary"', whereas 'the thesis of the
world'is "contingent"'. Notice that, paradoxically, this
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'thesis', which itself arises out of the decision by the
voice of the _I to immerse itself entirely within itself,
is expressed not in the voice of the 1, but in the
impersonal voice. It seems that whereas the voice of the
1 has.suspended all awareness of other voices, the
impersonal voice has not. What is happening here? The
impersonal voice, claiming no special status for itself,
asserts the absoluteness of the I voice.
But this is a very familiar relationship, though in
an unusual context. The impersonal voice poses the voice
of the I. as transcending it's, the impersonal voice's,
ability to formulate it. In short this is defended speech:
in terms of the analysis which I have performed when this
phenomenon has appeared in everyday language, the impersonal
voice is here formulating the appearance of a reality which
is posed as formulated by the voice of the 1. In this
case, following the analysis which I have proposed of Mr.
Cramond's speech, and speech encountered since, it may be
said that the very source of Husserl's notion of the 'trans¬
cendent' reality of the 'conscious' 'flowing life' and
'real present' of the _I is precisely the separation he has
made between the two voices which are a familiar feature
of our language.
This analysis implies that for Husserl it is the
impersonal voice which is the home base, and this his
excursions into the voices of the _I and the we are always
with the purpose of establishing there certainties which
g
can be employed to order the impersonal voice.
I have summarised the implications of the 'immanentist'
argument of Husserl's Ideaa in a familiar way: this
implication can be expressed in terns of the algebraic
notation:
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II. ,fI_ I = 'immanentism'
impersonal1- IJ
This equation is incomplete, as the voice I have called
'impersonal' has not been accurately identified yet. It
is plain that from my point of view this viewpoint can no
longer be called ' imiric. rent ism' at all. It is rather a
version of transcendentalism as I have defined it, namely,
the conjuring up of a reference to a reality transcending
linguistic formulation of that reality by contemplating
one voice as transcending another voice.
Having re-examined Husserl's 'immanentist' phenomenology,
I should like to turn briefly to a comparison with his
'transcendental' approach.
1 Transcendental i srn'
I should like to begin by discussing the passage in
which Ilusserl defines his second reduction. In section 8
of the Cartesian Med it: at i ons , entitled "The ego cogit-o as
transcendental subjectivity", Husserl writes,
[By my living, by my experiencing, thinking, valuing,
and acting, I can enter no world other than the one
that gets its sense and acceptance or status in and
from me, myself. If I put myself above all this life
and refrain from doing any believing that takes "the"
Ij wori d straightforwardly as existing - if I direct my
regard exclusively to this life itself, as conscious¬
ness o_f "the" world - I thereby acquire myself as the
pure ego, with the pure stream of my ccgitationes].9
This passage exhibits dramatically the change from Husserl's
immanentist to his transcendentalist phase. For here, within
the voice of the _I is formulated the phrase 'the pure ego',
which in the Ideas was the phrase used by the impersonal
voicevto metaphorically reformulate the voice of the _I. The
promise of this transcendental investigation seems to be,
that somehow the voice of the 1_ will itself grasp the
reflections of the impersonal voice about it. This would
seem to express a welcome aspiration towards 'self-conscious¬
ness', or rather its linguistic equivalent. Such an aspira¬
tion would also seem to be expressed by the new attitude to
be taken to the world, or in my term, the voice. I have
proposed that in the Ideas, the I_ was to forget that it was
a voice. It was this that enabled it to reach its conclusion,
'I am, this life is, I live, cogito'. In short, the I_ was
to forget that it was a voice formulating 'reality', and
instead immerse itself within its voice, confidently speak¬
ing reality. But here it seems, the _I is precisely to
remember that it is a voice, and to strive to apprehend itself
as such. It is to 'direct its regard to this life' itself
as consciousness of "the" world'. In my terms, it is to
direct its regard to its speech itself as speech of "the"
voice, and so attempt to apprehend what it is to be a voice.
Is this not precisely what I myself have advocated? Does
Husserl here not advocate precisely a linguistic phenomeno¬
logy?
He does not. For despite the reversal in one respect,
in another the core characteristic of the eiirlier phenomenolo-
gical reduction is preserved. The _T is to continue to direct
its attention exclusively to itself. Its learning what it is
to be a voice will be entirely self-learning, never learning
from others. By contrast, I have proposed that the object
of linguistic phenomenological enquiry is the orientation of
one voice to another, and the techniques whereby this is
achieved. But here I am not merely advocating an alternative
way of proceeding to that of Husserl. I am rather arguing
that he proceeds in the way which I advocate, though he
does not realise that he does so. I have argued in a trans¬
lation from Husserl, that 'speeches refer to speech, they
are related in this way or that way to speech'. I should now
like to show specifically how Husserl's 1^ speech is bound
up with other speech in 'directing its regard'.
I should like to consider in particular Husserl's
speech in the "Fifth Meditation", in which he most fully
explicates the problem of the constitution of the social
world. There are, as I indicated in my earlier consideration
of this argument, two stages to be followed. The first is the
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establishment within the 'transcendental' sphere of the
notion of 'ownness' and so the 'human ego'. The second
is the constitution of the 'alter ego' mirrored in my own
ego. The first of these is straightforward: as I have
argued, it is a repetition of the phenomenological reduc¬
tion, only now conceived as a theoretical possibility,
rather than a descriptive actuality. Husserl says:
[As Ego in the transcendental attitude, I attempt
first of all to delimit, within my horizon of
transcendental experience, what is peculiarly my
Ij own. First I say that it is non-aLien. I begin
by freeing that horizon abstractively from every¬
thing that is at all alien].*0
This procedure seems to be within the scope of the voice of
the I_. But as in the earlier descriptive version of this
reduction, the I_ apparently requires the assistance of the
impersonal voice for certain purposes:
[Furthermore,, the characteristic of belonging to
the surrounding world, not merely for others who
are also given at the particular time in actual
experience, but also for everyone, the character-
II. istic of being there for and accessible to every-
xmp
one ... should not be overlooked, but rather
1 1 1excluded abstractly | .
The notion of phenomena 'belonging to the surrounding voice'
e.g. 'for others' might seem to present some difficulty,
but I propose that a clear linguistic interpretation may
be placed upon it.
There is a problem for the voice of the I_: Though this voice
purports to formulate what is uniquely mine, the voice itself,
qua voice, is not at all uniquely mine, but rather shared in
common with others. Up to now, the 'transcendental'
reduction has done no rr.ore than establish its position within
the voice of the I_ generally. This third reduction purports
to go further, to distinguish within that voice what is
uniquely mine about my voice," from all else. It seems that
the notion 'for everyone' cannot be formulated by the voice
of the _I alone, so that this reduction, which arrives at
'the human ego' is not the pure finding of the ^E.
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However this is not the intervention of another voice
which I consider to be most crucial. Consider now the
second stage of the argument. Presuming that a 'human ego'
has been constituted, how is it possible for the voice of
the 1^ to comprehend an ego other than its own? Husserl
makes the following statement:
[I am lie re somatically, the centre cf a primordial
'world' oriented around me], [Consequently, my
entire primoridal ownness, proper to me as a monad,
has the content of the Here not the content belong-
II. ing to that definite There. Each of these contents
excludes the other: they cannot both coexist in my
sphere of ounness at the same time. But since the
other body there enters into a pairing association
with m> body here and,being given perceptually, becomes
the core of an appresentation, the core of my exper¬
ience of a coexisting ego, that ego ... must be
appresented as an ego now coexisting in the mode There,
III.j.] | 'such as I should be if I were there' ]. My own ego
however, the ego given in constant self-perception,
is actual now with the content belonging to his Here^,,
Therefore an ego is appresented as other than mine].
As the text shows, the voice of the 1 can formulate 'I am
here', but no more. The introduction of a notion of
'there' by contrast to it is the work of the impersonal voice
This is explicit in such a passage as the following:
[Since other subjectivity, by appresentation within
the exclusive own-essentialness of my subjectivity,
arises with the sense and status of a subjectivity
I. that is other in its own essence, it might at first
a mp
seem to be a mystery how community - even the first
community, in the form of a common world - becmmes
established. ... These two primordial spheres, mine
which is for me as ego the-, original sphere, and his
which is for me an appresented sphere - are they not
separated by [an abyss] I cannot actually cross,
since crossing it would mean, after all, that I
acquired an original (rather than an appresenting)
experience of someone else? ]].-*• 3
Here the dilemma is posed unresolvably in the voice of the I
which almost cries out for help at this point in the text.
Where can help be found? It is to be found in the speech
of the impersonal voice, which in so speaking reveals its
identity plainly for the first time. The fundamental
experience of someone else, Husserl tells us, is via the body
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[this natural body belonging to my sphere
appresents the other Ego, by virtue of the
pairing association with my bodily organism,
and with my Ego governing in mj organism,
within my primordially constituted Nature. In
so doing, it appresents first of till the other-
Ego's governing in this body, the body over
II. there, and mediately his governing in the Nature
imP that appears to him perceptually - identically
the Nature in which the body over there belongs,
identically the Nature that is my primoridal
Nature. It is the same Nature, but in tire mode
of appearance 'as if I were standing over there,
where the Other's body is]. 14
The impersonal voice, which as I have shown is Husserl's
own voice in the Ideas can now be seen to be his own
voice in the Meditations, and identified as the voice of
'body' or alternatively, of 'Nature'.
But this voice is quite familiar. It is precisely one of
the -ivo extra-ordinary voices which were found sustained in
the speech of all three teachers within the 'everyday'
school setting, though only for one of these was it his
'home base', his version of reality itself. It is intriguing
to find Husserl granting this voice such a crucial part in
his own scheme. Does this then mean that he himself can be
located on the 'immanentist', or 'existentialist' side of
the structure of everyday speech which I have proposed? It
does not. For according to Husserl, formulation of the
apprehension of the other which I have so far presented
constitutes only the "first and lowest level of coinmunalisa-
tion between me, the primordial monad for myself, and the
monad constituted in me, yet as other"'
How, then, are what Husserl calls 'higher intersubjective
communities' to be constituted?
Higher communities are deduced by generalising the
results of the establishment of the first community.
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Husserl expresses the character of this generalising in
various ways. He states, for example, as in his own word
a matter of 'fact1, that
[If, with my understanding of someone else, I
penetrate more deeply into him, into his horizon
of ownness, I shall soon run into the fact that,
Ij. just as his animate bodily organism lies in my
field of perception, so my animate organism lies
in his field of perception, and that in general,
he experiences me forthwith as an Other for him,
just as 1 experience him as my_ Other] . ^
This gives rise to my conceiving of a plurality of others,
possible as well as actual, which Husserl calls an !open!
community, inhabiting an 'open' Nature. It is in this
connection that he makes what I regard as his more disciplined
statement as to the generalisation process. He states,
[To this community, there naturally corresponds in
transcendental concreteness, a similarly open
community of monads which we designate as trans¬
cendental intersubjectivity. We need hardly say
that, as existing for me, it is constructed purely
within me, the mediating ego, purely by virtue of
sources belonging to my intentional!ty; neverthe¬
less it is constituted thus a_s a community consti-
I
^ tuted also in every other monad ... as the same
community - only with a different subjective mode
of experience - and as necessarily bearing within
it the same Objective world ] .1 7
Here, a new kind of logical principle is involved, and
Husserl states it in a different way. He employs the voice
of the we to designate this generalising which has the
character 'given that I can constitute an Other ego so can
every other' ego1, in short, so can we all.
But this result expressed in terms of the we is not
HusserlIs conclusion. He rather expresses that result in
these terms:
[Actually therefore there can exist only a single
community of monads, the community of all co-exist-
II , ing monads. Hence there can exist only one
n r-1 I 11 f P ™
Objective world, only one Objective time, only one
Objective space, only one Objective Nature].
This result, expressed triumphantly in llusserl's preferred
impersonal (natural) voice is achieved by mandatory meta¬
phorical reformulation of the voice of the we, which is
thereby constituted as transcendent. The 'transcendent'
argument of the Cartesian Meditations can thus be expressed
in the familiar notation:
1*I.T , r I 1 — 'transcendentalism'Nature l we j
The argument of the Ideas can also be more fully expressed
now that the voice of the impersonal has been identified:
II.T , | IT ] = ' immanentism'
Nature l I -1
It is apparent that Husserl's two reductions respectively
constitute the two principle modes of extra-ordinary speech
available in our language.
'Real! sin1
I. hope to have exhibited an '.immanent' critique of
Husserl's phenomenology in a double sense of the word.
First, I propose that my critique of his writing is itself
wholly inspired by the ideal of a new wcience of philosophy
which he upheld in his writing.^ Secondly, I propose that
insofar as that ideal itself represented a striving for an
'immanentist' position, and for the establishment of
philosophical certainty upon that basis, the linguistic
phenomenology which I have proposed now claims to occupy
that position, and to have displaced Husserl from it. I
shall nlaborate on this second claim, and then return to
reconsider the first.
Husserl claims to have articulated both an immanentist
and a transcendentalist philosophical position, and so to
have explored all the possibilities for philosophising
available to consciousness. I hope to have shown, or at
least established rigorously the principles on which such
a showing should be made, that Husserl in fact explored the
two transcendentalist positions available to language,
leaving unexplored an immanentist position also available to
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language, and in fact occupied by empirically available
everyday speech. I have attempted to occupy this position,
and have proposed a linguistic phenomenology located therein.
But to refer to this position as timmanentist1 and to both
of Husseri's positions as 'transcendentalist' is to bring
about a change of terminology. Husserl's conception of the
immanent is of a reality wholly available to consciousness,
although only imperfectly available to language. My concep¬
tion of the immanent is not of a reality wholly available to
language. It is rather a conception which I have called
'reality*, viz., that all that can be knov/n of reality is
knowable in language, but that language itself is other than
reality. It conceives not of reality, but of speech about
'reality', as that which is immanent and so addressable in
speech.
It would be pointless to state such a definition were it
already widely accepted. I propose, however, that it is not.
I propose that the prevailing conception of speech is as
speech about reality. This conception is widespread, as I
hope to have shown, not simply within everyday life(where
however it is not the only mode of speech available) but
also within phenomenological philosophy, sociology, and
psychology (where it is the only mode of speech available).
More specifically to the present argument, it is the concep¬
tion of speech upheld by Husserl himself. This conception,
is the one which I should like to refer to as 'natural'
speech, insofar as it is exemplified by the voice of
'nature' spoken by Husserl himself.
My conception of a new science of philosophy is inspired
by Husserl in this sense. Husserl set out to combat the
'natural* attitude which, endemic in philosophy, science,
and commonsense, he saw as inhibiting the development of
man's historical pursuit of rationality to its telos. I
likewise see what is for mfe 'natural' speech • as
inhibiting such a pursuit. Specifically, the claim to
certainty represented by the theological visions of extra¬
ordinary speech covers over the dialectic which is already
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It is now possible to come to terms with the notion
of intersubjectivity. I earlier proposed that this notion f
predominant within contemporary sociological explanation }
entails treating speech as the immanent appearance of a
transcendent reality posited by the intersubjectivist. In
like fashion the psychologist working with the notion of
subjectivity treats speech as the immanent appearance of a
transcendent reality which he posits. Each of these
exhibits what Garfinkel calls the 'documentary method1 of
interpretation.' I have shown by contrast how it is possible
for a linguistic phenomenologist to attend to the distinction
between appearance and reality made by speakers themselves.
I propose that as opposed to documentary method interpretation
of speech the mode of investigation, which I have exhibited
should be referred to as interruption of speech. This mode of
investigation 'interrupts* the speech which it investigates
in the sense that it places itself in the 'rupture' or gap
2
between the voices which speak. I have tried to exhibit
what this interruption involves in my use of the writing of
Husserl as the source for my version of linguistic phenomeno¬
logy. This provides an occasion for contrasting the two
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approaches, for I propose that in their use of Husserl
as the source for their versions of linguistic phenomenology
other writers have approached him under the assumption of
.intersub jectivity.
I propose that this distinction may be suggestively
formulated in another way. Previous linguistic phenomenologie
treated Husserl's texts as writing, that is to say they have
been pro-gramned by Husserl's writing: mine has treated
his texts as speech, that is to say I have been pro-yoked by
him. This contrast is illuminating as to the distinction
between writing and speech. This distinction is important
for my argument, for I propose that the relation between
'writing' and 'speech' as presently comprehended in our
society, echoes precisely the relation between the 'extra-
3
ordinary' and the 'ordinary' within speech itself.
Chambers' Dictionary has the following entries for
these words:
Programme, program ... a public notice: a paper,
booklet, or the like, giving a scheme of pro¬
ceedings arranged for an entertainment, conference,
course of study &c., with relevant details: the
items of such a scheme collectively: a plan of
things to be done - v.t. to provide with, enter
in &c., a programme ... [Greek programm, pro¬
clamation - pro, forth, gramma, a letter].4
Provoke ... v.t. to call forth: to summon: (obso¬
lete) to call out, challenge: excite or- call into
action, stimulate: to incite, bring about: to
excite with anger: to annoy, exasperate - v.i.
(Dryden) to appeal . . . [Latin provQcare, - aturn -
pro-, forth, vocare, to call]. 5
The Concise Oxford Dictionary offers a little more etymolo¬
gical information: Greek pro has the sense of 'before',
whereas Latin £ro has the sense of 'in front of', 'on behalf
of'; Greek grapho is 'to write'. It seems that one can
safely say that 'programme' has the sense of 'writing before',
whilst 'provoke' has the sense of 'speaking before'. But
note the widely differing connotations of the two words. I
suggest these may be summed up by saying, that 'programme'
has the sense of determining what follows, whereas 'provoke'
conveys no determinate relation to what follows, it rather,
in its senses of 'annoy' and 'exasperate', would seem to
convey asense of changing what had beer, determined. Nonethe-
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less these differences bear o
have a sense of one phenomenon
responsible for the productio
n a common theme: both words
leading to and being directly
n of, something else.
The crucial difference is, I suggest, that a 'pro¬
gramme' may be produced by the same agent who is then
subjected to its implications, whereas a 'provocation® is
always the work of an other. But if this is the heart of
the distinction being made, why is the distinction between
speech and writing involved? I propose the following inter¬
pretation. The distinction being made here rests on an
aspect of the social situation of speaking and writing.
Compare the relation between sender, recipient, and message
in the spoken and written cases. In the case of a written
message, the sender knows the complete message to its end
before the recipient knows the beginning.
By contrast, in the case of the spoken message, neither
sender nor recipient knows the end of the message, when it
begins. There are of course cases of spoken language in
which, to a greater or lesser extent, the whole message is
known by both speaker and listener so soon as the beginning
of the message is heard. This applies in particular to
'ritualised® forms of speech. But such forms of speech
have been, precisely, the topic of the present enquiry. I
suggest that it is precisely this character of 'defended®
i.e. ritualised speech, which establishes its true character
as 'writing®, speech wherein the speaker guarantees the out¬
come of the speech before the listener hears its beginning.
There are likewise cases of written language in which, to
some extent, the sender does not know the end before the
recipient knows the beginning. An important 'half-way®
example would bealetter which was part of an ongoing personal
correspondence, in which themes were introduced by one writer
who could not anticipate how they would be developed by the
other. By comparison with a published text such as a book
or scientific paper, particularly one which has gone through
a long process of redrafting and correction before it is
made public, the letter is clearly more spontaneous, less
predictable. I propose to say, that in this sense, it is
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closer to speech. I suggest, then, that the distinction
between 'speech5 and 1 writing1 may be sustained in a
rigorous fashion on the basis of this distinction.
This distinction throws light on the distinction
between 'provoking' and 'programming'. The 'programme'
is a written message preceding something. As such, it is
a message which is complete in itself: it therefore has an
ordering function on whatever it is that follows it, and
whatever it is must be bound by that order. In the terms
earlier used, it stands as an extra-ordinary social fact
which subsumes ordinary speech under its definition. The
'provocation' by contrast is a spoken message preceding
something. As such, it demands a response. It therefore
has a disordering effect on whatever was planned to be
going on: and it cannot determine what the response to it
should be. In the terns ear]jer used, it stands as ordinary
speech within which it sustains a tradition.
Previous linguistic phenomenologies have written
within the definition of Husserl's writings, or more usually,
one or other of the two texts I have considered, which they
have posed as extra-ordinary writing, programming their own
ordinary writing. Thereby the alienating gap within his
work lias been uncritically perpetuated in the work of
Schutz, Sartre, Garfinkel and Laing, none of whom address
it as a topic in its own right. I have rather sought to
write within the tradition of Husserl's writings, taking
his two texts together, which I have posed as ordinary
writing provoking my own ordinary writing. Specifically I
have addressed as my topic the gap within Husserl's work, and
sought to show how it may be overcome.
Thereby I hope to have inteurupted the intersubjectivity
surrounding Husserl. I hope to have done so not by a
reduction of his work which accredited a unity to him as a
subject on one occasion by covering over or repudiating
his work on another, but by standing between the divergent
voices which he speaks on all occasions.
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But in addressing the gap between the voices in
Husserl's speech, I have neglected the gap between the
voices in my own. I hope to have interrupted the writing
and speech which T have been examining. Since this is the
conception of the encounter with the other which has
theoreticity for me, I can only hope to be interrupted
myself in turn.^ In this case why speak? I should like
to conclude with some reflections on the prospects for
speech in our society.
It need hardly be stressed that any critique provoked
by Kusserl's writings on the I. and the we must begin by
relocating these 'persons' within the ongoing flux of ord¬
inary speech from which they have been severed. This
severance is produced not by Husserl himself in an e_x nihi 1 o
departure from everydayness as he supposes, but by extra¬
ordinary departures from ordinariness within everydayness
g
itself, which Husserl merely exemplifies. It becomes clear,
then, that to be provoked by Husserl into a critique of his
presuppositions is to be provoked by the presuppositions of
contemporary ccirmonsenae, presuppositions which he has
admirably laid bare in his own writing. What would such a
relocation involve?
I propose that a rational .speech would indeed have a
place for the we and the within it. Rational speech, by
one speaker to another, would continually relate the I to
the we. The we would act as a discipline upon the I
publically accountable to other I's, and would be open to
innovation by the I in the laght of its practise informed
by the we. In short, in rational speech, the I is a conven¬
ient term with which to formulate the immanent appearancecf
the world to me. The we is a convenient term with which to
formulate the necessary conditions of any possible appearance
of the world i.e. its transcendent reality. But neither of
these is a fixed and reified category: it can only become
so when, as in defended speech, my we and my I are separated
off from ongoing discourse, i.e. ongoing speech, and are
thereby constituted as defended, written, categories 'trans¬
cending' everyday life, i.e. natural and social facts sui
generls.
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In the absence of such defences, each and every
encounter with another is an opportunity for me to revise
my speech. Insofar as I encounter you who portrays the
world in different terms to mine, then your speech is an
occasion for me to clarify both my notion of we, for
you have extended my knowledge of the possibilities of
appearances in general, and my notion of 1, for now,
knowing of you what 1 did not previously know, I_ know of
my difference from you, and my difference from we, more
deeply than I did previously: I know more of the way reality
appears to me. This dialectical rationality comes into play
only in the context of demanding speech, never in the context
of defended speech.
Such rationality is not available in the school class¬
room. The teacher defends his speech so as not to be open
to such demands by the pupils, nor to make such demands upon
them. The teacher's I is unaccountable to his we, and
every 1^ is different. This being the case, the we is a
fantasy construction Just as is the 1^. In these circumstances,
the boys are not being socialised into a rational discourse,
but into the alienation of two opposed theological visions
of the world, one the 'heaven' of social order of explicit
rational rules, which is summoned up in fantasy but never
actualised, the other the 'hell' of a natural order of
impersonal inevitabilities i_n which each private consciousness
is up against nature unprotected.
It might appear that this alienation of speech was solely
a feature of specific, and reformable, institutional arrange¬
ments within the organisation of contemporary education. But
the evidence is that this is not so: my analysis of everyday
speech has shown the prevalence of these forms, and Busserl's
writing confirms them from a seemingly 'independent' source.
Accordingly, it seems they are deeply bound into the ideo¬
logical forms of society's self-comprehension, which constitute
the J_ and the we as being, in true Durkheimian fashion
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external realities over and above the individuals to
whom they refer. Only in certain instances of speech
can one glimpse ways of overcoming these reifications.
The urgent task for research is to discover how these
ways may be strengthened and brought to fruition. The
outcome could be, the changing of society.
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1. IP, p. 24•
2. Cf. McHugh, "The Failure of Positivism".
3. This is to say, that positivism conceives itself as
mathematical, in the sense in which Martin Heidegger
has explicated this term. Heidegger himself provides a
re-reading of the history of modern science, which
attempts to understand it in other than its own terms
in his What is a Thing? The notion of the 'mathematical'
as a critical term is employed by Alan Blum in his
Theorisng, and by Stanley Rosen in his Nihilism. My
indebtedness to these three writers will be apparent
to those who know their work.
4. The fruitfulness of irony in theorising is well presented
by Barry Sandywell, "Marx, Alienation, Speech".
5. All names of people and places connected with the school
setting are fictitious, with the exception of 'Scotland'.
6. One way of conceptualising my 'bias' is the following.
Suppose that the range of speech available in the class¬
room can be discriminated, more or Less roughly, as
between 'public' and 'private' modes. Then as one
participant speaker and listener in the setting, I have
access to a certain selection from within this range.
My access to the more 'public' modes of speech will equal
that of any other participant. My access to more 'private'
modes of speech may generally be less than that of any
other participant. But in specific instances, it is
likely that I shall have access to some 'intimate' speech
unavailable to some others within the setting, just as
eacli other person lias access to some 'intimate' speech
unavailable to me. My predicament is then qualitatively
110 different from that of any other speaker in the setting:
I know of only part of what occurs. It is quantitatively
different however, in that on the whole I know less of
'intimate' speech in general than 'anyone' else. In
fact the present study focusses most of its attention
on the 'public' talk of teachers.
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7. I had previously carried out a pilot study at another
city school which I shall call Peter's Hill. Here I
had experimented with a variety of techniques of 'data
collection' for the pursuit of a study which I regarded
as an 'anthropological' approach to life in classrooms.
These approaches involved the use of projective tests,
sentence completion tests, tape-recorded interviews,
an 'objective' coding scheme for examining non-verbal
social 'interaction', and a computer-based analysis of
classroom seating patterns. I employed the sentence-
competition test, interviews, and analysis of seating
patterns at Port Ness also, though they are not reported
here. However, I made certain methodological decisions
which did carry over. The first was that my participant
observation, if it was to achieve its aim of an incon¬
spicuous presence/could only be conducted within one
class in one school at a time, and preferably would be
sustained continuously throughout the day over a period
of weeks or months, otherwise my presence or absence in
a particular lesson on a particular day was itself a
major issue for the teacher and pupils before and during
that lesson. The second was that the collection of
verbatim records of conversations was the richest and
most rigorous'data' which I could obtain,though to begin
with I collected other kinds of information in addition.
Only after some weeks in Port Ness, did I come to con¬
ceive this linguistic material to constitute a self-
sufficient source of information for the purposes of my
enquiry.
8. At Port Ness school, classrooms were allocated to teachers,
so that pupils had to walk frorr. one to another between
lessons.
9. Hatching thus: '////' denotes my later expansion of
abbreviations in the notes.
10. This particular teacher made a routine practise of
giving (die boys a 'break' of five minutes or so to
talk at the end of every lesson. As will be seen he was
able to use the threat of withdrawal of this privilege
when trouble threatened.
11. I am discussing the situation at a commonsense level. I
might add that though this opinion was perhaps a little
over-stated, the general feeling among the staff was
that J2 were a good-natured class who got on well together
and with teachers.
12. In the subsequent analysis such descriptions as these of
how speech was spoken are no longer considered relevant.
The issue of how the 'physical' transmission of speech
bears on the message of that speech is thus outside the
scope of my enquiry. My view would be, that tone of
voice, bodily gestures, and so forth, can in no way add
meaning to the possibilities already contained within
the words spoken themselves. That is to say, that
language itself, more precisely the sensible/referential
unities called voices which I shall display in the
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sections on "Analysing" and "Synthesising" below,
makes possible a range of 'meanings', and the trans¬
mission of speech can only enhance of discriminate
between those 'meanings'. This being said, however,
my investigation itself reveals great variation within
language as between more and less explicit forms of
speech, and it may be that phenomena presently regarded
as 'non-verbal' accompaniments of language ought to be
regarded as proto-linguistic themselves in a fuller
analysis.
13. The systematic analysis of terms of address is unfortunate¬
ly not attempted in the present study. Any such analysis
would have to begin with a re-reading of Sacks' work on 'mem¬
bership categorisation devices', cf. his "On the Analysabil-"
ity of Stories by Children". In the present case, it will
be seen that Mr. Cramond's practise with regard to names,
which he scrupulously observed, served to establish each
boy as identically a member of the classroom community,
and was thus completely consistent with his 'ideological'
postulation of such a community in his talk to the boys.
14• I had hoped to begin my period of participant observation
on the first day of the new term, but in fact began
exactly one week after term had started.
15. The Scottish New Year, traditionally greater cause for
celebration than Christmas.
16. Since this is the first out of many examples of utter¬
ances which 1 shall be presenting, a few words of comment
may be necessary. It is I who has constituted this
piirticular series of words, or to be pedantic, this
stream of sounds, into an 'utterance' with a definite
beginning, and end. In that sense this whole study
simply exhibits my way of constituting speech. My study
is not unique in Lhis: so does every other written text
'about' speech, which includes 1n ter alia the whole of
empirical sociology. I shall go on to address in some
detail what I make of these 'utterances' once collected.
Uiis includes treating as problematic whatever analyti¬
cal unity they may possess. But I originally constituted
them as a concrete unity, and there is no record of that
procedure on my part. I can simply say that within a
commonsense frame of mind I recorded 'utterances' where
I heard one speaker as speaking but obtaining no response
to his speech, and I recorded 'conversations' where I
heard two or more speakers speaking in a mutually res¬
ponsive way. It is certainly arguable that others would
have 'heard' differently on occasions.
17• Each of "Teachers Talk and Classroom Discipline", and
"Some Ways of not Listening to What People Say" explores
some ways of interpreting spoken utterances suggested by
recent sociological and philosophical writing. In
"Teachers' Talk", the main butt for my criticism is
Erving Goffman's 'dramaturgical perspective' presented
in his Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. In "Some
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Ways", my argument proceeds in terms of and against
J.L. Austin's 'saying' and 'doing' distinction in
his How to do Things with Words.
18. This possibility is of course axiomatic in 'phenomenological'
and 'existentialist' thought.
19. This conception of the personal pronouns was that
articulated by Charles Sanders Peirce. A clear and
critical presentation of his theory of signs is Arthur
W. Burks, "Icon, Index, and Symbol". He quotes Peirce
as arguing that:
1, thou, that, this ...indicate things in the directest
possible way. ... A pronoun is an index. ... A pronoun
ought to be defined as a word which may indicate any¬
thing to which the first and second person have
suitable real connections, by calling the attention of
the second person to it (quoted from the Collected
Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, (2.287"^ by Burks,
op. cit., pp. 677-8).
This is precisely the view to which my own is most opposed.
20. This paragraph is written as a paraphrase of Schutz's
remarks about the puppet world conjured up by the social
scientist, in OMR, p. 255, as discussed in Chapter Two
"Multiple Realities", above.
21. For the time being, I shall take 'speech' and 'writing'
to be interchangeable. In the "Conclusion" below I
suggest the basis for a principled distinction between
them.
22. This statement is intendedly reminiscent of 'structural¬
ism'. It is impossible here to embark upon a discussion
of that movement: its diverse tendencies are as ramified
as those within 'phenomenology'. A writer 'representa¬
tive' of no one but himself, but who exhibits an iden-
tifiably 'structuralist' approach to language is Jacques
Lacan. In his paper "The Insistence of the Letter in
the Unconscious", he writes:
The speaking subject, if he seems thus to be the
slave of language, is all the more so of a discourse
in the universal moment of which lie finds himself at
birth, if only by dint of his proper name, (p.104).
Whilst I should conceive the task of a rational investiga¬
tion of language to be precisely the liberation of speakers
from such slavery, I find Lacan's account suggestive as
an account of speech in a less than rational society.
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23. The most powerful attack on this belief in general terms
and in the specific contexts of literary and political
writing has been mounted by the French 'Tel Quel' school
of literary critics. I have discussed the relevance of
their ideas for sociology in "Sociology as Writing".
Their work is another source of inspiration for me
which it is inadequate to acknowledge only in individual
citations.
24. This distinction is due to Frege, cf. his "On Sense and
Reference". 1 propose however that in the manner in
which I have employed them both the notions of 'sense'
and of 'reference' define the objects of a specifically
Ilusserlian linguistic enquiry.
25. As defined by Emile Durkheim in his Rules of Sociological
Method.
26. At this point I must acknowledge another source of
inspiration for the proposal which I am putting forward.
This is the point of view developed in the 1930s by the
Russian writers on language, Mixail Baxtin and his
colleague Valentin Volosinov. Baxtin expresses the
importance of speech about speech in these terms:
The problem of the orientation of speech toward
another utterance ... has a sociological signi¬
ficance of the highest order. The speech act by
its nature is social. The word is not a tangible
object, but an always shifting, always changing
means of social communication. It never rests
with one consciousness, one voice. Its dynamism
consists in movement from speaker to speaker,
from one context to another, from one social
community to another, from one generation to
another. Through it all the word does not forget
its path of transfer and cannot completely free
itself from the power of those concrete contexts
into which it had entered. By no means does each
member' of the community apprehend tire word as a
neutral element of the language system. Instead,
he receives the word from another voice, a word
full of that other voice. The word enters his
context from another context, and is permeated
with the intentions of other speakers. His own
orientation finds the word already occupied.
Thus the orientation of the word among words,
the various perceptions of other speech acts, and
the various means of reacting to them are perhaps
the most crucial problems in the sociology of lan¬
guage usage, any kind of language usage, including
the artistic,(Baxtin, "Discourse Typology in Prose",
pp. 194-5).
This point of view leads Volosinov to place particular
stress on the phenomenon of reported speech.
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Reported speech is speech within speech, utter¬
ance within utterance within utterance and at the
same time also speech about speech, utterance
about utterance, (Volosinov, Marxism and The-
Philosophy of Language, p. 115).
This property, he argues, throws light on a crucial
question for the sociology of language:
How, in fact, is another speaker's speech received?
What is the mode of existence of another's utterance
in the actual, inner-speech consciousness of the
recipient? How is it manipulated there, and what
process of orientation will the subsequent speech
of the recipient himself have undergone in regard
to it? (op.cit., p. 117)-
The answers to all of these questions can be given, at
least in part, by an examination of reported speech:
What we have in the forms of reported speech is
precisely an objective documentation of this
reception, (op.cit. , p. 117).
But in view of my discussion of the 'documentary'
interpretation of speech employed by Garfinkel, and by
Laing, I cannot accept Volosinov's precise wording
here. Of what, in his view, are the forms of reported
speech the 'document'?
Once we have learned to decipher it, this document
provides us with information, not about accidental
and mercurial subjective psychological processes in
the 'soul' of the recipient, but about steadfast
social tendencies in an active reception of other
speakers' speech, tendencies that have crystallised
into language forms. The mechanism of this process
is located, not in the individual soul, but in
society. It is the function of society to select and
to make grammatical (adapt to the grammatical struc¬
ture of its language) just those factors In the active
and evaluative reception of utterances that are
socially vital and constant, and hence, that are
surrounded in the economic existence of the particular
community of speakers (op.cit., p. 117).
Despite the realistic context within which he locates
his concerns, Volosinov's proposals for research into
language are highly suggestive. The 'techniques' which
I go on to investigate are in each case instances of
the reception of one speech by another, and my search
for such 'techniques' may be regarded as having its
source in Volosinov's notion as much as in ethnomethodology.
27. The notion of 'destruction' is used in this sense by
Heidegger, cf. especially Section 6 of Being and Time.
28. This analysis and synthesis as a whole is a way of
investigating what Garfinkel calls the "retrospective/
prospective sense" of speech, cf. RG, p. 41.
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29. Recourse to 'theology' for the source of the explanation
of transcendence as a phenomenon in everyday life is
suggested by Marx in his well-known discussion of the
'fetishism' of commodities, where he states:
the social character of men's labour appears to
them as an objective character stamped upon
the product of that labour ... it is a definite
social relation between men, that assumes, in
their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between
things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy,
we must have recourse to the mist-eveloped regions
of the religious world. In that world the
productions of the human brain appear as independ¬
ent beings endowed with life, and entering into a
relation both with one another and the human race.
(Capital, vol. I, p. 72).
The idea of viewing everyday life as 'theological' is
also in accordance with Heidegger's account of the
Western tradition of philosophy as 'onto-theological'.
Cf. his Identity and Difference.
30. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Caoitalism, p. 99.
31. ibid. , o. 108
32. ibid. , p. 105
33. Cf. Durkheim's discussion of the relationship between
relioion, society, and social science in the conclusion
to his Elementary Forms of the Religious Life:
We have said that there is something eternal in
religion: it is the cult and the faith. Men cannot
celebrate ceremonies for which they see no reason,
nor can they accept a faith which they in no way
understand. To spread itself or merely maintain
itself, it must be justified, that is to say, a
theory must be made of it. A theory of this sort
must undoubtedly be founded upon the different
sciences, from the moment when these exist; first
of all, upon the social sciences, for religious
faith has its origin in society ... (pp. 430-431).
For Durkheim, sociology is the modern bearer of
'eternal' theological speech. It must be acknowledged
that he is more explicit about this commitment and
its implications than his more recent followers.
Durkheim's work as a whole, and especially Elementary
Forms, is a mine of observations of transcendence as
a phenomenon in everyday life.
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34. W.I. Thomas, The Child in America, p. 572, quoted in
Schutz, CP I, p. 348.
35. David Matza, in Becoming Deviant, has proposed a version
of phenomenological sociology under the title of an 'app-
reciationist' stance. From my point of view, however,
the term is wider in application: it clearly applies to
both Garfinkel and Laing, though the objects of their
'appreciation1 differ.
36. IP, p. 43, Cf. Sartre's adoption of this argument dis¬
cussed in chapter two, "Life versus Thought in Sartre",
above.
37. Cf. no. 26 above.
38. I have discussed Coulter and Laing as paradigms for 'soc¬
iological' and 'psychological' explanation as a whole.
39. My conception of the 'permanent danger' stands in oppos¬
ition to Rosen's, op. cit., for whom the danger is of
'nihilism'. This danger is exhibited by those who do not
aspire to extra-ordinary speech. My view is, then, the
inverse of his. In other words, his 'nihilism' is my
'anomie'.
40. Alan Blum has employed 'literalism' as a critical term
in his "Reading Marx".
CHAPTER FIVE
1. McHugh et al formulate the problem here addressed in
this way:
Ego, for us, is the speaker who, by speaking, necess¬
arily forgets his reason for speech. Alter reminds
ego why he speaks by formulating ego's auspices. We
conceive ego then to make reference to his auspices
in order that alter may formulate them. In this way,
alter makes it rational for ego to speak.
(On the Beginning of Social Enquiry, p.4).
This statement appears in the preface to a text which was
produced by collaboration between four persons acting as
mutual egos and alters. Unfortunately they do not pres¬
ent the dialogue involved in that production. It should
also be pointed out that they apparently conceive of
'ego' and 'alter' as persons, a concrete conception com¬
pared to my notion of 'voices' as the phenomena which res¬
pond to one another in speech.
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2. TSEO, p. 89.
3. Basil Bernstein develops this distinction in his Class,
Codes and Control.
4. The exclusive and exhaustive opposition between on the
one hand speech which aspires to be completely rational,
and on the other hand silence, is the theme of Stanley
Rosen's essay, op. cit.
5. This proposal is in line with the critique of Bernstein's
account of the relation between language and social class
made by William Labov in 'The Logic of Non-Standard
English'. Whereas Bernstein characterises working-class
speech as 'restricted' as against middle-class speech as
'elaborated', Labov provides experimental evidence to
show that black lower class children are able to artic¬
ulate both modes of speech but that their use of each is
context-specific.
6. Quoted and discussed in Chapter Two, "Life versus Thought
in Sartre", above.
7. J.J. Rousseau, The Social Contract.
8. T. Hobbes, Leviathan.
9. This proposal is in line with, and inspired by, Heidegger's
account of what he calls the 'historicity' of our lang¬
uage, cf. Being and Time, section 6.
10. The notion of 'ek-sistence' is developed by J.J. Kockelmans
in "Language, Meaning, and Ek-sistence", an interpretat¬
ion of the later Heidegger's writings on language.
11. Cf. Austin's classic discussion of excuses, "A Plea for
Excuses ".
12. It is in this context that I would read Alan Dawe's arg¬
ument in "The Two Sociologies", which poses
two sociologies, a sociology of social system and a
sociology of social action, ... grounded in the diamet¬
rically opposed concerns with two central problems,
those of order and control. ... The first asserts the
paramount necessity ... of external constraint ... The
key notion of the second is that of autonomous man, able
to realise his full potential. (p. 214).
Dawe interestingly argues that:
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The two problems do not only create sociological lan¬
guages. Similar oppositions can be seen in many areas,
in psychology, psychoanalysis, literature, and, obviously,
political thought. (n. 32, p. 218).
His argument is thus compatible with and supportive of
mine that the reality of this opposition is linguistic.
In his paper however Dawe does not draw the conclusion
that the task of a radical linguistic practice should be
to overcome it.
13. I cannot address here the relationship between my version
of linguistic phenomenology and what has become known as
'ordinary language philosophy'. Criticism has been dir¬
ected against such philosophy, e.g. by Rosen op. cit.,
as advocating an uncritical acceptance of the existing
state of everydayness. Such criticism would be inapp¬
licable to my own approach. For in criticising extra¬
ordinary language I criticise it when it makes its app¬
earance within everydayness, as it does continually within
our society.
14. These two aspects are pursued separately in ethnomethod-
ology and in existentialism respectively. I regard them
as mutually indispensable. The question of change arises
here. I should propose that insofar as the speech of an
individual transcends the structure within which, up to
that point, he speaks, he has changed that structure.
Such innovation would exemplify what I understand by
Heidegger's notion of aletheia, dis-covery, Cf. his
Introduction to Metaphysics.
15. Cf. Rosen's discussion of the conditions for rational
discourse.
16. TSEO.
17. In DS, Laing refers to this contradiction as a 'double-
bind', a concept which he derives from G. Bateson, "To¬
ward a Theory of Schizophrenia". I discuss it more fully
in Chapter Seven, 'The Orderliness of Disorder', below.
18. That is, the perspective developed by Goffman, op. cit.
Cf. my fuller discussion of this in 'Teachers Talk'.
19. This notion stems from W.I. Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl.
20. Goffman, op. cit.
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21. Heidegger elaborates this conception in his Identity and
Difference. The impetus to treat etymologies seriously
as a way of enquiring into our language stems from
Heidegger's concern to investigate tradition.
22. Concise Oxford Dictionary, p. 319.
23. ibid. , p. 1375.
24. The sameness between these seeming opposites is well
drawn out by Rosen, op. cit.
25. Cf. Marx's remark
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like
nightmare on the brain of the living.
(Opening remarks to "Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte").
26. Cf. n. 13 above, such an aspiration could be attributed
to Wittgenstein and form the basis for a reading of him
as a social critic. Cf. both his major works, Tractatus
Logico Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations.
CHAPTER SIX
1. This poverty is a constant theme of the structuralist
anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss. Unfortunately he
conceives it to be an essential feature of man's con¬
dition. I rather regard it as a historical feature
of present society and hence as an indictment of that
society. Cf. The Savage Mind, especially the conclud¬
ing chapters, where Levi-Strauss articulates his rad¬
ically anti-historical viewpoint.
2. It is intriguing to conceive of this reality as an 'ally'
in terms discussed by Carlos Casteneda, The Teachings of
Don Juan. Cf. David Silverman, Reading Casteneda.
3. Cf. Dawe, op. cit.
4. Cf. Rosen, op. cit.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
1. Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary.
2. The notion of authenticity here is intended to be in
accordance with Heidegger's usage throughout Being and
Time.
3. Though it cannot be attempted here, an examination of
the expletive in the light of Derrida's discussion of
'presence' would be intriguing. It would appear that in
some way the twin notions of the enduring and the immed¬
iate represent the polar opposites of extra-ordinary and
dis-orderly speech. Cf. his Speech and Phenomena.
4. This accusation has often been levelled against
Heidegger. I prefer to level it against Durkheim, whose
sociology celebrates the transcendent dis-order of anomie,
which defines its own stance. Cf. Suicide.
5. Garfinkel has accused all previous sociology of portray¬
ing man as a 'judgemental dope', denying him the abil¬
ity to interpret his situation. I have tried to show
the limitations of his alternative vision, of man as
sociologist, which makes of him a philosophical dope.
The conception of man as theorist has been discussed as
a feature of everyday life by McHugh in his "Commonsense
conception of deviance", op. cit.
6. Cf. Melvin Pollner, who discusses this production in the
case of 'deviance' in his paper, 0£. cit.
7. Cf. Chapter Five, "Somebody Talking", above.
8. This would be the starting point for a critique of Rosen's
extra-ordinary attribution of nihilism to ordinary speech.
Cf. Rosen, op>. cit.
9. This dialectic is explored by McHugh et al in "Snubs".
10. TSEO, pp 88-9.
11. Compare the response made by another teacher when this
issue was raised in his class at around the same time:
Russell: Sir, are you going on strike, 'cos Mr.
Howie says the teachers are having a union
meeting.
Sinclair: February 28th.
Mr. Harris: I don't belong to a union. I belong to a
professional association.
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Like Mr. Howie, this teacher treated the question add¬
ressed to 'you' as an occasion to switch to extra¬
ordinary speech. Unlike Mr. Howie1s attempt at such
speech, however, Mr. Harris' remark questioned the ques¬
tion addressed to him. (Cf. the Experimenter's questions
in Garfinkel's conversation discussed in chapter two,
"Anomie", above). Thus having established his extra¬
ordinary position, he placed the onus on the boys to re¬
open their questioning if they chose to do so.
12. Garfinkel, SIE, chapter one, and also H. Garfinkel &
H. Sacks, "On Formal Structures of Practical Action".
13. This distinction between the one reality and the many
appearances is the theme of Blum's Theorising.
14. Cf. Mentone's remark to Mr. Howie discussed in Chapter
Six, "Philosophical Speech" above, and also his contrib¬
ution to the conversation reported in "Why don't you
get a bit of order in the class?" below.
15. The nature of this 'servitude' is explored by Hegel in
his account of the Master/Slave relationship in the
Phenomenology of Mind.
16. Garfinkel, SIE, p. 1 .•
17. SSA, p. 93.
CHAPTER EIGHT
1. Don Zimmerman & Melvyn Pollner, "The Everyday World as
a Phenomenon".
2. Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena is an effort to do
so by way of an examination of Husserl's explicit account
of language in his Logical Investigations, which I must
acknowledge as the inspiration behind my own attempt to
sketch a re-examination of the Ideas and the Cartesian
Meditations.
3. Naturally this attempt must be somewhat rough and ready
in view of the fact that it is working with an English
translation from the German.
4. ID, Section 27, p. 91.
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5. ibid., Section 29, PP 94-5.
6. ibid., Section 32, PP 99-100.
7. ibid., Section 46, p. 130.
8. ibid., p. 131.
9. CM, Section 8, P • 21.
10. ibid., Section 44, P. 95.
11. ibid., pp 95-6.
12. ibid., Section 54, P. 119.
13 . ibid., Section 55, PP 120-121.
14. ibid., p. 123.
15. ibid., Section 56, P- 128.
16. ibid., pp 129-130.
17. ibid., p. 130.
18. ibid., p. 140.
19. This is not, of course , to claim iat the present state¬
ment is the first to articulate such a critique. On
the contrary, Heidegger's discussion of 'phenomenology'
in section 7 of Being and Time, and Derrida's markedly
Heideggerian critique of Husserl's account of language,
are the inspiration for my own argument which should be
seen as a response to and a restatement of their argu¬
ments. I hope, however, that it is a suggestive restate¬
ment, which may make the critique accessible in a res-
earchable form.
CONCLUSION
1. SIE, chapter three.
2. This is intentionally evocative of Lacan, op. cit.
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3. This concern is suggested by the Tel Quel writers, inc¬
luding Derrida, who place writing as superior to speech.
I am here advocating the reverse. Cf. my "Sociology as
Writing".
4. Chambers' Twentieth Century Dictionary.
5. ibid.
6. This distinction matches that in Schutz between the
directness of the pure we-relationship on the one hand,
and indirect typifying social relationships on the other
hand. My distinction between ordinary and extra-ordinary
speech then corresponds precisely to that between lived
experience and reflective thought in Sartre and Schutz.
My commitment is then to the equivalent in this scheme
of lived experience over reflective thought, that is, to
speech over writing, in the belief that here the true
impetus of the phenomenological movement can be recapt¬
ured .
7. This conception resonates with the dialectical account
of the ego/alter relationship given by McHugh et al,
discussed at n. 1, Chapter Five above, but also with
the accounts of the interpersonal encounter given by
Schutz and by Sartre, where in each case there is a sense
in which the other apprehends me more truly than I app¬
rehend myself.
8. This however suggests that there is no need to restrict
the argument to phenomenology: it could be worked out
through any one of the discourses available in our soc¬
iety at the present time. An imposing task would be to




The following abbreviations have been used:
BN Sartre: Being and Nothingness
CM Husserl: Cartesian Meditations
CP Schutz: Collected Papers
DS Laing: Divided Self
DSW Schutz: Dimensions of the Social World
ID Husserl: Ideas
IP Husserl: Idea of Phenomenology
OMR Schutz: On Multiple Realities
PE laing: Politics of Experience
PSW Schutz: Phenomenology of the Social World
RG Garfinkel: Studies in the Routine Grounds of Everyday
Activities
SIE Garfinkel: Studies in Ethnomethodology
SO Laing: Self and Others
SSA Parsons: Structure of Social Action
TE Sartre: Transcendence of the Ego
TSEO Weber: Theory of Social and Economic Organisation
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